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Abstract	
	Separating	causation	from	correlation	in	empirical	studies	is	crucial	for	drawing	the	right	conclusions	 for	 social-policy	 development.	 In	 the	 last	 decade,	 the	 emergence	 of	increasingly	 sophisticated	 econometric	 techniques	 has	 opened	 up	 new	 ways	 to	 draw	causal	inferences	in	studies	analysing	observational	data.	This	thesis	contains	four	papers	employing	 such	 techniques	 to	 answer	 important	 research	 questions	 in	 three	 different	areas	of	social	policy:	education,	health,	and	immigration.						The	 first	 paper	 analyses	 the	 impact	 of	 retirement	 on	mental	 health	 in	 ten	European	countries.	 It	 exploits	 thresholds	 created	 by	 state-pension	 ages	 in	 an	 individual-fixed	effects	 instrumental-variable	 set-up,	 borrowing	 intuitions	 from	 the	 regression-discontinuity	 design	 literature,	 to	 deal	 with	 endogeneity	 in	 retirement	 behaviour.	 The	results	display	no	short-term	effects	of	retirement	on	mental	health,	but	a	large	negative	longer-term	 impact.	 This	 impact	 survives	 a	 battery	 of	 robustness	 tests,	 and	 applies	 to	women	and	men	as	well	as	people	of	different	educational	and	occupational	backgrounds	similarly.	The	findings	suggest	that	reforms	inducing	people	to	postpone	retirement	are	not	only	 important	 for	making	pension	systems	solvent,	but	with	 time	could	also	pay	a	mental-health	dividend	among	the	elderly	and	reduce	public	health-care	costs.						The	second	paper	studies	whether	 independent-school	 competition	 involves	a	 trade-off	 between	 pupil	 wellbeing	 and	 academic	 performance.	 To	 test	 this	 hypothesis,	 it	analyses	data	covering	pupils	across	the	OECD,	exploiting	historical	Catholic	opposition	to	state	 schooling	 for	 exogenous	 variation	 in	 independent-school	 enrolment	 shares.	 The	paper	 finds	 that	 independent-school	 competition	 decreases	 pupil	 wellbeing	 but	 raises	achievement	and	lowers	educational	costs.	The	analysis	and	balancing	tests	indicate	these	findings	 are	 causal.	 In	 addition,	 it	 finds	 several	 mechanisms	 behind	 the	 trade-off,	including	more	traditional	teaching	and	stronger	parental	achievement	pressure.						The	third	paper	analyses	the	impact	of	refugee	inflows	on	voter	turnout	in	Sweden	in	a	period	when	 shifting	 immigration	 patterns	made	 the	 previously	 homogeneous	 country	increasingly	 heterogeneous.	 Analysing	 individual-level	 panel	 data	 and	 exploiting	 a	national	 refugee	 placement	 programme	 to	 obtain	 plausibly	 exogenous	 variation	 in	immigration,	 it	 finds	 that	 refugee	 inflows	 significantly	 raise	 the	 probability	 of	 voter	turnout.	Balancing	tests	on	initial	turnout	as	well	as	placebo	tests	regressing	changes	in	turnout	on	future	refugee	inflows	support	the	causal	 interpretation	of	our	findings.	The	
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results	are	consistent	with	group-threat	theory,	which	predicts	that	increased	out-group	presence	spurs	political	mobilisation	among	in-group	members.						The	 fourth	 paper	 investigates	 the	 impact	 of	 adult	 education	 and	 training	 (AET)	 on	employment	outcomes	in	Sweden.	Exploiting	unusually	rich	data	from	the	Programme	for	the	 International	 Assessment	 of	 Adult	 Competencies	 and	 using	 an	 inverse-probability	weighted	 regression-adjustment	 estimator	 to	deal	with	 selection	bias,	 it	 finds	 that	AET	raises	the	probability	of	doing	paid	work	by	4	percentage	points	on	average.	This	impact	is	 entirely	 driven	 by	 non-formal,	 job-related	 AET,	 such	 as	 workshops	 and	 on-the-job	training.	The	paper	also	finds	that	the	effect	–	which	increases	with	training	intensity	–	is	very	 similar	 across	 different	 types	 of	 non-formal,	 job-related	 AET.	 Specification	 and	robustness	 tests	 indicate	 the	 estimates	 are	 causal.	 The	 results	 suggest	 that	 policies	stimulating	 relevant	AET	 take-up	have	promise	as	 a	way	 to	 secure	higher	 employment	rates	in	the	future.		
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1. Introduction		Separating	causation	from	correlation	in	empirical	studies	is	crucial	for	drawing	the	right	conclusions	for	social	policy.	To	do	so,	the	key	is	to	obtain	variation	in	the	independent	variable	of	interest	that	is	not	itself	affected	by	the	dependent	variable	and	is	not	related	to	other	factors	–	observable	or	unobservable	–	that	in	turn	affect	the	dependent	variable.	Without	 research	 that	 establishes	 a	 causal	 connection	 between	 interventions	 and	outcomes,	it	is	impossible	to	know	their	effects,	thus	hampering	the	advancement	of	cost-effective	policy.	 Indeed,	crafting	social	policy	without	access	 to	empirical	research	 from	which	it	is	possible	to	draw	causal	inferences	could	be	described	as	tantamount	to	taking	a	leap	in	the	dark.						Yet	this	is	often	not	reflected	in	policy	development.	One	reason	for	this	is	simply	the	studies	that	have	been	available	to	policymakers;	historically,	social-policy	research	has	generally	 not	 utilised	 rigorous	 impact-evaluation	 methods.	 This	 became	 especially	evident	after	the	EPI	Centre,	established	at	the	Institute	of	Education	to	map	social-policy	research,	published	the	results	of	systematic	reviews	of	such	research	in	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000s.	The	goal	was	to	create	a	database	of	studies	from	the	1940s	onwards	to	inform	 policy	 development	 in	 the	 field,	 in	 a	 way	 similar	 to	 what	 the	 Cochrane	Collaboration	previously	had	done	in	medicine.	However,	the	results	were	disappointing:	one	review	revealed	that	only	2.5	per	cent	of	thousands	of	studies	could	be	classified	as	methodologically	 sound.	 Furthermore,	 the	 review	 found	 that	 studies	 using	 stronger	methodologies	 were	 less	 likely	 to	 find	 a	 positive	 impact	 of	 the	 interventions	 under	investigation.	 In	 other	words,	 there	was	 a	 correlation	 between	 optimistic	 findings	 and	lower-quality	methodology	 (Oakley	et	al.	2005).	Thus,	an	 important	 reason	why	strong	empirical	social-policy	research	has	not	been	used	broadly	in	policymaking	is	likely	to	be	the	lack	of	such	research	in	a	historical	perspective.						However,	another	reason	is	that	politicians	have	often	chosen	to	rely	on	research	that	is	 insufficient	 from	 a	 causal	 standpoint	 because	 it	 happens	 to	 support	 their	 policies.	Rather	 than	 shaping	policy	 after	 robust	 evidence,	 there	has	been	a	 tendency	 to	 exploit	evidence	 –	 irrespective	 of	 quality	 –	 that	 supports	 the	 policy.	 An	 important	 example	concerns	 education.	 With	 the	 emergence	 of	 large-scale	 international	 surveys,	 it	 has	become	easier	than	ever	to	benchmark	countries	against	each	other	in	terms	of	test-score	performance.	This,	in	turn,	has	enabled	policymakers	to	engage	in	‘policy	borrowing’	by	
12		
attempting	 to	 copy	practices	 from	high-performing	 countries,	 often	 supported	by	high-profile	case	studies	in	the	area	(e.g.	Sahlberg	2014;	Tucker	2011).	An	interesting	example	of	such	policy	borrowing	is	displayed	by	Scotland’s	education	reforms	in	the	early	2000s,	which	 were	 partly	 justified	 by	 comparisons	 with	 the	 Finnish	 education	 system.	 For	example,	 an	 important	 reform	 in	 2003	 abolished	 statutory	 standardised	 tests	 and	 the	associated	league	tables	among	pupils	aged	5–14	(Peterkin	2003;	Scott	2003),	the	lack	of	which	is	a	feature	of	the	current	Finnish	system	that	is	often	highlighted	internationally	(see	 Heller-Sahlgren	 2015).	 Indeed,	 the	 decisions	 taken	 by	 the	 Scottish	 government	‘reflect[ed]	similar	decisions	in	countries	such	as	Finland	where	age	and	stage	testing	is	limited	to	the	final	two	years	of	secondary	education’	(Scottish	Labour	2014,	p.	23).	More	generally,	policymakers	worldwide	have	sought	 lessons	 from	the	OECD’s	 (2016)	report	on	 policies	 and	 practices	 that	 correlate	 with	 higher	 education	 performance	 cross-nationally.						Yet	such	an	approach	 is	risky.	This	 is	because	case	studies	of	what	countries	do	–	as	well	as	high-level	cross-national	correlations	–	can	mislead	us	in	understanding	how	the	policies	of	interest	contribute	to	pupil	performance.	There	are	many	differences	between	countries	 that	 may	 explain	 differences	 in	 both	 policy	 and	 outcomes.	 For	 this	 reason,	policies	 that	 are	 present	 in	 high-performing	 countries,	 or	 are	 positively	 related	 to	performance,	 may	 have	 a	 negative	 causal	 impact,	 while,	 vice	 versa,	 policies	 that	 are	present	in	low-performing	countries,	or	are	negatively	related	to	performance,	may	have	a	 positive	 causal	 effect.	 For	 example,	with	 respect	 to	 Finland,	 research	moving	 beyond	high-level	 correlations	suggests	 that	 factors	often	attributed	 to	 the	country’s	 success	 in	international	 surveys,	 including	 the	 lack	 of	 standardised	 testing	 and	 league	 tables,	 are	negative	for	pupil	performance	in	such	surveys	(e.g.	Bergbauer	et	al.	2018;	Burgess	et	al.	2013;	Heller-Sahlgren	2015).	Interestingly,	Scottish	pupils’	performance	has	also	fallen	in	domestic	and	international	sample-based	tests	in	the	past	decades,	following	the	reforms	(IEA	 2018;	 OECD	 2016;	 SSLN	 2017).	 While	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 attribute	 the	 falling	performance	 to	 the	 reduction	 of	 standardised	 testing	 and	 abolition	 of	 league	 tables	without	 proper	 research,	 it	 is	 consistent	with	 the	more	 rigorous	 evidence	 that	 already	exists	 on	 the	 topic	 –	 and	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 less	 rigorous	 evidence.	 And,	 in	 fact,	following	 intense	 debate	 about	 Scotland’s	 declining	 performance,	 the	 government	responded	by	re-introducing	national	testing	for	pupils	aged	5–14	(McIvor	2017).	
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					With	 respect	 to	 the	 OECD’s	 education	 analyses:	 while	 its	 reports	 are	 full	 of	 caveats	regarding	causal	inference	in	the	small	print,	the	organisation’s	conclusions	often	ignore	these	caveats.	An	important	 illustration	of	 this	tendency	is	 the	organisation’s	claim	that	‘there	 is	 no	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 [independent]	 schools	 help	 to	 raise	 the	 level	 of	performance	of	 the	 school	 system,	as	a	whole’	 (OECD	2011,	p.	4).	More	 recently,	 it	has	also	 claimed	 that	 the	 evidence	 in	 this	 respect	 is	 ‘unclear’	 since	 ‘PISA	 shows	 no	relationship	between	competition	and	results	in	cross-country	comparisons’	(OECD	2019,	p.	92).	While	both	statements	hold	true	in	the	organisation’s	own	analyses,	which	consist	of	unadjusted	correlations	between	countries’	independent-school	enrolment	shares	and	their	 average	 performances,	 this	 is	 not	 particularly	 informative	 given	 the	 potential	 for	bias	 in	such	analyses.	 Indeed,	more	rigorous	research	suggests	that	 independent-school	competition	 –	 as	 captured	 by	 the	 independent-school	 enrolment	 shares	 at	 the	 country	level	–	has	causal	positive	effects	on	PISA	scores	at	the	system	level	(see	Heller-Sahlgren	2018;	 West	 and	 Woessmann	 2010).1	Yet	 by	 drawing	 conclusions	 from	 simple	 cross-country	 correlations,	 and	 ignoring	 the	academic	 research	on	 the	 subject,	 the	OECD	has	contributed	to	misinterpretations	of	the	evidence	in	the	policy	community	worldwide	in	terms	of	the	system-level	impact	of	school	competition	in	international	surveys.						Perhaps	 even	 more	 conspicuously,	 the	 organisation	 has	 advised	 the	 Swedish	government	 that	 ‘school	 choice	 and	 competition	 likely	 weakened	 school	 performance	over	 time	 [in	 Sweden’s	 compulsory	 education	 sector]’	 (OECD	 2019,	 p.	 76),	 as	 the	country’s	 results	 in	 international	 tests	 have	 fallen	 in	 the	 same	 period	 as	 choice	 and	competition	were	introduced.	This	is	despite	the	fact	that	the	strongest	available	research	analysing	the	effects	of	these	particular	reforms,	on	domestic	performance	metrics	as	well	as	international	test	scores,	points	in	the	opposite	direction	(Böhlmark	and	Lindahl	2015;	Edmark	et	al.	2014;	Wondratschek	et	al.	2013).	In	other	words,	by	ignoring	the	academic	evidence	on	 the	 topic	 in	 favour	of	a	simple	correlation	between	 the	 introduction	of	 the	reforms	 and	 changes	 in	 performance,	 the	 OECD	 has	 confused	 politicians	 seeking	 to	pursue	evidence-based	policy.						Overall,	there	is	thus	little	doubt	that	a	lack	of	methodologically	sound	research,	and	a	refusal	to	utilise	such	research	in	policymaking,	hamper	the	development	of	social	policy	that	 is	 fit	 for	purpose.	As	noted,	 the	key	aspect	of	methodologically	 sound	quantitative																																																									1	Note	 that	 this	 conclusion	 is	 valid	 for	 research	 analysing	 system-level	 effects	 of	 independent-school	competition	on	international	test	scores	specifically;	the	broader	literature	on	the	effects	of	competition	and	independent	schools	is	more	mixed	(see	Heller-Sahlgren	2013).	
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research	is	that	it	in	one	way	or	the	other	obtains	variation	in	the	independent	variable	of	interest	 that	 is	not	 itself	 affected	by	 the	dependent	variable	and	 is	not	 related	 to	other	factors	–	observable	or	unobservable	–	that	affect	the	dependent	variable.	Traditionally,	such	variation	has	often	been	obtained	by	running	randomised	trials,	which	remain	the	supposed	 ‘gold	 standard’	 of	 policy-relevant	 research.	 Certainly,	 randomised	 trials	 are	important	 tools	 in	 obtaining	 internally-valid	 estimates	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 policy-relevant	interventions,	but	they	are	not	free	from	weaknesses	(see	Deaton	and	Cartwright	2018).	For	example,	it	is	often	difficult	to	obtain	sufficiently	large	and	diverse	samples	to	obtain	high	external	validity	in	the	findings,	which	in	turn	decreases	their	significance	for	policy	purposes.	Also,	they	are	often	expensive	and	in	some	areas	too	politically	sensitive	to	be	a	viable	option,	especially	when	studying	systemwide	structural	interventions.						Fortunately,	 in	 the	 last	 decade,	 the	 emergence	 of	 ‘big	 data’	 and	 increasingly	sophisticated	econometric	techniques	has	opened	up	new	ways	to	draw	causal	inferences	also	in	observational	studies	(see	Angrist	and	Piscke	2009).	However,	these	opportunities	are	yet	to	be	exploited	widely	in	social-policy	research,	which	this	thesis	seeks	to	partly	rectify.	 To	 do	 so,	 the	 thesis	 presents	 four	 papers	 employing	 different	 econometric	techniques	 to	 answer	 important	 questions	 in	 three	 areas	 of	 social	 policy:	 education,	health,	and	immigration.	In	doing	so,	the	thesis	not	only	makes	a	significant	contribution	to	 the	 literature	 in	 each	 of	 the	 specific	 areas	 under	 investigation,	 but,	 by	 exploiting	different	datasets	and	methods,	it	highlights	how	recent	methodological	advances	can	be	applied	to	draw	causal	conclusions	in	social-policy	research	more	generally.	In	this	sense,	it	informs	both	researchers	in	the	respective	fields	and	policymakers	seeking	to	develop	effective	policy.						The	 second	chapter	–	 ‘Retirement	Blues’	 –	 studies	 the	 short-	 and	 long-run	 impact	of	retirement	 on	 mental	 health	 in	 Europe,	 using	 the	 Survey	 of	 Health,	 Ageing,	 and	Retirement	in	Europe.	Decreasing	labour-force	participation	rates	have	put	pressure	on	the	 sustainability	 of	 pension	 systems	 in	many	 developed	 countries,	 while	 depressing	savings	rates	and	investment	levels.	Politicians	have	thus	begun	to	reform	state-pension	systems	to	incentivise	the	elderly	to	postpone	retirement,	for	example	by	increasing	the	regular	retirement	age	at	which	state-pension	benefits	may	be	drawn.	However,	 these	policies	 may	 have	 unintended	 consequences,	 which	 must	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 to	understand	 the	 reforms’	 total	 utility.	One	 such	 issue	 concerns	 how	 retirement	 affects	
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mental	 health,	 which	 has	 become	 an	 increasingly	 important	 policy	 goal	 in	 the	 past	decades.						To	 analyse	 this	 issue,	 the	 chapter	 exploits	 an	 individual-fixed	 effects	 instrumental	variable	 design,	 combined	 with	 intuitions	 borrowed	 from	 the	 regression-discontinuity	literature,	 using	 state-pension	 thresholds	 as	 instruments	 to	 separate	 causation	 from	correlation.	 It	 is	 the	 first	paper	 to	do	so	 in	a	 framework	 that	 separates	 the	short-	 from	longer-run	effects.	Its	headline	finding	is	that	retirement	has	no	impact	on	mental	health	in	 the	 short	 run,	 but	 a	 large	 negative	 longer-term	 effect.	 The	 study	 thus	 contributes	significantly	to	our	understanding	of	the	effects	of	retirement,	while	also	combining	and	highlighting	methodological	innovations	that	could	be	used	in	other	areas	of	social-policy	research.						The	 third	 chapter	 –	 ‘Smart	 but	 Unhappy:	 Independent-school	 Competition	 and	 the	Wellbeing-efficiency	 Trade-off	 in	 Education’	 –	 analyses	 whether	 independent-school	competition	 involves	 a	 trade-off	 between	 pupil	 wellbeing	 and	 academic	 performance.	While	educational	theory	assumes	that	wellbeing	and	academic	achievement	go	hand	in	hand,	 there	 is	 little	 empirical	 evidence	 supporting	 this	 assumption.	 It	 is	 crucial	 for	policymakers	to	understand	whether	education	interventions	involve	trade-offs	between	these	goals,	and,	using	international	pupil-level	data	from	34	OECD	countries,	the	chapter	provides	 new	 evidence	 of	 relevance	 in	 this	 respect	 to	 independent-school	 competition	specifically	 –	 the	 general	 effects	 of	 which	 have	 become	 a	 fiercely	 debated	 topic	worldwide.						To	obtain	conditionally	exogenous	variation	in	independent-school	competition	at	the	country	level,	the	chapter	builds	on	and	further	develops	an	instrument	based	on	Catholic	resistance	 to	 state	 schooling	 in	 the	 late	 19th	 and	 early	 20th	 centuries	 to	 predict	enrolment	shares	in	independently-operated	schools	today.	It	also	analyses	whether	the	assumption	of	conditional	exogeneity	holds,	including	by	using	balancing	tests	on	pupil-background	 characteristics.	 The	 study’s	 headline	 finding	 is	 that	 independent-school	competition	decreases	pupil	wellbeing	but	raises	achievement	and	 lowers	educational	costs.	In	addition,	 it	 finds	several	mechanisms	behind	the	results	and	hence	the	trade-off,	 including	more	 traditional	 teaching	 and	 stronger	 parental	 achievement	 pressure.	Overall,	the	paper	thus	breaks	new	ground	in	the	study	of	markets	in	education	–	but	also	displays	 how	 historical	 events	 and	 large	 datasets	 can	 be	 exploited	 to	 obtain	 causal	estimates	in	social	policy	more	generally.	
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					The	 fourth	 chapter	 –	 ‘Group	 Threat	 and	 Voter	 Turnout:	 Evidence	 from	 a	 Refugee	Placement	 Programme’	 –	 analyses	 the	 effects	 of	 refugee	 inflows	 on	 voter	 turnout	 in	Sweden	 in	 a	 period	 when	 shifting	 immigration	 patterns	 made	 the	 previously	homogeneous	country	increasingly	heterogeneous.	One	important	possible	consequence	of	 immigration	 could	 be	 altered	 political	 engagement	 among	 natives.	 However,	 the	identification	 problems	 involved	 in	 analysing	 the	 causal	 impact	 of	 immigration	 on	political	 outcomes	 are	 severe	 because	 of	 potential	 endogeneity	 in	 settlement	 and	mobility	patterns	–	 among	both	 immigrants	 and	natives	–	 as	well	 as	other	 sources	of	unobserved	heterogeneity.	This	study	addresses	these	problems	by	analysing	individual-level	 panel	 data	 and	 exploiting	 a	 national	 refugee	 placement	 programme	 to	 obtain	variation	 in	 refugee	 inflows	 that	 is	 free	 from	 bias	 due	 to	 endogenous	 settlement	 and	mobility	 patterns,	 and,	 once	 adjusting	 for	 municipal-fixed	 effects,	 also	 plausibly	exogenous	to	changes	in	individual-level	turnout	more	generally.						The	 chapter	 finds	 that	 refugee	 inflows	 significantly	 raise	 the	 probability	 of	 voter	turnout.	 The	 results	 are	 consistent	 with	 group-threat	 theory,	 which	 predicts	 that	increased	 out-group	 presence	 should	 spur	 political	 mobilisation	 among	 in-group	members.	Balancing	tests	on	initial	turnout	as	well	as	placebo	tests	regressing	changes	in	turnout	on	future	refugee	inflows	support	the	causal	interpretation	of	the	findings.	Given	the	 relative	 scarcity	 of	 convincing	 research	 on	 the	 relevance	 of	 group	 threat	 for	understanding	 individual-level	 voter	 turnout	 in	 general,	 the	 paper	 provides	 an	important	contribution	to	the	literature	of	how	real-world	demographic	changes	affect	political	 engagement.	More	 generally,	 it	 highlights	 how	 the	 combination	 of	 individual-level	 panel	 data	 and	 a	 natural	 experiment	 may	 be	 exploited	 to	 get	 around	 difficult	endogeneity	problems	in	social-policy	research.						The	 fifth	 chapter	 –	 ‘Lifelong	 Learning	 and	 Employment	 Outcomes:	 Evidence	 from	Sweden’	–	investigates	the	impact	of	adult	education	and	training	(AET)	on	employment	outcomes	 in	 Sweden.	 It	 is	 plausible	 that	 AET	 could	 help	 promote	 the	 knowledge	 and	skills	necessary	for	ensuring	high	employment	and	productivity	levels	in	the	future.	Yet	most	 existing	 research	 uses	 linear	 regression	methods	 that	 ignore	 possible	 selection	bias	 and	 does	 not	 analyse	 the	 effects	 of	 different	 types	 of	 AET	 separately.	 Exploiting	data	from	the	Programme	for	the	International	Assessment	of	Adult	Competencies,	this	paper	 adjusts	 for	 an	 unusually	 large	 number	 of	 important	 observable	 characteristics,	including	cognitive	skills,	formal	education	levels,	and	work	history.	Combined	with	an	
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inverse-probability	 weighted	 regression-adjustment	 estimator	 –	 which	 assumes	 that	assignment	 to	 AET	 is	 as	 good	 as	 random	 conditional	 on	 the	 covariates,	 but	 does	 not	make	 assumptions	 about	 the	 functional	 form	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 those	covariates	and	the	outcome	analysed	–	this	increases	the	probability	that	the	estimates	reflect	a	causal	impact.						The	chapter	finds	that	AET	raises	the	probability	of	doing	paid	work,	an	impact	that	is	entirely	 driven	 by	 non-formal,	 job-related	 AET,	 such	 as	 workshops	 and	 on-the-job	training.	 It	also	finds	that	the	effect	–	which	increases	with	training	intensity	–	 is	very	similar	across	different	types	of	non-formal,	job-related	AET.	Although	it	is	not	possible	to	conclusively	rule	out	omitted-variable	bias,	several	tests	suggest	this	is	not	a	serious	problem	for	the	 findings.	Overall,	 the	paper	thus	provides	 important	new	evidence	on	the	 effects	 of	 AET	 on	 employment	 outcomes	 and	 illustrates	 how	 social-policy	researchers	 can	 separate	 causation	 from	 correlation	 when	 no	 quasi-experimental	variation	 is	available,	or	when	such	quasi-experimental	variation	 is	not	relevant	 for	 the	population	of	interest.						Finally,	the	thesis	concludes	with	a	summary	of	the	papers’	findings	and	a	discussion	of	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	the	methods	utilised,	and	the	papers	more	generally,	while	also	providing	directions	 for	 future	research	and	considering	the	studies’	policy	implications.	Apart	from	providing	significant	contributions	to	the	literature	in	each	of	the	separate	areas	under	investigation,	by	studying	different	questions	of	relevance	to	social	policy	and	employing	different	econometric	techniques,	with	different	strengths	and	 weaknesses,	 the	 thesis	 provides	 important	 case	 studies	 of	 how	 recent	 scientific	advances	can	be	exploited	to	obtain	causal	estimates	–	given	different	contexts	and	data	availability	 –	 in	 the	 social-policy	 field	 specifically.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 hopes	 to	 aid	 the	development	of	more	evidence-based	social	policy	worldwide.		 	
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2. Retirement	Blues*†	
	
Published	in	the	Journal	of	Health	Economics,	Vol.	54,	July	2017,	pp.	66–78.	
	
Abstract		This	paper	analyses	the	short-	and	longer-term	effects	of	retirement	on	mental	health	in	ten	 European	 countries.	 It	 exploits	 thresholds	 created	 by	 state-pension	 ages	 in	 an	individual-fixed	 effects	 instrumental-variable	 set-up,	 borrowing	 intuitions	 from	 the	regression-discontinuity	 design	 literature,	 to	 deal	 with	 endogeneity	 in	 retirement	behaviour.	The	results	display	no	short-term	effects	of	retirement	on	mental	health,	but	a	large	negative	longer-term	impact.	This	impact	survives	a	battery	of	robustness	tests,	and	 applies	 to	 women	 and	 men	 as	 well	 as	 people	 of	 different	 educational	 and	occupational	backgrounds	similarly.	Overall,	the	findings	suggest	that	reforms	inducing	people	 to	 postpone	 retirement	 are	 not	 only	 important	 for	 making	 pension	 systems	solvent,	but	with	 time	could	also	pay	a	mental	health	dividend	among	the	elderly	and	reduce	public	health	care	costs.				
																																																								*	This	study	uses	data	from	SHARE	wave	1	and	2,	release	2.5.0,	as	of	24th	May	2011,	and	SHARE	wave	4	release	 1.0.0,	 as	 of	 30th	November	 2012.	 The	 SHARE	 data	 collection	 has	 been	 primarily	 funded	 by	 the	European	 Commission	 through	 the	 5th	 framework	 programme	 (project	 QLK6-CT-2001-	 00360	 in	 the	thematic	programme	Quality	of	Life),	through	the	6th	framework	programme	(projects	SHARE-I3,	RII-CT-	2006-062193,	COMPARE,	CIT5-	CT-2005-028857,	and	SHARELIFE,	CIT4-CT-2006-028812)	and	through	the	 7th	 framework	 programme	 (SHARE-PREP,	 211909	 and	 SHARE-LEAP,	 227822).	 Additional	 funding	from	 the	 US	 National	 Institute	 on	 Aging	 (U01	 AG09740-13S2,	 P01	 AG005842,	 P01	 AG08291,	 P30	AG12815,	 Y1-AG-4553-01	 and	OGHA	 04-	 064,	 IAG	 BSR06-11,	 R21	 AG025169)	 as	well	 as	 from	 various	national	 sources	 is	 gratefully	 acknowledged	 (see	 www.share-project.org	 for	 a	 full	 list	 of	 funding	institutions).	†	The	 author	 thanks	 Henrik	 Jordahl,	 Julian	 Le	 Grand,	 Ellen	 Meara,	 Olmo	 Silva,	 and	 two	 anonymous	referees	for	useful	comments	and	discussions.	
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2.1. Introduction		In	 the	 post-World	 War	 II	 period,	 the	 combination	 of	 increasing	 life	 expectancy,	decreasing	 fertility	 rates,	 and	 the	 normalisation	 of	 old-age	 retirement	 has	 induced	lower	 overall	 labour-force	 participation	 rates	 in	 developed	 countries.	 The	 rise	 of	retirement	was	in	turn	in	large	part	due	to	incentives	built	into	public	pension	systems,	which	have	induced	people	to	exit	the	labour	market	voluntarily	(e.g.	Gruber	and	Wise	1999,	 2004;	 Hurd	 et	 al.	 2012).	 Decreasing	 labour-force	 participation	 rates	 have	 put	pressure	on	 the	sustainability	of	pension	systems,	while	depressing	savings	 rates	and	investment	levels.	Politicians	have	begun	to	reform	state-pension	systems	to	incentivise	the	elderly	to	postpone	retirement,	for	example	by	increasing	the	official	retirement	age	at	which	state-pension	benefits	may	be	drawn.						However,	 these	 policies	may	 have	 unintended	 consequences,	which	must	 be	 taken	into	 account	 to	 understand	 the	 reforms’	 total	 utility.	 One	 such	 issue	 concerns	 how	retirement	 affects	mental	 health.	 In	 the	 past	 decades,	 public	 policy	 has	 become	more	concerned	 with	 improving	 people’s	 wellbeing	 in	 general.	 Thus,	 if	 retirement	 has	 a	positive	impact	on	mental	health,	attempts	to	increase	the	effective	retirement	age	may	thwart	this	policy	goal,	while	possibly	also	leading	to	higher	sick-leave	rates	and	rising	health	 expenditures.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 retirement	 has	 negative	 effects	 on	mental	health,	 policymakers	who	 seek	 to	 incentivise	 people	 to	 postpone	 retirement	 could,	 if	they	 are	 successful,	 produce	 a	 virtuous	 circle	 in	 which	 public	 pensions	 systems	 are	made	 sustainable,	 health	 expenditures	 decreased,	 and	 mental	 health	 among	 the	population	improved.						Previous	 research	 analysing	 health	 effects	 of	 retirement	 yields	 mixed	 results,	possibly	 reflecting	 both	 methodological	 choices	 and	 a	 general	 failure	 to	 distinguish	between	short-	and	longer-term	effects.	This	study	investigates	the	impact	of	retirement	on	 mental	 health	 in	 Europe	 in	 both	 a	 short-	 and	 longer-term	 perspective.	 Utilising	several	 waves	 of	 panel	 data	 from	 the	 Survey	 of	 Health,	 Ageing,	 and	 Retirement	 in	Europe	covering	ten	European	countries,	it	exploits	thresholds	created	by	state-pension	ages	 in	 an	 individual-fixed	 effects	 instrumental-variable	 (FE-IV)	 set-up,	 borrowing	intuitions	 from	 the	 regression-discontinuity	 design	 (RDD)	 literature,	 to	 deal	 with	endogeneity	 in	 retirement	 behaviour.	 The	 idea	 is	 that	 these	 thresholds	 create	 strong	economic	incentives	to	retire	once	crossed,	but	should	not	affect	mental	health	in	other	ways	once	age	effects	are	held	constant	in	a	flexible	way.	Previous	research	has	utilised	
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similar	strategies	–	most	often	finding	positive	or	zero	short-term	effects	of	retirement	on	mental	health	–	but	tends	to	ignore	common	pitfalls	that	threaten	their	validity	and	the	 possibility	 that	 the	 effects	 of	 retirement	 are	 not	 instant.	 To	 the	 best	 of	 our	knowledge,	this	paper	is	the	first	to	analyse	both	short-	and	longer-term,	lagged	effects	of	retirement	on	mental	health	 in	a	set-up	exploiting	age-dependent	discontinuities	to	predict	retirement.						The	results	display	no	short-term	impact	of	retirement	on	mental	health,	but	strong	negative	effects	that	become	apparent	a	couple	of	years	following	the	event.	The	longer-term	effect	does	not	differ	between	men	and	women,	or	between	people	with	different	educational	 and	 occupational	 backgrounds.	 It	 also	 survives	 a	 battery	 of	 robustness	tests,	which	 include	 analyses	 of	 narrower	 age	windows	 and	using	 inverse	probability	weighting	to	deal	with	panel	attrition.	The	differences	compared	with	similar	research	are	 attributed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 study	 differentiates	 between	 short-	 and	 long-term	effects	as	well	as	uses	a	methodology	that	provides	a	cleaner	estimate	of	the	impact	of	retirement	per	se.						Overall,	 the	 findings	 indicate	 that	 politicians	 do	 not	 face	 a	 trade-off	 between	increasing	 state-pension	 ages	 and	 improving	 wellbeing.	 Inducing	 people	 to	 postpone	retirement	is	not	only	necessary	to	make	pension	systems	sustainable,	but	can	also	be	a	way	 to	 improve	 mental	 health	 among	 the	 elderly.	 While	 pension	 reforms	 may	 have	immediate	negative	mental	health	effects	prior	to	retirement	as	some	research	suggests	–	 at	 least	 if	 these	 reforms	postpone	 eligibility	 rules	 late	 in	people’s	 lives	 –	 this	 paper	indicates	 that	 they	may	pay	a	mental	health	dividend	after	some	time	by	delaying	 the	negative	longer-term	impact	of	retirement	per	se.						The	 study	 proceeds	 as	 follows.	 Section	 2.2	 discusses	 the	 theoretical	 mechanisms	potentially	 linking	 retirement	 to	 mental	 health;	 Section	 2.3	 discusses	 the	 previous	literature;	 Section	 2.4	 discusses	 the	 data	 utilised;	 Section	 2.5	 outlines	 the	 paper’s	research	strategy;	Section	2.6	presents	the	results;	and	Section	2.7	concludes.	
2.2. Theory		Why	 and	 how	 might	 retirement	 affect	 mental	 health?	 One	 way	 to	 think	 about	 the	relationship	 between	 the	 two	 variables	 is	 through	 an	 economic	 lens	 in	 which	individuals	seek	to	maximise	 their	utility.	 In	Grossman’s	(2000)	human	capital	model,	health	 acts	 both	 as	 a	 direct	 consumption	 good,	 since	 it	 is	 important	 for	 people’s	
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wellbeing,	and	as	an	investment,	since	individuals	must	be	in	good	health	to	be	able	to	work	 and	 increase	 their	 lifetime	 earnings.	 Retirement	 may	 affect	 these	 properties	differently:	 the	 incentive	 to	 be	 in	 good	 health	 for	 investment	 purposes	 is	 no	 longer	present	 in	 retirement,	 but	 since	 individuals	 have	 more	 free	 time	 as	 retirees,	 the	consumption	 value	 of	 health	may	 increase.	 In	 the	 end,	 the	 theoretical	 net	 effect	 then	depends	on	whether	the	overall	marginal	utility	of	health	decreases	or	 increases	after	retirement	–	which	is	far	from	straightforward	to	predict	(Dave	et	al.	2006).						A	similarly	ambiguous	story	concerns	other	explanations	that	do	not	necessarily	rely	on	 rational	 choice.	 For	 example,	 retirement	may	 affect	 individuals’	 social	 capital	 and	networks,	which	research	suggests	have	positive	effects	on	health	(e.g.	d’Hombres	et	al.	2010;	 Folland	 2008;	 Rocco	 et	 al.	 2014;	 Ronconi	 et	 al.	 2012).	 Yet	 it	 is	 theoretically	unclear	how	retirement	affects	social	interactions:	people	may	lose	work	colleagues,	but	they	 also	 have	 more	 time	 to	 create	 a	 new,	 voluntarily	 established,	 social	 network.	Perhaps	reflecting	this	theoretical	ambiguity,	research	finds	mixed	effects	of	retirement	on	 the	 size	 of	 individuals’	 social	 networks	 (Börsch-Supan	 and	 Schuth	 2014;	 Fletcher	2014).	While	retirement	could	potentially	induce	couples	to	spend	more	time	together,	it	 may	 also	 increase	 the	 probability	 of	 divorce	 (see	 Stancanelli	 2014).	 A	 similarly	equivocal	story	applies	to	stress.	While	retirement	may	decrease	work-related	stress,	it	is	in	itself	a	life	event	that	can	be	very	stressful.	And	retirement	is	often	accompanied	by	a	decrease	in	income	and	consumption	(e.g.	Finnie	and	Spencer	2013),	which	may	affect	mental	 health	 negatively	 directly	 and	 via	 increased	 stress.	 In	 fact,	 such	 ambiguous	stories	apply	 to	most	 theoretical	mechanisms	potentially	 linking	retirement	 to	mental	health.1						Furthermore,	it	is	important	to	note	that	retirement	may	have	different	effects	in	the	short-	and	 longer-term	perspective.	This	 is	partly	because	the	effect	of	 investments	 in	health	is	likely	to	operate	with	a	lag,	which	means	that	lower/higher	investments	do	not	necessarily	 bring	 negative/positive	 effects	 until	 after	 some	 time.	 Similarly,	 in	 the	beginning,	retirement	may	be	perceived	more	like	a	holiday	rather	than	as	permanent	labour	market	exit	(e.g.	Atchley	1976).	If	so,	one	may	also	expect	people’s	mental	health	to	 improve	 –	 or	 at	 least	 not	 deteriorate	 –	 during	 this	 period.	 In	 a	 longer-term	perspective,	however,	the	holiday	effect	may	fade	out	and	be	replaced	by	mechanisms																																																									1	Of	 course,	 there	 is	 a	 plethora	 of	 other	 theoretical	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 retirement	 could	potentially	 affect	mental	 health	 in	 different	ways,	 such	 as	 changes	 in	 health	 insurance	 status,	 although	these	are	also	often	related	to	the	rational	choice	perspective.	
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generating	 lower	 mental	 health.	 Alternatively,	 it	 may	 be	 the	 case	 that	 retirement	increases	stress	and	dissatisfaction	in	the	short	run,	which	then	subside	in	the	long	run	as	 people	 acclimatise.	 All	 this	 is	 related	 more	 generally	 to	 the	 ‘hedonic	 treadmill’	hypothesis	(Brickman	and	Campbell	1971),	which	stipulates	that	life	events	only	affect	wellbeing	in	the	short	term	as	individuals	adapt	with	time.	Thus,	it	is	clearly	important	to	 take	 into	 account	 that	 short-	 and	 longer-term	 effects	 of	 retirement	 may	 differ,	although	it	is	difficult	to	predict	how	and	in	what	ways.	
2.3. Previous	literature		The	 impact	 of	 retirement	 on	 health	 has	 become	 a	 topic	 of	 increasing	 interest	 among	researchers	 in	 economics	 and	 other	 fields.	 Correlational	 studies	 analysing	 the	association	 between	 retirement	 and	mental	 health	 find	mixed	 effects	 (e.g.	 Dave	 et	 al.	2008;	 Jokela	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Lindeboom	et	 al.	 2002;	Mein	 et	 al.	 2003;	Mosca	 and	Barrett	2014;	Oksanen	et	al.	2011;	Vo	et	al.	2015;	Westerlund	et	al.	2009).	However,	since	the	act	 of	 retirement	 is	 not	 random,	 these	 studies	 cannot	 tease	 out	 its	 causal	 effects	 on	mental	health.						Improving	 the	 methodology,	 some	 researchers	 have	 employed	 IV	 models	 using	eligibility	ages	at	which	state-pension	benefits	can	be	drawn	to	predict	retirement.	The	idea	is	that	reaching	these	eligibility	ages	gives	rise	to	significant	economic	incentives	to	retire.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 argument	 goes,	 there	 is	 no	 reason	 why	 reaching	 the	threshold	 per	 se	 should	 affect	mental	 health	 apart	 from	 via	 retirement,	 once	 smooth	effects	of	age	are	held	constant.	This	gives	rise	to	the	potential	to	use	these	thresholds	as	 instruments	 for	 retirement	 in	 IV	 or	 fuzzy	RDD	 frameworks.	Another	 approach	has	been	 to	 utilise	 pension	 reforms	 in	 difference-in-difference	 set-ups,	 comparing	individuals	affected	by	the	reforms	with	individuals	who	are	not.	Overall,	studies	using	either	of	 these	 research	strategies	 tend	 to	 find	no	or	positive	effects	of	 retirement	on	mental	 health	 (e.g.	 Behncke	 2012;	 Blake	 and	 Garrouste	 2012;	 Charles	 2004;	 Coe	 and	Zamarro	2011;	Eibich	2015;	Fé	and	Hollingsworth	2012;	Fonseca	et	al.	2014;	Johnston	and	Lee	2009;	Latif	2013;	Mazzonna	and	Peracchi	2014;	Neuman	2008).2																																																									2	Using	a	 regular	 IV	 set-up,	Mazzonna	and	Peracchi	 (2014)	also	 find	weak	evidence	 in	 robustness	 tests	that	 longer	 time	 spent	 in	 retirement	 increases	 the	 likelihood	 of	 depression	 on	 average.	 However,	 the	instrument	used	is	the	distance	of	respondents’	actual	age	from	the	relevant	state-pension	thresholds.	As	discussed	in	Section	2.5.1,	this	variable	should	normally	be	included	as	a	control	to	allow	the	age	trend	to	differ	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 threshold	 and	 thus	 decrease	 the	 risk	 that	 the	 binary	 retirement	 indicator,	which	 in	 their	 study	 is	 only	 used	 to	 estimate	 the	 immediate	 impact	 of	 retirement,	 picks	 up	 non-linear	
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					However,	this	research	also	suffers	from	some	limitations.	First,	it	tends	to	include	a	number	 of	 ‘bad	 controls’	 that	 are	 endogenous	 to	 retirement,	 which	 means	 that	 it	controls	for	some	of	the	causal	pathways	through	which	retirement	may	affect	mental	health	 (Angrist	 and	 Pischke	 2009).	 Such	 bad	 controls	 include	 consumption,	 marital	status,	 and	 income	 –	 all	 of	 which	 may	 both	 affect	 mental	 health	 and	 be	 affected	 by	retirement	(e.g.	Finnie	and	Spencer	2013;	Haider	and	Stephens	2007;	Stancanelli	2014).	Second,	most	studies	ignore	potential	differences	between	immediate	and	lagged	effects	of	 retirement,	 which,	 as	 noted	 in	 Section	 2.2,	 may	 be	 quite	 different.	 Third,	 studies	evaluating	pension	reforms	in	difference-in-difference	set-ups	ignore	that	such	reforms	often	impact	on	behaviour,	and	mental	health,	before	individuals	retire	(e.g.	Bertoni	et	al.	2016;	de	Grip	et	al.	2012;	Montizaan	et	al.	2010).	This	violates	the	assumption	that	the	 reforms	 used	 for	 identification	 affect	 mental	 health	 solely	 through	 retirement,	thereby	casting	doubt	on	the	studies’	internal	validity.						Another	 potential	 problem	 in	 most	 previous	 research	 is	 that	 it	 uses	 instruments	constructed	 from	both	 regular	 and	early	 retirement	 ages.	This	neglects	potential	 self-selection	 into	 jobs	where	 individuals	 are	more	 likely	 to	be	 able	 to	 retire	 early,	which	could	undermine	the	validity	of	the	findings.	Furthermore,	since	early	retirement	ages	often	differ	depending	on	vocation	in	European	countries,	it	is	difficult	to	find	out	which	threshold	that	applies	to	which	segment	of	the	population.	While	discontinuities	arising	at	the	state-pension	age	should	help	ameliorate	measurement	error	in	retirement	status	as	observed	in	survey	data	–	since	the	discontinuities	are	shaped	by	institutional	rules	and	 are	 therefore	 uncorrelated	 with	 potential	 measurement	 error	 –	 it	 is	 thus	 also	possible	 that	 discontinuities	 at	 (alleged)	 early	 retirement	 ages	 induce	 new	measurement	error.	This,	in	turn,	is	likely	to	produce	attenuation	bias	in	the	estimates	(Angrist	 and	 Pischke	 2009).	 Of	 course,	 it	 is	 also	 not	 clear	whether	 early	 and	 regular	retirement	events	have	 the	same	effects;	as	 countries	are	 in	 the	process	of	 increasing	regular	 state-pension	 ages	 specifically,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 disentangle	 the	 separate	impact	of	retirement	at	these	ages.						Another	 general	 problem	with	 previous	 IV	 studies	 based	 on	RDD	 intuitions	 is	 that	they	often	 ignore	common	pitfalls	associated	with	such	designs.	For	example,	 they	do	not	present	results	 in	which	 the	 impact	of	age	 is	allowed	 to	differ	on	each	side	of	 the																																																																																																																																																																													effects	of	age.	This	is	not	a	trivial	concern,	especially	since	the	authors	use	a	relatively	broad	age	window	and	control	for	a	linear	age	trend	only.	
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discontinuities	 used	 as	 instruments	 (Lee	 and	 Lemieux	 2010).	 Similarly,	most	 existing	studies	 do	 not	 analyse	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	 findings	 by	 narrowing	 the	 range	 of	 data	analysed	around	the	discontinuities	(Angrist	and	Pischke	2015).3	Instead,	they	choose	a	rather	wide	range	of	data,	without	sufficiently	exploring	non-linear	effects	of	age	or	the	results’	sensitivity	to	the	specific	data	range.4						Overall,	therefore,	while	previous	research	most	often	finds	no	or	positive	effects	of	retirement	on	mental	health,	it	suffers	from	some	limitations.	Perhaps	most	important	is	 that	 previous	 studies	 do	 not	 generally	 separate	 short-	 from	 longer-term	 effects	 of	retirement.	 This	 study	 aims	 to	 remedy	 the	 shortcomings	 highlighted	 and	 provide	 a	more	 rigorous	 evaluation	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 retirement	 on	 mental	 health	 in	 Europe.	Section	2.5	discusses	this	strategy	in	detail.	
2.4. Data		This	study	utilises	data	from	the	first,	second,	and	fourth	waves	of	the	Survey	of	Health,	Ageing,	and	Retirement	 in	Europe	(SHARE),	conducted	at	different	points	 in	2004–05,	2006–07,	and	2011–12	respectively.	In	these	waves,	SHARE	provides	information	on	a	wide	 range	 of	 background	 and	 outcome	 variables	 from	 representative	 samples	 of	individuals	who	are	aged	50	and	over	in	ten	European	countries	(see	Börsch-Supan	et	al.	 2013):	 Austria,	 Belgium,	 Denmark,	 France,	 Germany,	 Italy,	 the	 Netherlands,	 Spain,	Sweden,	 and	 Switzerland.5	Analysing	 panel	 data	 spanning	 over	 several	 SHARE	waves	allows	us	to	investigate	both	the	short-	and	longer-term	effects	of	retirement	on	mental	health.	Table	2.1	displays	the	timeline	for	interviews	over	the	period	analysed.						As	 Table	 2.1	 shows,	 the	 second	 interview	 is	 held	 on	 average	 two	 years	 and	 three	months	after	 the	 first	 interview,	whereas	 the	 fourth	 interview	is	held	on	average	 four	years	and	four	months	after	the	second	interview,	and	six	years	and	seven	months	after	the	first	interview.6	In	our	main	analysis,	we	study	the	impact	of	a	change	in	retirement																																																									3	Much	previous	multi-country	research	has	also	ignored	the	possibility	that	the	impact	of	age	on	mental	health	differs	across	countries.	If	such	differential	age	effects	are	correlated	with	the	state-pension	ages	utilised	in	the	analysis,	estimates	may	be	biased.	4	The	 exception	 is	 Eibich’s	 (2015)	 paper,	 which	 finds	 a	 short-term	 positive	 impact	 of	 retirement	 on	mental	health	in	Germany.	5	The	 SHARE	 dataset	 has	 been	 used	widely	 in	 related	 economic	 research	 (e.g.	 Coe	 and	 Zamarro	 2011;	Godard	2016;	Mazzonna	and	Peracchi	2012;	Rohwedder	and	Willis	2010).		6	In	 unreported	 robustness	 tests,	 we	 restricted	 the	 sample	 to	 (1)	 only	 individuals	 with	 a	 time	 span	between	 the	 first	 and	 second	 waves	 of	 minimum	 two	 years	 and	 maximum	 three	 years,	 and	 (2)	 only	individuals	with	a	time	span	between	the	second	and	fourth	waves	of	minimum	four	years	and	maximum	five	years.	Overall,	the	main	results	were	very	similar.	
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status	over	the	first	and	second	waves	on	the	change	in	mental	health	over	the	second	and	 the	 fourth	 waves.	 Since	 the	 fourth	 interview	 takes	 place	 several	 years	 after	 the	change	 in	 retirement	 status	 took	 place	 between	 the	 first	 and	 the	 second	 waves,	 we	believe	our	set-up	captures	a	lagged,	longer-term	effect	well.	We	also	seek	to	compare	and	contrast	 this	 impact	with	 the	effect	of	 a	 change	 in	 retirement	 status	between	 the	first	 and	 second	 waves	 on	 changes	 in	 mental	 health	 over	 the	 same	 period,	 which	captures	 the	 immediate,	short-term	impact.	The	methodology	utilised	to	 tease	out	 the	different	effects	is	discussed	in	detail	in	Section	2.5.	
Table	2.1:	Timeline	for	interviews	 				 Mean	 Min	 Max	Wave	1	 October	2004	 March	2004	 December	2005	Wave	2	 January	2007	 September	2006	 October	2007	Wave	4	 May	2011	 February	2011	 March	2012	Time	passed		(Waves	1–2)	 2	years,	3	months	 11	months	 3	years,	4	months	Time	passed	(Waves	2–4)	 4	years,	4	months	 3	years,	5	months	 5	years,	6	months	Time	passed		(Waves	1–4)	 6	years,	7	months	 5	years,	6	months	 7	years,	10	months	
Note:	the	timeline	refers	to	the	main	sample	within	the	ten-year	age	window	over	and	below	the	relevant	state-pension	age.	It	is	essentially	identical	for	the	sample	within	the	three-year	age	window.		
2.4.1. Sample		The	main	 sample	 includes	 individuals	who	were	 interviewed	 in	 the	 first,	 second,	 and	fourth	wave	of	SHARE	and	who	were	50–75	years	old	at	the	second	wave	interview.7	As	discussed	 in	Section	2.5,	 the	 study	exploits	discontinuities	 in	 retirement	 that	occur	at	the	state-pension	age	to	obtain	exogenous	variation	in	retirement	behaviour.	The	state-pension	 ages	 for	 the	 ten	 European	 countries	 utilised	 in	 the	 study	 –	 which	 take	 into	account	 pension	 reforms	 in	 recent	 decades	 and	 thus	 vary	 across	 cohorts	 within	countries	–	are	displayed	in	Table	2.A.1	in	the	Appendix.	The	threshold	varies	between	55	 and	 67	 years,	 depending	 on	 country,	 gender,	 and	 cohort.	 However,	 individuals	reaching	their	state-pension	age	between	the	first	and	the	second	SHARE	waves	–	which	is	the	relevant	threshold	for	the	set-up	outlined	in	Section	2.5	–	were	between	60	and	
																																																								7	Since	 the	 third	wave	was	a	 special	 survey	 (SHARELIFE)	 that	did	not	enquire	 respondents	about	 their	mental	health,	it	cannot	be	used	in	this	paper.	
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65.8	This	gives	an	age	window	of	about	ten	years	over	and	under	the	lowest	and	highest	thresholds	 utilised,	 calculated	 at	 the	 second	wave,	 which	 is	 in	 line	 with	Moreau	 and	Stancanelli	(2013)	and	Stancanelli	and	Van	Soest	(2012).						The	 working	 sample	 thus	 consists	 of	 maximum	 8,566	 individuals	 across	 the	 ten	countries,	 all	 observed	 three	 times,	 with	 the	 exact	 sample	 size	 depending	 on	 the	restrictions	 discussed	 in	 Section	 2.4.2.	 Table	 2.2	 provides	 summary	 statistics	 for	 the	working	 sample	 as	well	 as	 differences	 in	means	 between	 individuals	 assigned	 to	 the	treatment	group	(those	who	crossed	the	state-pension	age	between	the	first	and	second	interviews),	and	individuals	assigned	to	the	control	group	(those	who	did	not	cross	the	state-pension	 age	 between	 the	 first	 and	 second	 interviews).9	In	 robustness	 tests,	 we	also	utilise	a	narrower	age	window	of	three	years	around	the	lowest	and	highest	state-pension	ages,	which	means	that	people	who	were	57–68	years	old	at	the	second	wave	are	 included.	 This	 decreases	 the	 sample	 size	 to	maximum	4,704	 individuals,	 again	 all	observed	three	times.		
2.4.2. Retirement		The	 study	 employs	 three	 different	 definitions	 of	 retirement.	 First,	 it	 classifies	individuals	as	retired	if	they	claim	to	be	retired	or	give	a	date	at	which	they	retired	that	precedes	the	interview	date.	Given	the	methodology	outlined	in	Section	2.5,	this	means	that	 we	 analyse	 the	 impact	 of	 retirement	 compared	 to	 the	 status	 of	 employed/self-employed,	 homemaker,	 unemployed,	 being	 engaged	 in	 other	 activities,	 as	well	 as	 the	permanently	 ill	 or	 disabled.	 This	 definition	 is	 useful	 since	 all	 non-retirees,	 not	 only	those	who	are	engaged	in	paid	work,	may	respond	to	retirement	incentives	at	the	state-pension	age.	This	is	because	they	may	still	be	able	to	access	age-dependent	benefits	at	that	 point,	 which	 could	 trigger	 permanent	 withdrawal	 from	 the	 labour	 market	 and	
																																																								8	The	only	exception	is	in	Denmark,	where	individuals	born	before	July	1939	instead	faced	a	retirement	age	of	67.	To	ensure	that	individuals	of	the	same	age	are	analysed	in	all	countries,	the	right-hand	side	of	the	age	window	is	calculated	from	age	65	also	for	the	Danish	sample.	However,	all	results	are	essentially	identical	 if	 the	Danish	age	window	is	 instead	extended	by	two	years	on	the	right-hand	side,	which	only	increases	the	sample	by	about	30	respondents.	Results	are	also	robust	to	extending	the	right-hand	side	of	the	age	window	to	67	for	all	countries.	9	The	 FE-IV	 design	 described	 in	 Section	 2.5	 analyses	 compliers	 only:	 respondents	 assigned	 to	 the	treatment	group	who	retired	between	waves	1	and	2	and	respondents	assigned	to	the	control	group	who	did	not	retire	in	that	period.	In	robustness	tests,	we	simultaneously	analyse	the	lagged	impact	of	retiring	between	waves	1	and	2	and	the	direct	effect	of	retiring	between	waves	2	and	4,	both	in	the	full	sample	and	 when	 excluding	 individuals	 who	 were	 retired	 and/or	 above	 the	 state-pension	 age	 at	 the	 first	interview.	As	Table	2.A.5	shows,	the	results	are	very	similar	in	these	analyses.	
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make	 them	 regard	 themselves	 to	 be	 retired.10	Furthermore,	 for	 policy	 purposes,	 the	mental	 health	 impact	 of	 retirement	 is	 relevant	 regardless	 from	 which	 category	respondents	officially	retire.						However,	to	ensure	that	the	above	definition	of	retirement	does	not	drive	the	results,	we	 also	 employ	 an	 alternative	 definition	 based	 on	 retirement	 from	 the	 labour	 force	only.	 In	 this	 definition,	 which	 is	 similar	 to	 Coe	 and	 Zamarro’s	 (2011),	 homemakers,	respondents	who	report	being	permanently	ill	or	disabled,	and	those	who	are	engaged	in	other	activities	are	instead	included	in	the	retirement	category,	as	long	as	they	do	not	also	 report	 having	 done	 any	 paid	work	 in	 the	 past	 four	weeks.	 Respondents	 in	 these	categories	who	report	having	done	paid	work	are	still	included	as	non-retirees.	Finally,	in	 the	 third	definition,	 the	 sample	 is	 simply	 restricted	 to	 individuals	who	 claim	 to	 be	retired	 or	 to	 be	 working.	 The	 latter	 category	 includes	 employed/self-employed	respondents	and	other	non-retired	individuals	who	report	having	done	paid	work	in	the	past	four	weeks.		
2.4.3. Mental	health		Following	previous	research	 in	 the	 field,	our	primary	measure	of	mental	health	 is	 the	Euro-D	scale.	The	scale	was	developed	specifically	as	a	common	depression	gauge	in	the	European	 Union	 and	 has	 shown	 to	 be	 valid	 for	 research	 purposes	 (see	 Prince	 et	 al.	1999).	The	scale	ranges	from	0	to	12,	with	higher	values	indicating	stronger	depressive	tendencies,	 counting	whether	or	not	 respondents	 reported	having	had	problems	with	the	following	in	the	past	month:	appetite,	concentration,	depression,	enjoyment,	fatigue,	guilt,	 interest,	 irritability,	 pessimism,	 sleep,	 suicidality,	 and	 tearfulness.	 Furthermore,	we	 also	 analyse	 the	 likelihood	 that	 respondents	 have	 reached	 the	 conventional	threshold	for	clinical	depression,	which	is	defined	as	a	score	of	4	or	more	on	the	Euro-D	scale.	In	both	cases,	therefore,	higher	values	indicate	worse	mental	health.		
2.4.4. Control	variables		If	 the	 design	 discussed	 in	 Section	 2.5	 produces	 random	 variation	 in	 respondents’	retirement	behaviour,	the	only	necessary	covariates	to	ensure	a	causal	interpretation	of	the	estimates	are	flexible	controls	for	respondents’	age.	However,	to	test	robustness	of																																																									10	This	 argument	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 F	 statistic	 for	 the	 instrument	 is	 the	 largest	 when	utilising	this	definition,	indicating	that	respondents	who	are	not	engaged	in	paid	work	prior	to	retirement	do	respond	to	the	incentives	in	the	regular	state-pension	system.	
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the	estimates,	it	is	also	useful	to	include	lagged	mental	health	status	to	ensure	that	mean	reversion	 does	 not	 bias	 the	 findings.	 Doing	 so	 may	 also	 increase	 precision	 in	 the	estimates.	 It	 is	 also	 possible	 to	 interact	 certain	 background	 variables	 with	 the	retirement	 indicator	 in	 order	 to	 investigate	 potential	 heterogeneous	 effects.	 These	issues	are	discussed	more	formally	in	Section	2.5.1.		
2.4.5. Attrition		It	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 potential	 selection	 problems	 due	 to	 non-random	 panel	attrition,	which	is	often	ignored	by	studies	exploiting	panel	surveys	to	evaluate	various	outcomes	 of	 retirement	 (e.g.	 Bonsang	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Eibich	 2015).	 Like	 in	 most	 panel	surveys,	 attrition	 in	SHARE	 is	 substantial:	 about	50	per	 cent	of	people	 interviewed	 in	the	first	wave	disappear	by	the	fourth	wave.	Of	course,	this	has	no	bearing	on	the	results	if	 attrition	 is	 unrelated	 to	 how	 retirement	 affects	 mental	 health,	 but	 this	 cannot	 be	established	 a	 priori.	 However,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 include	 individual-fixed	 effects,	 which	control	for	time-invariant	variables	that	affect	both	respondents’	propensity	to	remain	in	 the	 panel	 as	well	 as	 their	 retirement	 behaviour	 and	mental	 health.	 This	 should	 at	least	mitigate	the	attrition	problem.						As	a	further	robustness	check,	the	study	also	exploits	inverse	probability	weighting,	which	 allows	 attrition	 to	 be	 non-random	 as	 long	 as	 its	 causes	 are	 captured	 by	individuals’	 observable	 characteristics	 at	 the	 time	 before	 they	 drop	 out	 of	 the	 panel	(Moffit	et	al.	1999).	This	means	 that	we	estimate	 the	probability	 that	 individuals	who	were	interviewed	in	the	first	wave	remain	in	the	fourth	wave,	from	variables	observed	in	 the	 final	wave	 in	which	 they	participated	prior	 to	 the	 fourth	wave.	These	variables	include	 age,	 employment	 status,	marital	 status,	 education	 level,	 and	 a	 battery	 of	 self-assessed,	 mental,	 and	 physical	 health	 variables	 as	 well	 as	 indicators	 for	 cognitive	achievement.11	In	addition,	country-fixed	effects	are	included	to	ensure	that	differential	attrition	across	countries	does	not	bias	the	findings.						The	inverse	of	the	probability	of	remaining	in	the	panel,	as	predicted	by	this	model,	is	then	 used	 as	weight	 in	 robustness	 regressions	 analysing	 the	 impact	 of	 retirement	 on	
																																																								11	The	health	and	cognitive	indicators	include:	self-assessed	health,	the	Euro-D	scale,	the	number	of	drugs	taken,	 the	number	of	diagnosed	conditions,	 the	number	of	 limitations	with	activities	of	daily	 living,	 the	number	of	mobility	limitations,	as	well	as	memory	and	numeracy	scores.	
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mental	health.12	If	attrition	poses	a	serious	problem	for	the	study,	one	would	expect	the	results	 from	 the	weighted	models	 to	 differ	 significantly	 compared	with	 the	 ones	 that	exclude	weights.	 If	 the	 results	 are	 very	 similar,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	attrition	poses	a	serious	problem.	Although	it	is	impossible	to	demonstrate	conclusively	an	absence	of	attrition	bias,	the	combination	of	individual-level	fixed	effects	and	inverse	probability	weighting	leaves	little	room	for	any	remaining	bias.	
Table	2.2:	Descriptive	statistics	Variable	 Working	sample		 Treatment	group	 Control	group	Wave	1	 Mean	 SD	 Min	 Max	 Mean		 Mean	Age	 60.63	 6.65	 47.23	 74.46	 62.53	 60.42	Retired	(1)	 0.44	 0.50	 0	 1	 0.53	 0.43	Retired	(2)	 0.59	 0.49	 0	 1	 0.70	 0.57	Retired	(3)	 0.52	 0.50	 0	 1	 0.64	 0.51	Euro-D	 2.16	 2.10	 0	 12	 1.98	 2.19	Depression	 0.23	 0.42	 0	 1	 0.20	 0.23	Wave	2	 Mean	 SD	 Min	 Max	 Mean		 Mean	Age	 62.95	 6.65	 50	 75.92	 64.95	 62.73	Retired	(1)	 0.51	 0.50	 0	 1	 0.81	 0.48	Retired	(2)	 0.65	 0.48	 0	 1	 0.91	 0.62	Retired	(3)	 0.60	 0.49	 0	 1	 0.90	 0.57	Euro-D	 2.09	 2.06	 0	 11	 1.91	 2.11	Depression	 0.21	 0.41	 0	 1	 0.19	 0.21	Wave	4	 Mean	 SD	 Min	 Max	 Mean	 Mean	Age	 67.24	 6.66	 54.08	 80.77	 69.20	 67.02	Retired	(1)	 0.65	 0.48	 0	 1	 0.87	 0.62	Retired	(2)	 0.78	 0.42	 0	 1	 0.96	 0.75	Retired	(3)	 0.74	 0.44	 0	 1	 0.96	 0.72	Euro-D	 2.27	 2.11	 0	 12	 2.25	 2.27	Depression	 0.24	 0.43	 0	 1	 0.25	 0.24	
n	 8,566	 849	 7,717	
Note:	Respondents	assigned	to	the	treatment	group	crossed	the	state-pension	age	between	waves	1	and	2,	while	 respondents	 assigned	 to	 the	 control	 group	 did	 not	 cross	 the	 state-pension	 age	 in	 that	 period.	Retired	(1):	respondents	who	report	to	be	retired	or	give	a	retirement	date	preceding	the	interview	date.	Retired	 (2):	 retired	 (1)	 plus	 homemakers,	 the	 permanently	 ill	 or	 disabled,	 and	 those	 engaged	 in	 other	activities	(as	long	as	they	do	not	do	paid	work).	Retired	(3):	retired	(1)	but	excluding	all	non-workers	in	the	non-retired	 category	 (for	 the	 last	definition:	n	 =	7,113	 in	 the	 total	 sample,	n	=	692	assigned	 to	 the	treatment	group	and	n	=	6,421	assigned	to	the	control	group).		
2.5. Research	design		As	noted	in	Section	2.3,	any	valid	research	design	used	to	evaluate	the	causal	effect	of	retirement	 on	 mental	 health	 must	 take	 into	 account	 that	 the	 former	 is	 likely	endogenous	 to	 the	 latter.	 This	 section	 discusses	 the	 research	 design	 employed	 in	 the	study	to	deal	with	endogeneity	in	retirement	behaviour.																																																									12	The	regression	predicting	the	probability	to	remain	in	the	panel	is	estimated	using	a	probit	model,	but	all	weighted	results	are	essentially	identical	if	we	use	a	linear	probability	model	instead.	
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2.5.1. Obtaining	exogenous	variation	in	retirement	behaviour			When	 analysing	 the	 impact	 of	 retirement	 on	mental	 health,	 the	 easiest	 strategy	 is	 to	estimate:	 𝑚ℎ# = 𝛼 + 	𝛽)𝑟# + 𝛽+𝑥# + 𝜀# 	 	 				 																						(1)	where	𝑚ℎ# 	is	the	mental	health	outcome	analysed;	𝑟# 	is	a	dummy	variable	taking	either	the	value	1	(retired)	or	0	(not	retired);	and	𝑥# 	is	a	vector	of	control	variables	assumed	to	affect	both	retirement	and	mental	health.						The	critical	assumption	is	that	𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑟#, 𝜀#|𝑥# = 0.	But	if	𝑥# 	does	not	include	all	factors	that	affect	both	𝑟#	and	𝑚ℎ# ,	or	if	𝑚ℎ# 	has	an	independent	impact	on	𝑟# ,	the	results	will	be	plagued	by	endogeneity.	In	addition,	measurement	error	in	𝑟# 	may	generate	attenuation	bias.	Any	of	these	issues	would	mean	that	𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑟#, 𝜀#|𝑥# ≠ 0	(Angrist	and	Pischke	2009).	As	noted	in	Section	2.3,	the	critical	assumption	is	not	likely	to	hold.	To	ensure	a	causal	interpretation	 of	 the	 paper’s	 findings,	 it	 is	 thus	 key	 to	 obtain	 exogenous	 variation	 in	retirement	behaviour.						To	 do	 so,	 the	 paper	 proposes	 an	 individual-fixed	 effects	 IV	 design,	 with	 intuitions	borrowed	from	the	RDD	literature.	The	design	is	based	on	retirement	ages	in	European	pension	 systems,	which	 create	 age	 thresholds	 at	which	 economic	 incentives	 to	 retire	increase	 substantially.	 In	 this	 set-up,	 the	 discontinuities	 act	 as	 instruments	 for	individuals’	 employment	 status	 in	 a	 2SLS	model,	with	 age	 as	 the	 continuous	 variable	determining	 the	 discontinuities	 (Angrist	 and	 Piscke	 2009;	 Imbens	 and	 Wooldridge	2009).	As	noted	in	Section	2.3,	this	idea	has	been	exploited	in	previous	research,	but	not	in	a	way	that	allows	researchers	to	distinguish	between	short-	and	longer-term	effects.	Because	of	the	potential	problems	that	may	arise	by	using	the	early	retirement	age,	as	discussed	in	Section	2.3,	the	paper	focuses	solely	on	the	regular	state-pension	age.						The	idea	behind	the	design	is	formalised	as	follows:	
𝑃 𝑟# = 1 𝑎𝑔𝑒# = 𝑓) 𝑎𝑔𝑒# 	if	𝑎𝑔𝑒# ≥ 𝑠𝑝#	𝑓@ 𝑎𝑔𝑒# 	if	𝑎𝑔𝑒# < 𝑠𝑝#	,	where	𝑓)(𝑠𝑝#	) ≠ 𝑓@(𝑠𝑝#	)	where	𝑠𝑝# 	is	 the	applicable	eligibility	age.	For	this	paper’s	purposes,	 the	assumption	 is	that	𝑓) 𝑠𝑝#	 > 𝑓@(𝑠𝑝#),	 since	 economic	 incentives	 raise	 the	 likelihood	 that	 individuals	retire	when	they	reach	the	eligibility	age.	Thus,	the	probability	of	𝑟# = 1	as	a	function	of	𝑎𝑔𝑒# 	can	be	written:	
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𝑃 𝑟# = 1 𝑎𝑔𝑒# = 𝑓@ 𝑎𝑔𝑒# + [𝑓) 𝑎𝑔𝑒# − 𝑓@ 𝑎𝑔𝑒# ]	𝑠𝑝# 	where	𝑠𝑝# 	is	a	dummy	variable	with	the	value	of	1	if	𝑎𝑔𝑒# ≥ 𝑠𝑝#	and	0	if	𝑎𝑔𝑒# < 𝑠𝑝# .	The	strategy	is	dependent	on	the	ability	to	separate	smooth	effects	of	𝑎𝑔𝑒# 	from	the	impact	at	𝑠𝑝# ,	 which	 serves	 as	 instrument	 for	𝑟# .	 The	 paper	 follows	 previous	 studies	 and	assumes	 a	 quadratic	 age	 trend	 in	 the	 baseline	 estimates.	 Recent	 research	 shows	 that	estimates	including	higher-order	polynomials	in	similar	designs	may	be	misleading	and	that	it	is	therefore	preferable	to	reduce	the	range	of	data	around	the	threshold	(Gelman	and	Imbens	2014).						The	principal	difference	between	our	set-up	and	a	regular	fuzzy	RDD	is	the	inclusion	of	 individual-level	 fixed	 effects,	 which	 means	 that	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 variation	 within	individuals	across	time	rather	than	the	variation	between	individuals.	This	also	means	that	 the	 identification	assumptions	are	different.	While	a	 traditional	 fuzzy	RDD	would	hinge	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 people	 who	 are	 on	 different	 sides	 of,	 but	 close	 to,	 the	state-pension	 age	 only	 differ	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 probability	 of	 being	 retired,	 once	controlling	flexibly	for	the	direct	impact	of	age,	our	individual	fixed-effects	IV	estimator	hinges	on	the	assumption	that	merely	crossing	the	threshold	serving	as	instrument	does	not	 impact	 an	 individual’s	 mental	 health	 around	 the	 threshold	 apart	 from	 via	retirement.	 We	 note	 that	 similar	 designs,	 combining	 individual-fixed	 effects	 with	intuitions	 from	the	RDD	literature,	have	been	utilised	 in	previous	research	 in	this	and	other	fields	(e.g.	Eibich	2015;	Lemieux	and	Milligan	2008;	Petterson-Lidbom	2012).						We	thus	model	the	lagged,	longer-term	impact	of	retirement	on	mental	health	using	a	2SLS	model.	Unlike	most	previous	research,	we	allow	the	impact	of	age	to	differ	on	both	sides	 of	 the	 eligibility	 threshold	 used	 as	 instrument.	 To	 do	 so,	we	 centre	 age	 and	 its	polynomial	 –	by	 subtracting	 the	 state-pension	age	 from	 the	 respondent’s	 age	–	which	ensures	 that	 the	 coefficient	of	 the	 retirement	 indicator	 still	measures	 the	 jump	 in	 the	dependent	 variable	 at	 the	 threshold	 serving	 as	 instrument	 (see	 Angrist	 and	 Pischke	2009,	2015).	We	also	take	into	account	cross-country	differences	 in	age	effects,	below	and	above	the	threshold.13	The	estimation	then	reads:	
																																																								13	Thus,	a	key	difference	between	this	paper’s	set-up	and	the	one	used	by	Coe	and	Zamarro	(2011)	is	the	fact	that	we	exploit	the	longitudinal	aspect	of	SHARE,	allowing	us	to	include	individual-fixed	effects	and	to	separate	 short-	 from	 longer-term	 effects	 of	 retirement.	 Other	 differences	 include	 the	 fact	 that	 they	analyse	only	men,	do	not	take	into	account	that	the	effect	of	age	may	differ	across	countries,	 ignore	the	fact	that	the	impact	of	age	may	differ	below	and	above	the	threshold	serving	as	instrument,	use	both	early	
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𝑟#HI) 	= 𝛼 + 𝛽)𝑠𝑝#HI) + 𝛽+𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI) 	+ 𝛽J𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI)+		+𝛽K𝑠𝑝#HI)(𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI))	+𝛽L𝑠𝑝#HI)(𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI)+) 	+ 𝛾N(𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI)) + 𝛾N(𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI)+) 	+ 𝛾N[𝑠𝑝#HI)(𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI))]	+𝛾N[𝑠𝑝#HI)(𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI)+)	]	+𝛿# + 𝜇H + 𝜚H + 𝜀#H																															(2)																																																		𝑚ℎ#H = 𝛼+	𝛽)𝑟RHI) + 𝛽+𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI) + 𝛽J𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI)+	+𝛽K𝑠𝑝#HI)(𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI))	+𝛽L𝑠𝑝#HI)(𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI)+) 	+ 𝛾N(𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI)) + 𝛾N(𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI)+) + 𝛾N[𝑠𝑝#HI)(𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI))]	+𝛾N[𝑠𝑝#HI)(𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI)+)	]	+𝛿# + 𝜇H + 𝜚H + 𝜀#H																																(3)	where	𝑟RHI)	is	 the	 predicted	 values	 of	𝑟#HI)	from	 the	 first	 stage	 with	𝑠𝑝#HI)	as	 the	excluded	 instrument;	𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI) 	and	𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI)+ denote	 (𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI) − 	 𝑠𝑝#HI)) 	and	 (𝑎𝑔𝑒#HI) −	𝑠𝑝#HI))+ 	respectively;	 𝛿# 	denotes	 individual-fixed	 effects;	 and	 𝜇H 	and	 𝜚H 	represent	separate	year-	and	month-fixed	effects	respectively.	Including	interactions	between	the	age	 variables	 and	𝛾N ,	 which	 denote	 country	 dummies,	means	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 age	 is	allowed	to	differ	across	countries.14						The	 model	 thus	 effectively	 analyses	 the	 impact	 of	 a	 change	 in	 retirement	 status	between	the	first	and	second	waves	(on	average	spanning	two	years	and	three	months)	on	 the	 change	 in	 mental	 health	 between	 the	 second	 and	 fourth	 waves	 (on	 average	spanning	four	years	and	four	months).	Because	the	shift	in	retirement	status	may	occur	at	 any	point	 between	 the	 two	 interviews,	 but	mental	 health	 is	measured	 at	 the	 exact	point	 of	 the	 interviews,	 the	 model	 focuses	 only	 on	 the	 change	 in	 mental	 health	 that	occurs	after	the	shift	in	retirement	status	has	taken	place.	Of	course,	the	set-up	thus	also	risks	 ignoring	 potential	 immediate	 effects	 of	 a	 shift	 in	 retirement	 status	 between	 the	first	 and	 the	 second	 waves.	 Yet	 if	 we	 also	 control	 for	 lagged	 mental	 health,	 any	difference	 between	 compliers	 in	 the	 treatment	 and	 control	 groups	 due	 to	 differential	mental	 health	 trends	 between	 the	 first	 and	 the	 second	 waves	 is	 ignored.	 Also,	 in	robustness	tests,	we	simply	analyse	the	change	in	mental	health	between	the	first	and	fourth	waves,	thus	taking	into	account	any	short-term	impact	directly.					An	important	rationale	behind	the	study	is	also	to	investigate	whether	the	short-term	effect	of	retirement	differs	from	the	longer-term	impact.	Thus,	in	models	analysing	the	short-term	effect	of	retirement,	we	estimate	equations	(2)	and	(3)	but	with	all	variables																																																																																																																																																																													and	regular	state-pension	ages	as	instruments,	and	control	for	potentially	endogenous	variables,	such	as	marital	status	and	income.	14	The	 results	 are	 very	 similar	 if	 we	 also	 include	 separate	 indicators	 for	𝑎𝑔𝑒#H	and	𝑎𝑔𝑒#H+	and	 their	interactions	with	𝛾N 	when	analysing	longer-term	effects.	This	is	expected	if	the	strategy	induces	random	variation	in	retirement	behaviour.	
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measured	 at	𝑡	instead	 of	𝑡 − 1.15	Effectively,	 we	 then	 analyse	 the	 impact	 of	 retiring	between	the	first	and	the	second	waves	on	the	change	in	mental	health	over	the	same	period.	 In	 this	 way,	 by	 altering	 the	 observation	 window	 across	 two	 and	 four	 waves	respectively,	it	is	possible	to	compare	and	contrast	the	short-	and	longer-term	effects	of	retirement	on	mental	health	using	the	same	spike	in	retirement	that	occurs	at	the	state-pension	age	as	 instrument,	while	at	 the	same	time	holding	constant	differential	 linear	and	non-linear	age	trends	under	and	above	the	thresholds.16						We	also	investigate	potential	heterogeneous	effects	depending	on	gender,	education	level,	as	well	as	physical	and	psychological	occupational	burden.	We	create	one	dummy	that	takes	the	value	1	for	women	and	0	for	men,	and	one	dummy	that	takes	the	value	1	for	education	levels	equal	to	or	below	lower-secondary	school	and	0	otherwise.	We	then	utilise	 Kroll’s	 (2011)	 indexes	measuring	 the	 physical	 burden	 (OPB)	 and	 psychosocial	burden	(OSB)	of	different	occupations,	calculated	 from	their	 ISCO-88	codes,	which	we	link	 to	 the	 SHARE	 dataset.17	The	 indexes	 range	 from	 1	 to	 10,	 with	 higher	 values	indicating	higher	occupational	strain.	We	create	 two	dummies	 indicating	physical	and	psychosocial	 occupational	 strain	 above	 the	 value	 of	 5.	 By	 interacting	 these	 variables	with	 the	 retirement	 indicator,	 and	 in	 turn	 instrumenting	 the	 product	 with	 the	interaction	 between	 the	 variables	 and	 the	 state-pension	 threshold,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	analyse	potential	heterogeneous	effects	within	the	above	framework.		
2.5.2. Assumptions		A	useful	instrument	must	first	of	all	be	relevant,	which	in	this	case	means	that	it	should	correlate	with	 retirement.	 It	must	 also	 be	 valid,	 in	 this	 case	meaning	 that	 it	must	 be	exogenous	 to	mental	 health,	 and	 further	 satisfy	 the	monotonicity	 requirement,	which	here	means	that	there	cannot	be	people	who	choose	not	to	retire	because	they	reach	the																																																									15	In	estimations	analysing	short-term	effects,	the	sample	is	restricted	to	observations	in	the	first	and	the	second	waves.	 This	 ensures	 that	 the	 short-	 and	 longer-term	 effects	 can	 be	 compared	 among	 the	 same	individuals.	However,	results	for	the	direct	association	and	impact	over	the	second	and	fourth	waves	are	presented	in	Tables	2.A.2,	2.A.3,	and	2.A.5	in	the	Appendix.	16	Our	 modelling	 approach	 thus	 differs	 from	 Mazzonna	 and	 Perrachi’s	 (2014)	 attempt	 to	 separate	shorter-	 and	 longer-term	 effects	 of	 (early	 and	 regular)	 retirement	 on	 general	 health.	 Whereas	 these	authors	 effectively	 use	 the	 interaction	 between	𝑠𝑝# 	and	(𝑎𝑔𝑒#H −	𝑠𝑝#H)	as	 instrument	 for	 time	 spent	 in	retirement,	we	include	the	lagged	version	of	this	variable	and	its	polynomial	as	well	as	their	interactions	with	 country	dummies	 as	 controls	 to	 ensure	 that	differential	 age	 trends	 above	 the	 thresholds	 are	held	constant.	17	We	use	the	ISCO-88	code	for	respondents’	last	job	in	the	first	instance.	For	some	respondents,	the	code	is	only	available	for	their	second	or	 first	 job.	To	maximise	the	number	of	observations,	we	thus	use	the	code	for	the	second	job	in	the	second	instance	and	the	code	for	the	first	job	in	the	third	instance.	
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state-pension	 age	 (Imbens	 and	 Angrist	 1994;	 Hahn	 et	 al.	 2001).	 Previous	 research	shows	that	age-dependent	financial	incentives	in	public	pension	systems	are	important	for	retirement	behaviour	(e.g.	Börsch-Supan	et	al.	2009;	Gruber	and	Wise	1999,	2004;	Hurd	et	al.	2012).	 It	 is	also	unlikely	 that	reaching	 the	state-pension	age	would	 induce	some	people	not	to	retire,	which	would	violate	the	monotonicity	requirement.	And	since	we	 hold	 constant	 individual-fixed	 effects	 and	 control	 very	 flexible	 for	 the	 continuous	variable	 from	 which	 the	 binary	 instrument	 is	 constructed	 –	 in	 ways	 similar	 to	 RDD	strategies	–	we	believe	the	instrument	satisfies	the	validity	requirement	in	our	set-up.18						Furthermore,	having	access	to	panel	data	also	means	that	it	is	possible	to	investigate	more	thoroughly	whether	our	set-up	produces	random	variation	in	retirement.	Indeed,	if	 this	 is	 the	 case,	 the	 retirement	 coefficient	 should	 not	 differ	 much	 when	 including	lagged	mental	health	as	independent	variable,	although	precision	may	increase	(Lee	and	Lemieux	 2010).	 Including	 lagged	 mental	 health	 also	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	 test	 and	control	 for	 potential	mean	 reversion,	 which	may	 affect	 the	 findings	 (e.g.	 Angrist	 and	Pischke	2009).19							Finally,	we	note	that	the	age	window	utilised	may	impact	the	findings.	Choosing	the	window	 involves	 a	 trade-off	 between	 consistency	 and	 efficiency:	 a	 smaller	 window	decreases	 the	 likelihood	 of	 bias,	 but	 fewer	 observations	 simultaneously	 increase	 the	variance	(Lee	and	Lemieux	2010).	We	thus	restrict	the	age	window	in	robustness	tests	to	ensure	that	the	results	do	not	hinge	on	the	one	utilised	in	the	main	set-up.	
2.6. Results		Table	2.3	displays	estimates	from	OLS	models	that	include	individual-fixed	effects,	but	do	not	correct	for	endogeneity	in	retirement	behaviour,	using	the	ten-year	age	window	calculated	 at	 the	 second	 wave.	 The	 coefficients	 are	 insignificant	 for	 both	 measures	analysed.	This	holds	true	when	analysing	the	short-term	association	between	the	 first	and	the	second	waves	in	the	first	panel,	and	when	analysing	the	longer-term	association	in	 the	 second	 panel.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 results	 in	 Table	 2.A.2	 show	 a	 negative	 direct	association	 between	 the	 second	 and	 fourth	 waves,	 indicating	 a	 positive	 relationship																																																									18	As	always,	the	estimates	capture	a	local	average	treatment	effect	(LATE)	of	retirement	on	mental	health	(Imbens	and	Angrist	1994).	 In	 this	 study,	 the	LATE	 is	 relevant	 for	 individuals	who	 retire	because	 they	reach	the	relevant	state-pension	eligibility	age.	19	Because	 individual-fixed	effects	are	 included,	 lagged	mental	health	 is	mechanically	correlated	with	𝜀#H	(Nickell	 1981),	 but	 this	 is	 not	 a	 problem	 for	 this	 study’s	 purposes,	 as	 long	 as	 lagged	mental	 health	 is	orthogonal	to	the	instrument	–	which	the	exercise	is	supposed	to	test.	
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between	retirement	and	mental	health	over	that	period.	The	OLS	estimates	thus	support	previous	findings	of	zero	or	positive	effects	of	retirement	on	mental	health.	
Table	2.3:	Estimates	from	individual-fixed	effects	OLS	models	
		 FE-OLS	 FE-OLS	 FE-OLS	 FE-OLS	 FE-OLS	 FE-OLS	
Retirement	
definition	 1	 2	 3	 1	 2	 3	
		 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Clinical	depression	
Clinical	
depression	
Clinical	
depression	Short-term	associations	𝑟#H	 -0.04	 -0.03	 -0.06	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	
	 (0.07)	 (0.07)	 (0.08)	 (0.01)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	Long-term	associations	𝑟#HI)	 -0.03	 0.02	 -0.11	 0.00	 0.01	 -0.01		 (0.07)	 (0.07)	 (0.08)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)		n	 8,566	 8,566	 7,113	 8,566	 8,566	 7,113	
Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	individual	level	are	 in	 parentheses.	 All	 regressions	 include	 individual-,	 year-,	 and	 month-fixed	 effects,	 a	 quadric	 age	trend,	and	interactions	with	country	dummies.	
					Turning	 to	our	main	research	strategy	 to	deal	with	endogeneity,	Table	2.4	displays	the	 estimates	 from	 the	 FE-IV	model	 in	 equations	 (2)	 and	 (3).	 The	 first	 stage	 results	show	 that	 the	 instrument	 is	 strong,	 with	 the	 F	 statistics	 always	 displaying	 values	considerably	 higher	 than	 23.1,	 which	 is	 the	 relevant	 threshold	 when	 using	 cluster-robust	standard	errors	(Olea	and	Pflueger	2013).	The	coefficients	indicate	that	reaching	the	 state-pension	 age	 threshold	 increases	 the	 likelihood	 of	 retirement	 by	 10–17	percentage	 points,	 depending	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 retirement,	 and	 are	 always	statistically	 significant	 at	 the	 1	 per	 cent	 level.	 It	 is	 thus	 clear	 that	 there	 is	 sufficient	variation	 in	retirement	behaviour	 in	 the	data,	and	that	 it	can	be	predicted	well	by	the	state-pension	age	threshold.						The	second-stage	results	in	the	first	panel,	in	turn,	display	no	evidence	that	a	change	in	retirement	status	over	the	first	and	second	waves,	measured	by	the	coefficient	of	𝑟RH ,	has	 any	 short-term	 effects	 on	 changes	 in	 mental	 health	 over	 the	 same	 period.	 As	displayed	 in	 Tables	 2.A.3	 and	 2.A.5,	 this	 also	 holds	 true	 in	 the	 FE-IV	 analyses	 of	 the	direct	impact	over	the	second	and	fourth	waves,	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	OLS	estimates	in	Table	2.A.2.						However,	 the	 results	 in	 the	 second	 panel	 uniformly	 indicate	 that	 a	 change	 in	retirement	status	over	the	first	and	second	waves,	measured	by	the	coefficient	of	𝑟RHI),	has	 a	 large	 negative	 longer-term	 impact	 on	 changes	 in	 mental	 health	 between	 the	
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second	and	fourth	waves.	The	coefficients	display	that	retirement	increases	the	overall	Euro-D	 score	 by	 1.55–2.44	 points,	 relative	 to	 the	 control	 group,	 depending	 on	which	retirement	definition	 that	 is	utilised.	Based	on	 the	descriptive	 statistics	 for	 the	 fourth	wave	 in	 Table	 2.2,	 this	 corresponds	 to	 0.81–1.30	 standard	 deviations.	 Meanwhile,	retirement	 increases	 the	 likelihood	 of	 remaining	 or	 becoming	 clinically	 depressed,	defined	 as	 scoring	 4	 or	 higher	 on	 the	 Euro-D	 scale,	 in	 the	 longer	 term	 by	 31–50	percentage	points,	relative	to	the	control	group.	This	corresponds	to	an	impact	of	0.72–1.16	standard	deviations,	which	is	slightly	lower	compared	with	the	effect	size	obtained	when	analysing	the	Euro-D	index.	20	Thus,	the	initial	results	indicate	that	retirement	has	considerable	negative	longer-term	effects	on	mental	health.21						Since	we	do	not	detect	any	short-term	effects	on	mental	health,	the	results	imply	that	the	 longer-term	 coefficients	 pick	 up	 a	 negative	 effect	 of	 retirement	 on	mental	 health	rather	than	merely	a	reversion	following	positive	short-term	effects.	This	interpretation	receives	support	from	models	including	lagged	mental	health	in	the	third	panel,	which	display	almost	identical,	but	slightly	more	precise,	longer-term	estimates.	Also,	as	Table	2.A.4	 shows,	 the	 results	 are	 very	 similar	 when	 analysing	 the	 impact	 of	 a	 change	 in	retirement	status	between	 the	 first	and	second	waves	on	 the	change	 in	mental	health	between	the	first	and	fourth	waves,	thus	incorporating	any	short-term	effects	directly.	Overall,	therefore,	the	FE-IV	estimates	point	in	one	direction:	retirement	has	no	impact	on	mental	health	in	the	short	run,	but	a	large	negative	effect	in	the	longer	term.22						Meanwhile,	 in	 models	 evaluating	 longer-term	 effects,	 the	 Hausman	 tests	 always	reject	 the	null	hypothesis	of	no	endogeneity,	 indicating	 that	OLS	estimates	are	biased	downward.	This	 is	unsurprising	given	the	results	 in	Table	2.3,	but	may	be	unexpected																																																									20	The	results	are	plausible	since,	as	displayed	in	Table	2.2,	the	average	Euro-D	score	increased	from	1.91	to	 2.25	 (sd	 =	 2.05),	while	 the	 share	 of	 depressed	 individuals	 increased	 from	0.19	 to	 0.25	 	 (sd	 =	 0.46),	between	waves	2	and	4	among	respondents	who	crossed	the	state-pension	age	between	waves	1	and	2.	This	should	be	compared	with	an	increase	in	the	average	Euro-D	score	from	2.11	to	2.27	(sd	=	2.17),	and	the	share	of	depressed	individuals	from	0.21	to	0.24	(sd	=	0.48),	between	waves	2	and	4	in	the	group	who	did	not	cross	the	state-pension	age	between	waves	1	and	2.	The	impact	of	retirement	on	mental	health	is	effectively	identified	from	these	differences.	21	The	reduced-form	effect	of	crossing	the	state-pension	age	threshold	is	to	generate	an	increase	of	0.287	Euro-D	points	(standard	error	=	0.088)	and	raise	the	likelihood	of	depression	by	0.053	(standard	error	=	0.019),	using	the	specifications	equivalent	to	columns	1,	2,	4,	and	5	in	panel	2.	In	the	sample	analysed	in	columns	3	and	6	in	panel	2,	the	reduced-form	impact	is	0.253	Euro-D	points	(standard	error	=	0.092)	and	0.056	(standard	error	=	0.021)	respectively.	22	As	Table	2.A.5	shows,	the	findings	are	very	similar	when	analysing	the	lagged	impact	of	retirement	and	controlling	 for	 the	 direct	 effect	 between	waves	 2	 and	 4,	 both	 in	 the	main	 sample	 and	when	 excluding	respondents	 who	 were	 retired	 and/or	 above	 the	 state-pension	 age	 in	 wave	 1.	 Overall,	 these	 results	indicate	 that	 our	 main	 strategy	 is	 appropriate	 for	 capturing	 the	 longer-term	 effect	 of	 retirement	 on	mental	health.	
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since	potential	reverse	causality	is	often	thought	to	bias	OLS	estimates	in	the	opposite	direction,	 with	 poor	 mental	 health	 raising	 the	 probability	 of	 retirement.	 Yet	 the	differences	 are	 plausible	 since	 omitted	 variables	 and	 measurement	 error	 may	 bias	estimates	downward	more	than	potential	reverse	causality	biases	estimates	upward.23	
Table	2.4:	Estimates	from	FE-IV	models		
		 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	
Retirement	
definition	 1	 2	 3	 1	 2	 3	
		 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Clinical	depression	
Clinical	
depression	
Clinical	
depression	Short-term	effects	𝑟RH	 -0.16	 -0.26	 -0.44	 -0.04	 -0.06	 -0.09	
Second	stage	 (0.49)	 (0.78)	 (0.65)	 (0.11)	 (0.18)	 (0.15)	𝑠𝑝#H	 0.17***	 0.10***	 0.13***	 0.17***	 0.10***	 0.13***	
First	stage	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	F	statistic	 88.56	 38.32	 48.62	 88.56	 38.32	 48.62	Hausman	test	 	0.81	 	0.77	 0.56	 0.72	 0.77	 0.50	Longer-term	effects	
Excluding	lagged	mental	health	𝑟RHI)	 1.70***	 2.74***	 1.90**	 0.31**	 0.50**	 0.42**	
Second	stage	 (0.55)	 (0.95)	 (0.74)	 (0.12)	 (0.21)	 (0.17)	𝑠𝑝#HI)	 0.17***	 0.10***	 0.13***	 0.17***	 0.10***	 0.13***	
First	stage	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	F	statistic	 88.46	 38.25	 48.73	 88.46	 38.25	 48.73	Hausman	test	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	
Including	lagged	mental	health	𝑟RHI)	 1.61***	 2.60***	 1.69**	 0.29***	 0.47**	 0.37**	
Second	stage	 (0.50)	 (0.87)	 (0.67)	 (0.11)	 (0.18)	 (0.15)	𝑠𝑝#HI)	 0.17***	 0.10***	 0.13***	 0.17***	 0.10***	 0.13***	
First	stage	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	F	statistic	 88.42	 38.23	 48.67	 88.46	 38.24	 48.75	Hausman	test	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	
n	 8,566	 8,566	 7,113	 8,566	 8,566	 7,113	
Note:	Significance	 levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	 individual	 level	are	in	parentheses.	All	models	include	the	variables	in	equations	(2)	and	(3).		
2.6.1. Robustness	tests	
	
2.6.1.1. Three-year	age	window		How	sensitive	are	 the	results	 to	 the	specific	age	window	around	 the	 threshold?	Table	2.5	 displays	 estimates	 from	 models	 with	 the	 sample	 restricted	 to	 individuals	 aged	within	approximately	three	years	over	and	under	the	lowest	and	highest	thresholds	at	the	second	interview.	We	then	include	a	linear	age	trend.	Again,	there	is	little	evidence																																																									23	Indeed,	research	analysing	the	impact	of	retirement	on	cognitive	ability	also	finds	that	OLS	results	are	biased	in	the	same	way	(Bonsang	et	al.	2012).	
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of	any	short-term	effects.	However,	the	longer-term	effects	are	considerable,	despite	the	fact	that	45	per	cent	of	the	main	sample	is	dropped.	Estimates	in	Table	2.A.6	also	show	that	 the	 long-term	 effect	 remains	 when	 including	 a	 quadratic	 age	 trend,	 despite	 the	narrower	age	window.	Overall,	therefore,	the	results	are	robust	to	using	a	narrower	age	window,	 which	 further	 supports	 the	 idea	 that	 our	 research	 design	 captures	 causal	effects.	
Table	2.5:	Estimates	from	FE-IV	models	(3-year	age	window)	
		 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	Retirement	definition	 1	 2	 3	 1	 2	 3	
		 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Clinical	depression	
Clinical	
depression	
Clinical	
depression	Short-term	effects	𝑟RH	 -0.04	 -0.06	 -0.22	 0.01	 0.01	 -0.01	
Second	stage	 (0.40)	 (0.60)	 (0.49)	 (0.09)	 (0.14)	 (0.11)	𝑠𝑝#H	 0.20***	 0.13***	 0.17***	 0.20***	 0.13***	 0.17***	
First	stage	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	F	statistic	 123.34	 60.33	 78.85	 123.34	 60.33	 78.85	Hausman	test	 	0.98	 	0.99	 0.82	 0.98	 0.91	 0.89	Longer-term	effects	
Excluding	lagged	mental	health	𝑟RHI)	 1.30***	 1.98***	 1.18**	 0.25**	 0.39**	 0.27**	
Second	stage	 (0.44)	 (0.69)	 (0.53)	 (0.09)	 (0.15)	 (0.12)	𝑠𝑝#HI)	 0.20***	 0.13***	 0.17***	 0.20***	 0.13***	 0.17***	
First	stage	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	F	statistic	 123.66	 60.64	 79.27	 123.66	 60.64	 79.27	Hausman	test	 <0.01	 <0.01	 0.02	 <0.01	 <0.01	 0.01	
Including	lagged	mental	health	𝑟RHI)	 1.28***	 1.95***	 1.08**	 0.26***	 0.40***	 0.27**	
Second	stage	 (0.40)	 (0.63)	 (0.49)	 (0.09)	 (0.14)	 (0.11)	𝑠𝑝#HI)	 0.20***	 0.13***	 0.17***	 0.20***	 0.13***	 0.17***	
First	stage	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	F	statistic	 123.63	 60.62	 48.67	 123.67	 60.64	 79.28	Hausman	test	 <0.01	 <0.01	 0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	
n	 4,704	 4,704	 3,818	 4,704	 4,704	 3,818	
Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	individual	level	in	parentheses.		
2.6.1.2. Inverse	probability	weighting		As	noted	in	Section	2.4.5,	it	is	important	to	investigate	whether	panel	attrition	threatens	the	validity	of	the	findings.	Table	2.A.7	displays	results	from	the	same	specifications	as	those	 estimated	 in	 the	 third	 panels	 in	 Tables	 2.4	 and	 2.5,	 with	 the	 exception	 that	respondents	 are	 weighted	 by	 their	 inverse	 probability	 to	 remain	 in	 the	 panel,	 as	predicted	 by	 the	 baseline	 characteristics	 discussed	 in	 Section	 2.4.5.	 All	 estimates	 are	
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very	similar	to	the	ones	obtained	without	weights,	irrespective	of	retirement	definition	utilised	and	outcome	analysed.	In	fact,	the	coefficients	become	larger,	even	though	a	few	observations	 are	 lost	 because	 of	 missing	 values	 on	 the	 variables	 used	 to	 predict	 the	probability	that	respondents	remain	 in	the	panel.	The	conclusion	from	this	exercise	 is	thus	that	it	is	unlikely	that	selective	attrition	poses	a	threat	to	the	study’s	findings.		
2.6.2. Heterogeneous	effects		While	all	results	so	far	indicate	that	retirement	has	a	negative	average	impact	on	mental	health	 in	 the	 longer-term	 perspective,	 this	 does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 it	 affects	everybody	in	the	same	way.	Table	2.A.8	shows	results	from	models	that	allow	the	long-term	impact	of	retirement	to	differ	depending	on	gender,	educational	background,	and	physical	as	well	as	psychosocial	occupational	strain,	as	discussed	in	Section	2.5.1.	There	is	 no	 evidence	 of	 statistically	 significant	 heterogeneous	 effects.24	The	 coefficients	 are	generally	 small	 and/or	 inconsistent	 across	 retirement	 definitions.	 In	 unreported	regressions,	 we	 found	 no	 evidence	 of	 heterogeneous	 short-term	 effects	 between	 the	first	 and	 second	 waves	 either.	 Overall,	 this	 indicates	 that	 the	 zero	 immediate	 and	negative	longer-term	effects	of	retirement	on	mental	health	generally	apply	similarly	to	men	and	women	as	well	as	individuals	with	different	socio-economic	and	occupational	backgrounds.25	
2.7. Conclusion		As	 policymakers	 worldwide	 have	 begun	 to	 reform	 state-pension	 systems	 to	 induce	higher	 labour-force	 participation	 among	 the	 elderly,	 research	 investigating	 the	 causal	impact	of	retirement	on	health	and	wellbeing	has	become	increasingly	important.	While	previous	 studies	 analysing	mental	 health	 have	 generally	 found	 positive	 or	 no	 effects,	they	 suffer	 from	 limitations.	 Perhaps	 most	 conspicuous	 is	 that	 nobody	 thus	 far	 has	separated	 short-	 from	 longer-term	effects	of	 retirement	 in	 a	 rigorous	 framework	 that	exploits	 discontinuities	 in	 retirement	 arising	 from	 state-pension	 ages.	 This	 is	 an																																																									24	This	 also	 applies	 when	 analysing	 the	 sample	 within	 the	 three-year	 age	 window.	 We	 found	 some	evidence	that	the	negative	impact	of	retirement	was	only	detectable	among	respondents	who	were	living	with	a	partner	at	the	time	of	the	first	wave.	However,	the	number	of	single	individuals	being	affected	by	the	instrument	threshold	is	small	in	our	sample,	which	makes	it	difficult	to	draw	strong	conclusions	from	this	exercise.	25	In	unreported	regressions,	we	also	estimated	separate	models	for	the	different	groups,	but	again	found	little	consistent	evidence	of	heterogeneity;	no	differences	were	statistically	significant	and	no	subgroups	appeared	to	benefit	from	retirement.	
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important	 shortcoming	 since	 there	 are	 good	 theoretical	 reasons	 to	 believe	 that	 the	short-	and	longer-term	effects	of	retirement	differ.						This	study	has	sought	to	remedy	these	issues	by	investigating	the	short-	and	longer-term	effects	of	retirement	on	mental	health	in	ten	European	countries.	Analysing	panel	data	 from	 the	 Survey	 of	 Health,	 Ageing,	 and	 Retirement	 in	 Europe,	 it	 utilised	 an	individual-fixed	effects	IV	approach	and	age-based	discontinuities	within	state-pension	systems	as	instruments.	Although	the	results	show	no	impact	of	retirement	in	the	short	run,	 there	 is	 strong	 evidence	 of	 a	 considerable	 negative	 lagged	 effect	 that	 appears	within	a	couple	of	years’	time.	This	effect,	which	survives	a	range	of	robustness	tests,	is	apparent	both	when	analysing	the	Euro-D	scale	as	well	as	the	cut-off	point	 for	clinical	depression.	 It	 applies	 to	 women	 and	 men	 similarly	 and	 also	 appears	 to	 operate	independently	of	 individuals’	educational	background	and	 level	of	occupational	strain.	This	 indicates	 retirement	 affects	 people	 of	 different	 socio-economic	 backgrounds	 and	professions	similarly	in	terms	of	mental	health.						Yet	while	the	study	has	found	a	negative	longer-term	effect	of	retirement	on	mental	health,	it	is	silent	on	the	mechanisms	through	which	this	effect	operates.	Policymakers	and	practitioners	would	certainly	benefit	from	understanding	these	mechanisms	when	attempting	to	counter	the	negative	long-run	impact;	identifying	the	specific	mechanisms	linking	retirement	 to	declining	mental	health	 in	a	 longer-term	perspective	remains	an	important	topic	for	future	research	to	investigate.						Nevertheless,	 overall,	 this	 study’s	 findings	 indicate	 that	policymakers	do	not	 face	 a	trade-off	between	making	state-pension	systems	solvent	and	 improving	mental	health	among	the	elderly.	Certainly,	as	displayed	by	other	research,	reforms	affecting	eligibility	to	 state	 pensions	 may	 have	 immediate	 negative	 mental	 health	 effects	 operating	independently	 of	 retirement,	 at	 least	 if	 these	 reforms	 affect	 people	 late	 in	 their	 lives.	With	time,	however,	our	 findings	 indicate	that	such	reforms	not	only	are	necessary	to	make	pension	systems	sustainable,	but	may	also	be	an	efficient	way	to	improve	mental	health	among	the	elderly	by	delaying	the	negative	longer-term	effect	of	retirement	per	se.				
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Appendix	
	
Table	2.A.1:	State-pension	ages	across	countries,	gender,	and	cohorts	
Country	 Men	 Women	Austria	 65	 60	Belgium	 65	 60-63	Denmark	 65-67	 65-67	France	 60	 60	Germany	 65	 60-62	Italy	 60-65	 55-60	Netherlands	 65	 65	Spain	 65	 65	Sweden	 65	 65	Switzerland	 65	 62-63	
Note:	The	state-pension	ages	are	based	on	those	provided	by	Mazzonna	and	Perrachi	(2012),	with	slight	adjustments	based	on	data	from	other	sources	(see	Börsch-Supan	and	Wilke	2006;	SSA	2006).	The	state-pension	age	varies	by	country,	gender,	and	cohort	(as	indicated	by	the	age	ranges	in	the	columns).	
	
	
Table	2.A.2:	The	short-term	association	between	retirement	and	mental	health	(waves	2–4)		 FE-OLS	 FE-OLS	 FE-OLS	 FE-OLS	 FE-OLS	 FE-OLS	Retirement	definition	 1	 2	 3	 1	 2	 3	
		 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Clinical	depression	
Clinical	
depression	
Clinical	
depression	𝑟#H	 -0.13**	 -0.15**	 -0.17**	 -0.03**	 -0.03**	 -0.04**		 (0.06)	 (0.06)	 (0.07)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	n	 8,551	 8,551	 	7,228	 8,551	 8,551	 		7,228	
Note:	Significance	 levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	 individual	 level	are	 in	 parentheses.	 The	 model	 specifications	 correspond	 to	 those	 in	 the	 first	 panel	 in	 Table	 2.3,	 but	instead	analysing	changes	between	waves	2	and	4.	The	number	of	individuals	differs	slightly	compared	to	the	models	in	the	paper.	This	is	because	of	a	few	instances	of	missing	data,	and,	in	the	case	of	the	models	using	the	third	retirement	definition,	because	more	individuals	reported	themselves	to	be	either	working	or	retired	between	the	second	and	fourth	waves.	
	
	
Table	2.A.3:	The	short-term	impact	of	retirement	on	mental	health	(waves	2–4)		 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	Retirement	definition	 1	 2	 3	 1	 2	 3	
		 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Clinical	depression	
Clinical	
depression	
Clinical	
depression	𝑟RH	 -0.04	 -0.06	 -0.04	 0.07	 	0.10	 0.10	
	 (0.35)	 (0.50)	 (0.44)	 (0.08)	 	(0.11)	 	(0.10)	F	statistics	 165.35	 80.49	 97.02	 165.36	 80.51	 97.00	Hausman		 	0.97	 	0.99	 0.97	 	0.23	 0.27	 	0.24	
n	 8,551	 8,551	 	7,228	 8,551	 8,551	 	7,228	
Note:	Significance	 levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	 individual	 level	are	 in	 parentheses.	 The	 model	 specifications	 correspond	 to	 those	 in	 the	 first	 panel	 in	 Table	 2.4,	 but	instead	analysing	changes	between	waves	2	and	4,	with	all	controls	measured	at	𝑡,	while	also	 including	lagged	mental	health.	
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Table	2.A.4:	Longer-term	effects	between	waves	1	and	4	
		 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	Retirement	definition	 1	 2	 3	 1	 2	 3	
		 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Clinical	depression	
Clinical	
depression	
Clinical	
depression	𝑟RHI)	 1.52***	 2.46***	 1.47**	 0.27**	 0.44**	 0.33*			 (0.56)	 (0.94)	 (0.75)	 (0.12)	 (0.20)	 (0.17)	F	statistic	 88.46	 38.25	 48.73	 88.46	 38.25	 48.73	Hausman		 <0.01	 <0.01	 0.02	 0.03	 0.02	 0.04	
n	 8,566	 8,566	 7,113	 8,566	 8,566	 7,113	
Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	individual	level	in	parentheses.		The	specification	corresponds	to	the	one	used	in	the	second	panel	in	Table	2.4,	but	instead	analysing	changes	in	mental	health	between	waves	1	and	4.	
	
	
Table	2.A.5:	Controlling	for	short-term	effects	between	waves	2	and	4	(excluding	and	including	
further	restrictions	on	the	control	group)		 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	Retirement	definition	 1	 2	 3	 1	 2	 3	
		 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Clinical	depression	
Clinical	
depression	
Clinical	
depression	Full	working	sample	𝑟RHI)	 1.91***	 2.67***	 1.62*	 0.45***	 	0.67***	 0.51**	
	 (0.62)	 (1.03)	 (0.89)	 (0.14)	 	(0.24)	 	(0.21)	𝑟RH	 0.33	 0.06	 -0.02	 0.18	 	0.17	 0.12	
	 (0.56)	 (0.81)	 (0.73)	 (0.13)	 	(0.19)	 	(0.17)	
n	 8,550	 8,550	 	7,011	 8,550	 8,550	 		7,011	Excluding	individuals	who	were	retired	at	wave	1	𝑟RHI)	 1.66***	 1.61**	 1.20**	 0.32***	 	0.34**	 0.30**	
	 (0.52)	 (0.63)	 (0.59)	 (0.12)	 	(0.14)	 	(0.13)	𝑟RH	 0.26	 0.38	 0.15	 0.15	 0.10	 0.10	
	 (0.44)	 (0.53)	 (0.48)	 (0.10)	 (0.12)	 (0.11)	
n	 4,757	 3,535	 3,334	 4,757	 3,535	 		3,334	Excluding	individuals	who	were	retired	and/or	above	the	state-pension	age	at	wave	1	𝑟RHI)	 2.50***	 2.04**	 1.64**	 0.53***	 	0.40**	 0.38**	
	 (0.94)	 (0.82)	 (0.77)	 (0.20)	 	(0.18)	 	(0.17)	𝑟RH	 -0.03	 -0.05	 -0.18	 0.10	 0.03	 0.04	
	 (0.54)	 (0.70)	 (0.61)	 (0.12)	 (0.15)	 (0.14)	
n	 4,310	 3,416	 3,224	 4,310	 3,416	 		3,224	
Note:	Significance	 levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	 individual	 level	are	 in	parentheses.	The	specifications	correspond	to	 the	one	used	 in	 the	 third	panel	 in	Table	2.4,	while	also	including	𝑟RH	(with	𝑠𝑝#H	as	instrument).	The	minimum	F	statistic	is	18.45.	The	minimum	Cragg-Donald	F	statistic	 is	14.29.	The	Hausman	test	always	displays	values	lower/higher	than	0.1	for	the	lagged/non-lagged	coefficient	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
49		
Table	2.A.6:	Combining	a	quadratic	age	trend	with	the	3-year	age	window	
		 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	Retirement	definition	 1	 2	 3	 1	 2	 3	
		 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Clinical	depression	
Clinical	
depression	
Clinical	
depression	Excluding	lagged	mental	health	𝑟RHI)	 2.61***	 3.76***	 2.75**	 0.50***	 0.72**	 0.64***		 (0.84)	 (1.33)	 (1.07)	 (0.18)	 (0.28)	 (0.24)	F	statistics	 45.92	 27.43	 28.71	 45.92	 23.43	 28.71	Hausman	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	Including	lagged	mental	health	𝑟RHI)	 2.27***	 3.27***	 2.25**	 0.39**	 0.57**	 0.48**		 (0.75)	 (1.18)	 (0.94)	 (0.16)	 (0.24)	 (0.21)	F	statistics	 45.82	 23.33	 28.50	 46.01	 23.37	 28.76	Hausman	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	
n	 4,704	 4,704	 3,818	 4,704	 4,704	 3,818	
Note:	Significance	 levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	 individual	 level	are	in	parentheses.	
	
	
Table	2.A.7:	Estimates	from	models	using	inverse	probability	weighting	
		 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	Retirement	definition	 1	 2	 3	 1	 2	 3	
		 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Clinical	depression	
Clinical	
depression	
Clinical	
depression	Weighted	estimates	from	the	3rd	panel	in	Table	2.4	𝑟RHI)	 2.21***	 3.48***	 2.67***	 0.39***	 0.61***	 0.57***			 (0.61)	 (1.05)	 (0.86)	 (0.11)	 (0.22)	 (0.19)	F	statistic	 71.95	 34.00	 39.62	 72.01	 34.02	 39.70	Hausman		 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	
n	 8,493	 8,493	 7,050	 8,493	 8,493	 7,050	Weighted	estimates	from	the	3rd	panel	in	Table	2.5	𝑟RHI)	 1.68***	 2.49***	 1.67***	 0.33***	 0.48***	 0.38***		 (0.47)	 (0.72)	 (0.58)	 (0.10)	 (0.16)	 (0.12)	F	statistic	 106.12	 58.20	 69.37	 106.10	 58.23	 69.41	Hausman		 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	 <0.01	
n	 4,661	 4,661	 3,782	 4,661	 4,661	 3,782	
Note:	Significance	 levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	 individual	 level	are	in	parentheses.	
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Table	2.A.8:	Heterogeneous	effects		 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	 FE-IV	Retirement	definition	 1	 2	 3	 1	 2	 3	
		 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Euro-D	 Clinical	depression	
Clinical	
depression	
Clinical	
depression	
Gender	𝑟RHI) ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒	 0.07	 1.53	 0.04	 -0.06	 0.16	 -0.05		 (0.48)	 (0.98)	 (0.60)	 (0.10)	 (0.20)	 (0.14)	𝑟RHI)	 1.57***	 2.04***	 1.67**	 0.33***	 0.41***	 0.39***		 (0.54)	 (0.71)	 (0.67)	 (0.12)	 (0.15)	 (0.15)	
n	 8,566	 8,566	 7,113	 8,566	 8,566	 7,113	
Education	𝑟RHI) ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑤	𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	 -0.53	 -0.28	 -0.66	 -0.10	 -0.06	 -0.14		 (0.57)	 (0.81)	 (0.69)	 (0.12)	 (0.17)	 (0.16)	𝑟RHI)	 2.02***	 2.86***	 2.22**	 0.36**	 0.51**	 0.48**		 (0.66)	 (1.02)	 (0.92)	 (0.15)	 (0.22)	 (0.21)	
n	 8,502	 8,502	 7,056	 8,502	 8,502	 7,056	
Occupational	Physical	Burden	𝑟RHI)*ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ	𝑂𝑃𝐵	 0.04	 0.14	 0.24	 -0.10	 -0.11	 -0.04		 (0.49)	 (0.69)	 (0.60)	 (0.11)	 (0.15)	 (0.13)	𝑟RHI)	 1.55***	 2.33***	 1.76**	 0.34***	 0.49***	 0.38**		 (0.53)	 (0.84)	 (0.69)	 (0.12)	 (0.19)	 (0.16)	
Occupational	Psychosocial	Burden	𝑟RHI)*ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ	𝑂𝑆𝐵	 0.21	 0.17	 0.57	 0.07	 0.08	 0.13		 (0.48)	 (0.68)	 (0.57)	 (0.11)	 (0.15)	 (0.13)	𝑟RHI)	 1.43**	 2.28**	 1.47*	 0.24*	 0.39*	 0.27		 (0.60)	 (1.00)	 (0.80)	 (0.14)	 (0.22)	 (0.18)	
n	 7,607	 7,607	 6,665	 7,607	 7,607	 6,665	
Note:	Significance	 levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	 individual	 level	are	in	parentheses.	The	minimum	F	statistic	for	the	instrumented	interaction	is	61.70	and	the	minimum	F	statistics	 for	𝑟RHI)	is	 18.70.	 The	 minimum	 Cragg-Donald	 F	 statistic	 is	 23.77.	 The	 Hausman	 test	 always	displays	p-values	lower	than	or	equal	to	0.1.	All	models	include	lagged	mental	health.	OPB	=	Occupational	Physical	Burden.	OSB	=	Occupational	Psychosocial	Burden.	
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3. Smart	but	Unhappy:	Independent-school	Competition	and	the	
Wellbeing-efficiency	Trade-off	in	Education*		
Published	in	the	Economics	of	Education	Review,	Vol.	62,	February	2018,	pp.	66–81.		
Abstract	
	We	study	whether	 independent-school	competition	involves	a	trade-off	between	pupil	wellbeing	and	academic	performance.	To	test	this	hypothesis,	we	analyse	data	covering	pupils	across	 the	OECD,	exploiting	historical	Catholic	opposition	to	state	schooling	 for	exogenous	 variation	 in	 independent-school	 enrolment	 shares.	 We	 find	 that	independent-school	competition	decreases	pupil	wellbeing	but	raises	achievement	and	lowers	 educational	 costs.	 Our	 analysis	 and	 balancing	 tests	 indicate	 these	 findings	 are	causal.	 In	 addition,	we	 find	 several	mechanisms	 behind	 the	 trade-off,	 including	more	traditional	teaching	and	stronger	parental	achievement	pressure.		
																																																								*	The	author	thanks	Sarah	Cohodes,	Susan	Dynarski,	Henrik	Jordahl,	Julian	Le	Grand,	Olmo	Silva,	Dinand	Webbink,	 two	 anonymous	 referees,	 and	 participants	 at	 the	 conference	 ‘Efficient	 provision	 of	 public	services’	 hosted	 by	 the	 Research	 Institute	 of	 Industrial	 Economics	 in	 Vaxholm,	 Sweden	 for	 useful	comments	and	discussions.	
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3.1. Introduction		The	 extent	 to	 which	 independently-operated	 schools	 improve	 pupil	 outcomes	 has	become	 a	 fiercely	 debated	 topic	 in	 the	 economics	 of	 education.	 An	 important	motive	behind	 reforms	 designed	 to	 increase	 independent-school	 access,	 such	 as	 vouchers,	 is	that	 such	 schools	will	 increase	 competition	 and	 thus	 generate	 improvements	 in	pupil	performance	at	the	system	level	(e.g.	Friedman	1962;	Le	Grand	2007;	Neal	2002).	In	the	past	decades,	research	has	begun	to	evaluate	whether	or	not	this	holds	true	in	different	contexts.						However,	 the	 existing	 literature	 focuses	 mostly	 on	 academic	 outcomes.	 Certainly,	such	 outcomes	 are	 important	 given	 their	 links	 with	 labour-market	 success,	 non-pecuniary	 long-term	outcomes,	 and	 economic	development	 (e.g.	 Atherton	 et	 al.	 2013;	Brunello	et	al.	2016;	Card	1999;	Hanushek	et	al.	2015;	Hanushek	and	Woessmann	2012,	2016;	 Oreopoulos	 and	 Salvanes	 2011).	 But	 there	 are	 also	 important	 non-cognitive	outputs	 of	 schooling.	 These	 outputs	 include	 pupil	 wellbeing,	 which	 has	 become	 an	increasingly	 emphasised	 policy	 goal	 in	 western	 countries,	 justified	 by	 the	 fact	 that	wellbeing	 in	 childhood	 and	 adolescence	 is	 an	 important	 predictor	 of	 risky	 behaviour,	adult	wellbeing,	and	a	range	of	other	outcomes	(e.g.	Carneiro	et	al.	2007;	Frijters	et	al.	2014;	Jones	2013;	Layard	et	al.	2014;	Lévy-Garboua	et	al.	2006;	Takakura	et	al.	2010).	As	school	is	a	key	part	of	youngsters’	lives,	it	is	perhaps	unsurprising	that	measures	of	wellbeing	 at	 school	 also	 predict	 a	 range	 of	 more	 general	 wellbeing	 and	 behavioural	indicators	(e.g.	Gibbons	and	Silva	2011;	Huebner	and	Gilman	2006;	Huebner	and	Diener	2008;	Huebner	et	al.	2014;	Locke	and	Newcomb	2004).	Furthermore,	it	may	be	easier	to	positively	affect	pupil	wellbeing	and	other	non-cognitive	indicators	at	school,	compared	with	cognitive	performance	(e.g.	Heckman	and	Kautz	2013;	Payton	et	al.	2008).						Importantly,	 however,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 interventions	 improving	 academic	efficiency,	 in	 terms	 of	 academic	 output	 per	 dollar	 spent,	 also	 have	 positive	 effects	 on	wellbeing	 at	 school.	 Progressive	 pedagogical	 theory,	 characterised	 by	 child-centred	ways	 of	 working,	 generally	 assumes	 the	 two	 go	 hand	 in	 hand	 (Christodoulou	 2014;	Mintz	 2012),	 an	 idea	 that	 is	 often	 highlighted	 in	 policy	 debates.	 For	 example,	 Public	Health	 England	 (2014:4)	 argues:	 ‘[P]romoting	 the	 health	 and	wellbeing	 of	 pupils	 and	students	 within	 schools	 and	 colleges	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 improve	 their	 educational	outcomes	and	their	health	and	wellbeing	outcomes’.	Yet	there	is	little	rigorous	empirical	evidence	supporting	this	assumption.	In	fact,	research	suggests	that	policies	improving	
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academic	performance	also	often	appear	to	make	learning	and	school	life	less	joyful	(e.g.	Falch	and	Rønning	2012;	Jürges	and	Schneider	2010;	Warton	2001).	If	this	is	the	case,	policies	 that	 raise	 academic	efficiency	may	also	produce	 lower	pupil	wellbeing	–	 thus	generating	 a	 wellbeing-efficiency	 trade-off	 in	 education.	We	 hypothesise	 that	 market	incentives,	 which	 are	 likely	 to	 induce	 stronger	 focus	 on	 academic	 efficiency,	 involve	such	 a	 trade-off.	 Given	 the	 widespread	 belief	 in	 pedagogical	 and	 policy	 circles	 that	wellbeing	 and	academic	 achievement	 are	positively,	 and	 causally,	 related	–	 as	well	 as	the	considerable	interest	paid	to	the	effects	of	market	reforms	in	education	in	general	–	this	is	an	important	issue	to	investigate	in	its	own	right.						Utilising	pupil-level	data	from	the	Programme	for	International	Student	Assessment	(PISA)	covering	15-year	old	pupils	across	34	OECD	countries,	we	test	our	hypothesis	by	analysing	the	system-level	effects	of	independent-school	competition	on	pupil	wellbeing	and	 academic	 efficiency.1	We	 build	 on	 prior	 research	 –	 the	most	 relevant	 of	which	 is	West	 and	 Woessmann’s	 (2010)	 –	 and	 use	 an	 instrumental-variable	 (IV)	 strategy	exploiting	Catholic	resistance	 to	state	schooling	 in	 the	19th	and	early	20th	centuries	 to	predict	 enrolment	 shares	 in	 independently-operated	 schools	 today.	 As	 school	secularisation	 gained	 ground,	 Catholics	 tended	 to	 push	 for	 access	 to	 independent	schools	 in	 countries	 without	 Catholicism	 as	 state	 religion.	 We	 thus	 use	 Catholic	population	shares	in	1900,	interacted	with	an	indicator	for	whether	or	not	Catholicism	was	the	state	religion,	as	 instrument	 for	contemporary	 independent-school	enrolment	shares.	Controlling	 for	detailed	 regional-fixed	effects	and	a	number	of	 relevant	pupil-,	school-,	 and	 country-level	 controls,	 including	 the	 contemporary	 version	 of	 the	instrument	 itself,	 it	 is	plausible	that	this	variation	is	exogenous.	This	 is	especially	true	since	we	account	for	a	number	of	other	important	historical	factors	affecting	the	extent	to	 which	 Catholic	 resistance	 did	 in	 fact	 generate	 higher	 independent-school	competition,	and,	if	it	did,	the	extent	to	which	this	competition	has	survived	to	this	day.	If	 anything,	 other	 research	and	our	analysis	 suggest	 the	 strategy	may	bias	 the	 results	against	our	hypothesis.						We	 find	 that	 independent-school	 competition	 has	 considerable	 negative	 effects	 on	pupil	 wellbeing.	 The	 effects	 are	 just	 as	 conspicuous	 when	 restricting	 the	 sample	 to	pupils	in	state	schools,	indicating	that	the	impact	depends	on	system-level	competition																																																									1	For	a	discussion	about	the	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	using	international	data,	see	Hanushek	and	Woessmann	(2011).		
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rather	than	on	the	direct	impact	of	independent-school	attendance	and/or	pupil	sorting.	We	further	confirm	positive	effects	of	competition	on	PISA	scores	and	a	negative	impact	on	 education	 expenditures	 found	 in	 previous	 research	 (see	 West	 and	 Woessmann	2010),	 thus	 supporting	 the	 idea	 of	 a	wellbeing-efficiency	 trade-off.	 Balancing	 tests	 on	pupil-background	variables	support	the	causal	interpretation	of	our	findings.						Analysing	 potential	 mechanisms	 behind	 the	 trade-off,	 we	 find	 that	 competition	induces	 more	 traditional	 teaching,	 instructional	 time,	 and	 homework,	 which	 prior	research	 suggests	 raise	 achievement	 and	 lower	 wellbeing.	 Also,	 competition	 makes	pupil-teacher	relations	more	hierarchical	and	increases	parental	achievement	pressure,	two	other	relevant	mechanisms	behind	the	wellbeing-efficiency	trade-off.						Finally,	based	on	our	findings	and	other	research	comparing	the	longer-term	returns	to	 cognitive	 achievement	 and	wellbeing	 in	 adolescence,	we	 carry	 out	 a	 basic	 back-of-the-envelope	 cost-benefit	 analysis.	 This	 indicates	 that	 the	 positive	 effects	 of	independent-school	 competition	on	 academic	 efficiency	outweigh	 the	negative	 impact	on	pupil	wellbeing	from	an	economic	standpoint.	However,	using	adult	life	satisfaction	as	 the	 unit	 of	 measurement	 rather	 than	 money,	 the	 costs	 of	 competition	 appear	 to	outweigh	its	benefits.	While	further	research	is	necessary	to	draw	strong	conclusions	in	this	 respect,	 the	 analysis	 at	 least	 suggests	 a	 more	 general	 trade-off	 between	 the	traditional	 goals	of	 education	policy	and	 the	wellbeing	agenda	 to	which	policymakers	should	pay	attention.						The	 paper	 proceeds	 as	 follows.	 Section	 3.2	 discusses	 the	 theoretical	 link	 between	school	competition	and	wellbeing	as	well	as	 related	research;	Section	3.3	outlines	 the	data	analysed;	Section	3.4	describes	the	methodology;	Section	3.5	presents	the	results	and	a	tentative	back-of-the-envelope	cost-benefit	analysis;	and	Section	3.6	concludes.	
3.2. Theory	and	related	literature		Theoretically,	 the	 system-level	 effects	 of	 independently-operated	 schools	 should	depend	 on	 parental	 demand	 for	 different	 outcomes.	 If	 parents	 perceive	 the	marginal	utility	 of	 wellbeing	 at	 school	 to	 be	 high,	 we	 might	 expect	 independent-school	competition	 to	 have	positive	 effects	 in	 this	 respect.	 For	 example,	 increasing	 access	 to	independent	 schools	 expands	 school	 choice,	 which	 may	 allow	 for	 a	 better	 match	between	 pupil	 and	 school	 (e.g.	 Adnett	 and	 Davies	 2002).	 Additionally,	 independent	schools	may	be	more	responsive	to	pupil	needs	and	have	more	capacity	to	innovate	(e.g.	
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Chubb	 and	 Moe	 1988).	 Finally,	 with	 more	 opportunities	 for	 choice,	 schools	 must	compete	to	attract	pupils	(e.g.	Hoxby	2003).	The	competitive	pressures,	in	turn,	would	force	 schools	 that	 produce	 low	 wellbeing	 to	 either	 improve	 or	 go	 out	 of	 business.	Overall,	the	result	would	be	higher	pupil	wellbeing	on	average	throughout	the	system.						However,	this	story	hinges	on	the	assumption	that	parents	value	pupil	wellbeing,	and,	if	 there	 are	 trade–offs	 between	wellbeing	 and	other	 types	of	 school	 quality,	 that	 they	value	the	former	more	than	the	latter.	The	research	in	this	respect	is	admittedly	scarce,	but	it	does	not	support	this	assumption.	In	England,	Gibbons	and	Silva	(2011)	find	that	peer	quality	and	school	value	added	dominate	pupil	wellbeing	as	predictors	of	parental	satisfaction	 with	 schools.	 And	 whereas	 peer	 quality	 and	 school	 value	 added	 are	capitalised	into	house	prices,	average	pupil	happiness	is	not.	This	indicates	that	parents	prefer	 academic	 and	 peer	 quality	 over	 pupil	 wellbeing,	 thus	 generating	 stronger	incentives	for	schools	to	focus	on	the	former	rather	than	the	latter.						Certainly,	 progressive	 pedagogical	 theory,	 characterised	 by	 child-centred	 ways	 of	working,	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 wellbeing	 for	 improving	 achievement	(Christodoulou	 2014;	 Mintz	 2012).	 Yet	 there	 is	 little	 evidence	 in	 favour	 of	 this	hypothesis.	On	the	contrary,	cognitive	research	suggests	that	memorisation,	repetition,	and	 teaching	of	 facts	–	activities	 that	are	not	necessarily	 fun	or	 inspiring	–	are	key	 to	learning	(Christodoulou	2014;	Ingvar	and	Eldh	2014).	Furthermore,	research	has	found	that	 educational	methods	 and	 interventions	promoting	higher	performance,	 including	traditional	teaching	methods	and	central	exit	examinations,	also	often	appear	to	make	learning	 and	 school	 life	 less	 joyful	 (e.g.	Algan	 et	 al.	 2013;	Bietenback	2014;	 Jiang	 and	McComas	2015;	 Jürges	 and	 Schneider	2010;	 Jürges	 et	 al.	 2012;	Kirschner	 et	 al.	 2006;	Regh	2012;	Schwerdt	and	Wuppermann	2011;	Sweller	et	al.	2007).	Similar	stories	apply	to	time	spent	in	school,	instructional	time,	and	time	spent	doing	homework	(Aucejo	and	Romano	2014;	Csikszentmihalyi	and	Hunter	2003;	Falch	and	Rønning	2012;	Gustafsson	2013;	Kuehn	and	Landeras	2012;	Lavy	2015;	Rivkin	and	Schiman	2015;	Warton	2001).	In	 other	 words,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 assumptions	 of	 progressive	 pedagogical	 theory,	practices	 that	 produce	 higher	 academic	 efficiency	 also	 often	 seem	 to	 generate	 lower	pupil	wellbeing.2																																																									2	In	 an	 interesting	 contribution	 less	 related	 to	 wellbeing,	 West	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 find	 that	 Boston	 charter	schools	that	produce	high	cognitive	achievement	appear	to	have	negative	effects	on	various	self-reported	non-cognitive	measures.	However,	 the	 latter	 impact	may	be	due	 to	 reference	bias,	 since	 charter-school	pupils	 report	having	considerably	 stricter	and	more	hierarchical	 school	environments	 characterised	by	
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					A	potential	reason	explaining	these	results	is	that	interventions	with	positive	effects	on	achievement	make	pupils	work	harder,	which	may	in	turn	increase	their	stress	levels	and	thus	decrease	their	wellbeing.	Another	possibility	is	that	the	interventions	decrease	wellbeing	via	raised	stress	levels	that	induce	pupils	to	focus	more	on	their	schoolwork	–	which,	in	turn,	raise	achievement.	Yet	another	possible	reason	is	that	achievement	and	wellbeing	 affect	 each	 other	 positively,	 but	 that	 the	 net	 effect	 of	 the	 interventions	 on	wellbeing	 is	 still	 negative	 due	 to	 other	 mechanisms	 that	 operate	 independently	 of	achievement.	Regardless	of	the	mechanism,	the	cause	of	the	differential	effects	is	in	any	case	the	interventions	per	se	–	which	appear	to	involve	a	causal	net	trade-off	between	achievement	and	wellbeing.						However,	whether	or	not	such	a	trade-off	applies	to	market	incentives	in	education	is	an	open	question.	The	 literature	analysing	 the	effects	of	school	choice,	autonomy,	and	competition	 is	mixed,	 but	 often	 finds	 small-to-moderate	 positive	 effects	 on	 academic	outcomes	 and	 overall	 efficiency	 (e.g.	 Böhlmark	 and	 Lindahl	 2015;	 Chakrabarti	 2008;	Eyles	and	Machin	2015;	Lavy	2010;	Muralidharan	and	Sundararaman	2015).3	For	 this	paper’s	purposes,	 the	most	relevant	research	 is	West	and	Woessmann’s	 (2010)	study,	which	uses	 similar	data	 and	 instrument	 as	we	do.	They	 find	 that	 larger	 independent-school	 enrolment	 shares	 improve	 academic	 efficiency	by	 raising	performance	 in	PISA	and	lowering	per-pupil	expenditures.						Nevertheless,	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	only	one	paper	analyses	effects	on	pupil	wellbeing.	Utilising	 Spanish	high-school	data,	with	 an	 identification	 strategy	based	on	independent-school	 availability,	 Green	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 find	 negative	 effects	 on	 pupil	satisfaction	 of	 attending	 independently-operated	 schools.	 The	 authors	 speculate	 that	this	negative	impact	may	be	due	to	a	stronger	focus	on	academic	achievement	in	such	schools.	 However,	 they	 do	 not	 empirically	 investigate	 potential	 trade-offs	 directly	 or	study	the	system-level	effects	of	independent-school	competition.						Overall,	 therefore,	while	 the	 theoretical	 impact	of	 competition	 from	 independently-operated	 schools	 on	 pupil	 wellbeing	 is	 somewhat	 ambiguous,	 it	 appears	 more	reasonable	to	predict	a	negative	effect.	However,	 it	also	appears	reasonable	to	predict	that	 this	 negative	 impact	 will	 be	 accompanied	 by	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 academic	efficiency.	We	 therefore	expect	 a	 trade-off	 in	 terms	of	how	school	 competition	affects																																																																																																																																																																													high	 expectations.	 By	 studying	 competition	 at	 the	 country	 level,	 we	minimise	 the	 potential	 for	 similar	reference	bias	in	pupil	wellbeing.	3	See	Heller-Sahlgren	(2013)	for	a	comprehensive	review	and	assessment	of	this	literature.	
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pupil	wellbeing	and	academic	efficiency.	The	next	section	describes	the	data	utilised	to	investigate	these	issues.	
3.3. Data		To	 study	 how	 independent-school	 competition	 affects	 pupil	 wellbeing	 and	 academic	efficiency,	 as	 well	 as	mechanisms	 behind	 a	 potential	 trade-off,	 we	 exploit	 pupil-level	data	 from	 the	 2012	 round	 of	 the	OECD’s	 PISA	 survey.	 PISA	was	 created	 as	 a	 reliable	metric	of	pupil	knowledge,	and	has	been	carried	out	every	three	years	since	2000.	In	the	2012	round,	representative	samples	of	pupils	aged	between	15	years	and	three	months	and	16	 years	 and	 two	months	 in	 34	OECD	 countries	 –	 as	well	 as	 in	 31	other	partner	countries	or	economies	–	were	tested	in	mathematical,	reading,	and	scientific	literacy.						In	 addition	 to	 sitting	 the	 tests,	 pupils	 complete	 questionnaires	with	 rich	 details	 on	their	background	characteristics	and	personal	views,	which	we	use	to	obtain	indicators	for	pupil	wellbeing.	While	the	total	sample	across	the	34	OECD	countries	covers	about	295,000	 pupils,	 the	 rotating	 design	 of	 the	 questionnaire	 means	 that	 the	 sample	 size	when	analysing	wellbeing	is	about	190,000	pupils.4	To	obtain	information	on	ownership	structure	 and	 funding	 sources,	 we	 also	 make	 use	 of	 the	 school-level	 questionnaire,	which	 enquired	 headteachers	 about	 school-background	 information.	 Table	 3.A.1	outlines	the	descriptive	statistics	of	the	variables	used	in	the	analysis.		
3.3.1. Data		In	PISA	2012,	pupils	were	 for	 the	 first	 time	asked	about	 their	happiness	at	 school,	 or	more	specifically	to	what	extent	they	agree	with	the	following	statement:	‘I	feel	happy	at	school’.	Pupils	were	asked	to	choose	one	of	 the	 following	options:	(1)	 ‘strongly	agree’,	(2)	 ‘agree’,	 (3),	 ‘disagree’,	 or	 (4)	 ‘strongly	 disagree’,	 which	 we	 recode	 so	 that	 higher	values	indicate	higher	wellbeing.	Research	indicates	that	similar	measures	of	subjective	wellbeing	 are	 valid	 and	 reliable,	 both	 across	 and	 within	 countries,	 for	 children	 and	adults	alike	(e.g.	Alesina	et	al.	2004;	Frey	and	Stutzer	2002;	Gilman	and	Huebner	2003;	Huebner	 2004;	 Krueger	 and	 Schkade	 2008;	 Veenhoven	 2012).	 While	 our	 preferred	measure	may	 to	 some	 extent	 also	 pick	 up	 general	wellbeing,	 this	 is	 not	 necessarily	 a																																																									4	In	PISA	2012,	the	questionnaire	was	divided	into	one	common	part,	which	covers	background	variables	and	was	 administered	 to	 all	 pupils,	 and	one	 rotating	part,	which	 includes	 additional	 question	 sets	 that	were	randomly	allocated	to	pupils	within	schools.	The	design,	which	follows	the	one	for	the	cognitive	test	itself,	means	that	about	two	thirds	of	pupils	answered	all	questions	in	the	rotating	part	(see	OECD	2014).	
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problem.	This	is	because	happiness	at	school	is	likely	to	affect	wellbeing	more	generally.	Indeed,	 previous	 research	 suggests	 similar	 measures	 predict	 general	 wellbeing	indicators,	such	as	depression,	anxiety,	 life	satisfaction,	and	suicidal	 ideation	(Gibbons	and	Silva	2011;	Huebner	and	Diener	2008;	Huebner	and	Gilman	2006;	Huebner	et	 al.	2014;	Locke	and	Newcomb	2004).	For	our	purposes,	it	makes	most	conceptual	sense	to	study	wellbeing	at	school	specifically	since	the	independent	variable	of	interest	is	likely	to	 affect	 wellbeing	 primarily	 via	 the	 school	 environment,	 and	 because	 we	 are	particularly	interested	in	the	potential	trade-off	between	pupil	wellbeing	and	academic	achievement.	 By	 focusing	 on	 wellbeing	 at	 school	 specifically,	 we	 therefore	 study	 the	parameter	of	wellbeing	that	is	most	relevant	to	education	policy	per	se.	As	highlighted	by	the	OECD	(2013	p.	33):	 ‘As	schools	are	a,	if	not	the,	primary	social	environment	for	15-year	 olds,	 these	 subjective	 evaluations	 [of	 pupil	 happiness]	 provide	 a	 good	indication	 of	 whether	 education	 systems	 are	 able	 to	 foster	 or	 hinder	 overall	 student	well-being.’	We	thus	believe	our	principal	wellbeing	measure	is	highly	relevant	for	the	purpose	 of	 this	 paper.	 Nevertheless,	 in	 robustness	 tests,	we	 also	 consider	 alternative	wellbeing	metrics	 that	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 pick	 up	 pupils’	 attitudes	 to	 the	 school	 itself,	including	peer	relations.		
3.3.2. Academic	efficiency		While	 our	 principal	 focus	 is	 on	 pupil	 wellbeing,	 we	 also	 analyse	 PISA	 scores	 in	 all	subjects	as	well	as	cumulative	per-pupil	expenditures	between	ages	6	and	15,	which	we	obtain	 from	 the	 OECD	 (2016a).5	This	 allows	 us	 to	 investigate	 whether	 or	 not	 the	positive	 effects	 on	 academic	 achievement	 and	 negative	 impact	 on	 educational	expenditures,	 found	 in	 previous	 research	 using	 a	 similar	 methodology	 (West	 and	Woessmann	2010),	are	detected	also	in	our	extended	sample	of	countries	in	PISA	2012	and	with	the	methodological	alterations	described	in	Section	3.4.1	and	Appendix	B.	This	is	important	for	ensuring	that	our	interpretation	of	a	potential	trade-off	is	correct.		
3.3.3. Potential	mechanisms		In	 addition,	 we	 consider	 potential	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 independent-school	competition	may	operate.	One	plausible	mechanism	could	be	the	way	teachers	interact																																																									5	For	this	analysis,	we	use	the	expenditure	data	reported	in	the	PISA	2009	report	since	the	data	for	Greece	is	missing	in	the	PISA	2012	report.	However,	results	are	essentially	identical	if	we	instead	use	the	latter	data	and	exclude	Greece.	
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with	children	and	specifically	their	teaching	methods.	As	noted	in	Section	3.2,	research	finds	 that	pupil-centred	methods	generate	 lower	achievement,	while	at	 the	same	time	making	 learning	more	enjoyable.	 If	competition	sharpens	 incentives	 to	raise	academic	efficiency,	teachers	may	thus	use	more	traditional	methods	as	a	means	to	compete.	To	study	this	issue,	we	use	pupils’	views	regarding	the	extent	to	which	their	mathematics	teachers	are	student	oriented,	according	to	the	OECD’s	(2014)	taxonomy:	 ‘The	teacher	gives	different	work	to	classmates	who	have	difficulties	 learning	and/or	 to	 those	who	can	 advance	 faster’;	 ’The	 teacher	 assigns	 projects	 that	 require	 at	 least	 one	 week	 to	complete’;	‘The	teacher	has	us	work	in	small	groups	to	come	up	with	a	joint	solution	to	a	problem	or	task’;	and	 ‘The	teacher	asks	us	to	help	plan	classroom	activities	or	topics’.	Pupils	 are	 asked	 to	 choose	 one	 of	 the	 following	 options:	 (1)	 ‘Every	 lesson’,	 (2)	 ‘Most	lessons’,	 (3)	 ‘Some	 lessons’,	or	(4)	 ‘Never	or	hardly	ever’.	We	recode	the	responses	so	that	higher	values	indicate	more	use	of	pupil-centred	methods.						Furthermore,	 we	 also	 consider	 a	 related	 potential	 mechanism:	 hierarchical	 school	environments.	Research	on	Knowledge	is	Power	Program	(KIPP)	schools	indicates	that	school	models	predicated	on	hierarchical	 environments	boost	pupil	performance	 (e.g.	Abdulkadiroğlu	 et	 al.	 2016;	 Angrist	 et	 al.	 2013).	 However,	 more	 hierarchical	 school	environments	 may	 lower	 pupil	 wellbeing	 via	 worsened	 pupil-teacher	 relations.	 To	study	these	issues,	we	use	responses	to	the	statement	‘Most	of	my	teachers	really	listen	to	what	I	have	to	say’	as	a	proxy	for	the	degree	of	hierarchy	in	pupils’	relationships	with	teachers,	and	responses	to	the	statement	‘Students	get	along	well	with	most	teachers’	as	a	 general	 measure	 of	 pupil-teacher	 relations.	 In	 these	 cases,	 pupils	 were	 asked	 to	choose	one	of	the	following	options:	(1)	‘strongly	agree’;	(2)	‘agree’;	(3)	‘disagree’;	or	(4)	‘strongly	disagree’,	which	we	recode	so	that	higher	values	indicate	less	hierarchical	and	better	pupil-teacher	relations.						In	 addition,	 we	 investigate	 the	 effects	 of	 competition	 on	 parental	 achievement	pressure.	 Such	 pressure	 could	 be	 positively	 related	 to	 both	 competition	 and	performance,	 while	 also	 having	 negative	 effects	 on	 wellbeing.	 Thus,	 we	 consider	headteachers’	 appraisals	 of	 the	 level	 of	 parental	 pressure	 to	 achieve	 high	 academic	achievement:	(1)	‘There	is	constant	pressure	from	many	parents,	who	expect	our	school	to	 set	 very	 high	 academic	 standards	 and	 to	 have	 our	 students	 achieve	 them;	 (2)	‘Pressure	 on	 the	 school	 to	 achieve	 higher	 academic	 standards	 among	 students	 comes	from	 a	 minority	 of	 parents’;	 or	 (3)	 ‘Pressure	 from	 parents	 on	 the	 school	 to	 achieve	
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higher	academic	standards	among	students	is	largely	absent’.	We	recode	the	responses	so	that	higher	values	indicate	stronger	parental	achievement	pressure.6					Finally,	 we	 analyse	 instructional	 time	 and	 time	 spent	 on	 homework.	 As	 noted	 in	Section	3.2,	 these	variables	have	been	 found	to	be	positive	 for	academic	achievement,	while	also	being	associated	with	 lower	wellbeing.	We	 thus	analyse	pupil	 responses	 to	the	question:	 ‘In	a	normal,	full	week	at	school,	how	many	class	periods	do	you	have	in	total?’.	We	 further	 consider	 the	 number	 of	 class	 periods	 per	week	 in	 each	 of	 the	 test	subjects.7	Unlike	the	previous	statements,	these	are	open	questions	and	pupils	are	thus	asked	 to	write	 down	 the	 total	 number	 of	 class	 periods	per	week,	 instead	of	 choosing	from	 different	 sets	 of	 options.	 To	 analyse	 the	 total	 impact	 on	 time	 spent	 doing	homework,	we	instead	use	the	number	of	hours	per	week	pupils	report	that	they	spend	on	‘Homework	or	other	study	set	by	your	teachers’.	Again,	this	question	is	open	rather	than	closed.		
3.3.4. Independent-school	competition		In	 order	 to	 capture	 independent-school	 competition	 at	 the	 system	 level,	 we	 use	 the	proportion	 of	 15-year	 old	 pupils	who	 attend	 independently-operated	 schools	 in	 each	country,	 calculated	 from	 the	 PISA	 2012	 school	 questionnaire.	 In	 this	 questionnaire,	headteachers	 were	 asked	 to	 report	 whether	 or	 not	 their	 school	 is	 a	 ‘private	 school’,	defined	as	a	 school	managed	directly	or	 indirectly	by	a	non-government	organisation,	such	as	a	church,	trade	union,	business,	or	other	private	institution,	or	a	‘public	school’,	defined	 as	 a	 school	 managed	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 by	 a	 public	 education	 authority,	government	agency,	or	governing	board	appointed	by	government	or	elected	by	public	franchise.	The	aggregate	share	of	pupils	attending	independently-operated	schools	is	a	useful	measure	to	capture	the	level	of	independent-school	competition	in	an	education	system	and	has	been	used	in	similar	research	(see	Hanushek	and	Woessmann	2011).		
3.3.5. Control	variables		
																																																								6	Since	 the	 sampling	 procedure	 of	 schools	 was	 designed	 to	 optimise	 sampling	 of	 pupils	 rather	 than	schools,	the	OECD	recommends	that	researchers	‘analyse	school-level	variables	as	attributes	of	students	rather	than	as	elements	in	their	own	right’	(OECD	2014,	p.	398).	This	means	that	we	analyse	the	effects	of	headteachers’	responses	at	the	pupil	level	rather	than	the	school	level.	7	Since	class	periods	vary	in	length,	we	also	analysed	the	average	period	length	in	each	of	the	test	subjects	in	robustness	tests.	The	results	are	briefly	discussed	in	footnote	31	in	this	chapter.	
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We	obtain	relevant	control	variables	from	the	school	and	pupil	questionnaires.	First,	we	include	controls	for	a	range	of	pupil-background	characteristics:	gender,	age,	immigrant	background	 (first	 and	 second	 generation),	 an	 index	 of	 home	 possessions,	 the	 highest	occupational	status	of	parents,	and	the	highest	educational	level	of	parents,	expressed	in	years	of	schooling.8	We	also	include	indicators	for	whether	or	not	schools	are	located	in	a	village,	small	town,	town,	city,	or	large	city.9	In	addition,	we	control	for	pupils’	school	starting	 age	 and	 grade	 attended.	 Since	 sampling	 is	 based	 on	 pupils’	 age	 at	 test,	 these	variables	 may	 reflect	 important	 institutional	 characteristics	 of	 different	 education	systems,	 which	 could	 potentially	 correlate	 with	 both	 our	 outcome	 variables	 and	 the	instrument	discussed	in	Section	3.4.1	through	mechanisms	other	than	competition.10						Finally,	we	also	control	for	a	number	of	country-level	variables,	 including	(log)	GDP	per	capita	in	2011,	obtained	from	the	OECD	(2016b),	and	regional	dummies	for	Oceania,	East	 Asia,	 Europe,	 Middle	 East,	 Latin	 America,	 and	 North	 America	 in	 the	 baseline	estimates.	 In	 most	 models,	 however,	 we	 further	 include	 dummies	 for	 Anglo-Saxon	Europe,	Northern	Europe,	Western	Continental	Europe,	Eastern	Europe,	and	Southern	Europe.	This	allows	us	 to	control	 for	 fine-grained	regional-fixed	effects	 to	ensure	 that	cross-national	 cultural	 differences	 associated	 with	 both	 the	 instrument	 discussed	 in	Section	 3.4.1	 and	 the	 outcomes	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 bias	 the	 findings.11	In	 addition,	 we	control	for	other	relevant	country-level	variables	discussed	in	Section	3.4	and	Appendix	B	to	strengthen	our	instrumental-variable	strategy.	
																																																								8	Foreign-born	 pupils	 with	 two	 foreign-born	 parents	 are	 classified	 as	 first-generation	 immigrants,	whereas	 native-born	 pupils	 with	 at	 least	 one	 foreign-born	 parent	 and	 foreign-born	 pupils	 with	 one	native-born	 parent	 are	 classified	 as	 second-generation	 immigrants.	 Thus,	 pupils	 with	 two	 native-born	parents	 are	 classified	 as	 natives.	 The	 index	 of	 home	 possessions,	 the	 highest	 occupational	 status	 of	parents,	and	the	highest	years	of	schooling	of	parents	compose	the	broader	ESCS	index	(see	OECD	2014).	9	The	 average	 socio-economic	 and	 ethnic	 background	 of	 school	 peers	 may	 also	 affect	 the	 outcomes.	However,	since	independent-school	competition	may	increase	school	segregation	(e.g.	Hsieh	and	Urquiola	2006;	Böhlmark	et	al.	2016),	peer	background	is	a	potential	mechanism	through	which	competition	may	affect	wellbeing	 as	well	 as	 academic	 efficiency	 and	 is	 thus	 a	 ‘bad	 control’	 (Angrist	 and	 Pischke	 2009).	However,	as	displayed	in	Table	3.A.5,	the	results	are	robust	to	controlling	for	the	school-level	mean	of	all	pupil-level	variables.	10	As	in	most	surveys,	the	PISA	dataset	contains	some	missing	values	for	pupil-	and	school-level	variables,	although	this	problem	is	minor	for	any	single	control	in	our	analysis.	Nevertheless,	we	impute	values	for	missing	control	variables	using	the	weighted	mean	at	the	school	or	country	level,	always	using	the	lowest	level	available.	For	dummy	variables,	we	assign	a	value	of	1	or	0	depending	on	which	category	the	mean	is	closest	to.	In	order	to	ensure	that	the	results	are	not	biased	by	this	procedure,	we	also	include	dummies	for	missing	values	and	 interactions	between	 them	and	 the	 imputed	values.	Similar	 techniques	are	used	widely	 in	 previous	 research	 analysing	 PISA	 data	 (see	 Hanushek	 and	 Woessmann	 2011).	 Results	 are	essentially	identical	if	we	instead	drop	observations	with	any	control	containing	missing	values.	11	Note,	 however,	 that	we	 refrain	 from	 controlling	 for	 input	 variables,	 such	 as	 education	 spending	 and	class	size,	which	are	‘bad	controls’	and	should	be	left	out	of	the	equation.	
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3.4. Empirical	set-up		To	study	 the	 impact	of	 independent-school	 competition	on	 the	outcomes	discussed	 in	Section	3.3,	our	starting	point	is	the	following	OLS	model:	𝑜_`N = 𝛼 + 𝛽)𝑠𝑝N + 𝛽+𝑥_`N + 𝛽J𝑦 N + 𝛽K𝑧N + 𝜀_`N 																																	(1)		where	 	𝑜_`N 	is	 the	outcome	of	pupil	𝑝	in	 school	𝑠	in	 country	𝑐;	𝑠𝑝N 	denotes	 the	 share	of	pupils	 attending	 independently-operated	 schools	 in	 each	 country;	𝑥_`N 	is	 a	 vector	 of	pupil-level	 predictors;	𝑦 N 	is	 a	 vector	 of	 school-level	 predictors;	 and	𝑧N 	is	 a	 vector	 of	country-level	predictors.						The	 model’s	 assumption	 is	 that	𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑠𝑝N ,	𝜀_`N 𝑥_`N, 𝑦 N, 𝑧N = 0.	 However,	 if	𝑥_`N ,	𝑦 N ,	and	𝑧N 	together	 do	 not	 include	 all	 variables	 that	 impact	 both	𝑜_`N 	and	𝑠𝑝N ,	 or	 if	𝑜_`N 	affects	𝑠𝑝N 	directly,	 it	 would	 mean	 that	𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑠𝑝N ,	𝜀_`N 𝑥_`N, 𝑦 N, 𝑧N ≠ 0	and	 the	 results	will	 suffer	 from	 endogeneity	 bias	 (Angrist	 and	 Pischke	 2009).	 That	 is,	 the	 level	 of	independent-school	 competition	may	 in	 itself	be	affected	by	 the	outcomes,	generating	reverse	 causality,	 and/or	 omitted	 variables	may	 affect	 both	 the	 level	 of	 independent-school	competition	and	the	outcomes.	The	direction	of	bias	arising	from	these	issues	is	theoretically	 unclear,	 and	 partly	 depends	 on	 relative	 parental	 demand	 for	 different	types	of	school	quality	per	the	discussion	in	Section	3.2.		
3.4.1. Obtaining	exogenous	variation	in	independent-school	competition		To	 address	 potential	 endogeneity,	 we	 seek	 to	 obtain	 exogenous	 variation	 in	independent-school	 competition	 by	 exploiting	 historical	 resistance	 to	 state	 schooling	among	Catholics.	This	strategy	has	previously	been	used	to	predict	independent-school	enrolment	shares	within	and	between	countries	(Allen	and	Vignoles	2015;	Cohen-Zada	2009;	Cohen-Zada	and	Elder	2009;	Falck	and	Woessmann	2013;	West	and	Woessmann	2010).	The	idea	is	that	in	countries	where	Catholicism	was	not	the	de	facto	state	religion	in	 the	 late	 19th	 and	 early	 20th	 centuries,	 Catholics	 fiercely	 resisted	 the	 growing	 state	monopolisation	of	education.						This	 is	because	in	countries	where	Catholics	could	not	ensure	that	teaching	in	state	schools	was	consistent	with	 their	doctrine,	 such	as	Belgium,	 they	worked	 to	establish	independent	 schools	 and	 pushed	 governments	 to	 obtain	 public	 funding	 for	 them.	 In	some	 countries,	 Catholics	 joined	 forces	 with	 other	 groups	 that	 sought	 access	 to	
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independently-operated	schools.	For	example,	in	the	Netherlands,	Catholics	teamed	up	with	Calvinists	against	secular	forces	in	the	Schoolstrijd,	which	only	ended	in	1917	when	equal	 funding	 for	 independent	 and	 state	 schools	 was	 enshrined	 in	 the	 Dutch	constitution.	 As	 a	 general	 rule,	 however,	 Protestants	 were	 more	 accepting	 of	 state	monopolisation	 of	 education	 and	 rarely	 engaged	 in	 the	 same	 struggles.	 Nevertheless,	when	 Catholics	 were	 successful,	 the	 laws	 implemented	 often	 supported	 funding	 for	other	independent	schools	as	well	(see	Glenn	1989,	2011).	We	discuss	the	intuition,	and	historical	features	that	interfere	with	its	logic,	in	more	detail	in	Appendix	B.						Thus,	 Catholic	 population	 shares	 in	 the	 early	 20th	 century	 in	 countries	 where	Catholicism	 was	 not	 the	 de	 facto	 state	 religion	 should	 be	 a	 useful	 instrument	 for	enrolment	 shares	 in	 independently-operated	schools	 today,	once	controlling	 for	other	relevant	predictors	discussed	below.	We	obtain	Catholic	population	shares	in	1900	and	2010	from	Brown	and	James	(2015)	and	indicators	for	whether	or	not	Catholicism	was	the	state	religion	in	1900,	1970,	and	2000	from	Barrett	et	al.	(2001).12	Our	instrument	is	then	constructed	from	the	interaction	between	Catholic	population	shares	in	1900	and	a	dummy	 variable	 taking	 the	 value	 of	 0	 for	 countries	 in	which	 Catholicism	was	 the	 de	facto	 state	 religion	 in	 1900	 as	 well	 as	 immediately	 before	 World	 War	 II	 and	 1	otherwise.13	The	 latter	 restriction	 is	 applied	 because	 the	 political	 dynamic	 in	 the	education	 sphere	 in	 countries	 that	 permanently	 disestablished	 the	 Catholic	 Church	early	 in	 the	 20th	 century	was	 often	 similar	 to	 those	 that	 had	 done	 so	 by	 1900.14	This	historical	instrument	allows	us	to	control	directly	for	its	contemporary	version:	Catholic	population	 shares	 in	 2010	 interacted	 with	 an	 indicator	 taking	 the	 value	 of	 0	 if	
																																																								12	The	only	adjustments	we	make	to	the	data	obtained	from	Barrett	et	al.	(2001)	are:	(1)	Ireland	is	treated	as	 not	 having	 Catholicism	 as	 state	 religion	 in	 1900,	 since	 it	 was	 then	 part	 of	 the	 non-Catholic	 United	Kingdom	(see	Barro	and	McCleary	2005),	and	(2)	Austria	is	treated	as	having	Catholicism	as	its	de	facto	state	religion	in	1900.	Although	the	region	that	became	Austria	in	1918	did	not	officially	have	any	state	religion	 since	 the	 Austro-Hungarian	 Compromise	 of	 1867,	 the	 state	 provided	 an	 essential	 Catholic	monopoly	 in	 the	 public	 education	 system,	 also	 after	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 state	 in	 1918	 until	 Nazi	Germany’s	annexation	of	the	country	in	1938	(Glenn	2011;	Kaiser	and	Wohnout	2004).	13	For	Slovakia,	we	use	Catholic	population	shares	 in	1910	since	this	 is	 the	first	year	 for	which	data	are	available	for	the	country	in	Brown	and	James’s	(2015)	data	series.	14	For	 example,	 while	 Chile	 only	 abolished	 Catholicism	 as	 state	 religion	 in	 1925,	 the	 public	 education	system	had	become	secularised	and	centralised	already	in	the	mid-to-late	1800s,	much	to	the	denigration	of	the	country’s	Catholics	who	consequently	began	pushing	for	access	to	independent	schools	(Barr-Melej	2001;	Collier	1997;	Gauri	1998).	As	discussed	in	Appendix	B,	a	similar	story	applies	to	France	prior	to	the	abrogation	of	Napoleon’s	Concordat	of	1801	in	1905.	
64		
Catholicism	 was	 the	 state	 religion	 in	 1900,	 1970,	 and	 2000,	 and	 1	 otherwise.15	This	means	 that	 we	 control	 for	 any	 direct	 impact	 on	 the	 dependent	 variable	 that	 our	instrument	may	pick	up,	and	that	the	exogenous	variation	we	exploit	stems	only	from	interactions	in	historical	Catholic	population	shares	and	state	religion	that	are	unrelated	to	 the	 contemporary	 interaction	 between	 these	 variables	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 change	 in	 the	interaction	–	when	holding	constant	the	other	variables	in	the	model.						Also,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 controls	 discussed	 in	 Section	 3.3.5,	 we	 take	 further	precautions	 by	 adjusting	 for	 the	 following	 variables:	 Calvinist	 population	 shares	 in	1900;	population	size	in	1900;	Communist	and	post-Soviet	backgrounds;	indicators	for	early	 defeat	 of	 the	 Catholic	 Church	 in	 countries	where	 Catholicism	was	 not	 the	 state	religion;	national	bans	on	Jesuits	in	the	late	19th	and	early	20th	centuries;	indicators	for	countries	or	regions	that	were	de	facto	annexed	into	Nazi	Germany	during	World	War	II;	indicators	for	pro-Catholic	allies	or	client	states	of	Nazi	Germany;	and	indicators	for	countries	 or	 regions	 that	 recently	 implemented	 voucher	 programmes	 in	 which	 for-profit	operators	participate	on	an	equal	basis,	or	carried	out	reforms	that	encouraged	mass	conversions	of	state	schools	to	independently-operated	status.						The	general	 idea	behind	the	 inclusion	of	 these	variables	 is	 to	control	 for	sources	of	current	 independent-school	 enrolment	 shares	 that	 cannot	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	instrument	and	thus	maximise	 its	relevance	and	 increase	confidence	 in	 its	validity.	To	save	space,	we	discuss	the	complete	rationales	for	each	variable	in	Appendix	B	and	only	provide	 a	 few	 short	 illustrations	here.	One	example	 concerns	Calvinists,	who	 in	 some	countries	joined	the	Catholics’	more	general	resistance	to	secular	state	schooling,	giving	the	latter	a	probability	of	success	that	was	disproportionate	to	the	relative	size	of	their	community.	We	take	this	into	account	by	controlling	for	the	share	of	Calvinists	in	1900.	Another	example	is	the	role	of	the	Society	of	Jesus	in	the	establishment	of	independent	schools,	as	the	first	teaching	order	of	the	Catholic	Church.	During	the	struggle	between	secular	and	religious	forces	in	the	19th	century,	Jesuits	and	their	associate	orders	were	often	 banned	 from	 certain	 territories	 for	 longer	 periods	 of	 time,	 often	 specifically	because	of	their	educational	 influence.	We	thus	control	 for	these	bans	in	our	set-up.	A	third	example	relates	to	the	impact	of	Nazi	Germany	during	World	War	II.	Being	part	of,	or	de	facto	annexed	into	(but	not	occupied	by),	the	Greater	German	Reich	meant	severe																																																									15	The	overall	results	are	similar	if	we	instead	simply	control	for	Catholic	population	shares	in	2010	in	all	countries,	by	itself	or	together	with	a	separate	indicator	for	whether	or	not	Catholicism	was	the	de	facto	state	religion	in	1900,	1970,	and	2000.	
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persecution	of	the	Catholic	Church	and	closure	of	all	independent	schools.	We	take	this	into	account	by	 controlling	 for	an	 indicator	of	Nazi	 takeover	and	de	 facto	annexation.	Again,	detailed	accounts	of	all	additional	adjustments	are	provided	in	Appendix	B.16		
3.4.2. IV	specification		Thus,	to	obtain	plausibly	exogenous	variation	in	independent-school	enrolment	shares	across	OECD	countries,	we	then	estimate	the	following	2SLS	model:	𝑠𝑝N = 𝛼 + 𝛽)1900𝑐𝑠N + 𝛽+𝑥_`N + 𝛽J𝑦 N + 𝛽K𝑧N + 𝜀_`N 																															(2)		 𝑜_`N = 𝛼 + 𝛽)𝑠𝑝N + 𝛽+𝑥_`N + 𝛽J𝑦 N + 𝛽K𝑧N + 𝜀_`N 																																				(3)		where	𝑠𝑝N 	is	 the	predicted	 values	 of	𝑠𝑝N 	from	 the	 first	 stage,	while	1900𝑐𝑠N 	represents	the	 excluded	 instrument,	 outlined	 in	 Section	3.4.1.	The	vectors	𝑥_`N ,	𝑦 N ,	 and	𝑧N 	denote	the	 pupil-,	 school-,	 and	 country-level	 controls	 discussed	 in	 Sections	 3.3.5	 and	 3.4.1,	including	2010𝑐𝑠N ,	 which	 denotes	 the	 contemporary	 version	 of	 the	 instrument.	 The	variation	in	the	first	stage	is	thus	driven	by	the	interaction	between	historical	Catholic	population	 shares	 and	 the	 state	 religion	 indicator	 when	 holding	 constant	 the	contemporary	interaction	between	these	variables	–	thus	obtaining	identification	from	the	 change	 in	 the	 interaction	 over	 time	 –	 and	 only	 comparing	 countries	 within	 the	regions	controlled	for	by	the	regional-fixed	effects.	We	cluster	the	standard	errors	at	the	country	 level,	weight	 all	 regressions	by	pupils’	 inverse	 sampling	probability,	 and	give	each	country	equal	aggregate	weight	in	the	regressions.17						Of	 course,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 prove	 conclusively	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 above	 model	captures	 the	effects	of	 competition	on	pupil	wellbeing	and	academic	efficiency,	 rather	than	 the	 instrument’s	 effects	 through	 a	 different	 channel.	 This	 may	 seem	 especially	important	 since	we	 study	 several	 outcomes,	 which	 as	 discussed	 in	 Section	 3.2	might	
																																																								16	Without	the	inclusion	of	at	least	some	of	these	variables,	the	F	statistics	drops	radically,	suggesting	the	instrument	 becomes	 too	weak.	 For	 example,	 if	we	 only	 include	 broader-regional	 fixed	 effects	 together	with	the	pupil-level	and	school-location	controls,	the	F	statistic	in	the	first	stage	drops	from	about	46	to	3.	Adding	(log)	GDP	per	capita	and	the	Communist	indicator	only	increases	the	F	statistics	to	5,	but	adding	indicators	 for	 post-Soviet	 background	 and	national	 Jesuit	 bans	 raises	 the	 F	 statistics	 to	 22.	 Adding	 the	other	variables	then	strengthens	the	instrument	further.	Excluding	the	additional	controls	also	makes	the	data	less	balanced.	Specifically,	the	instrument	then	significantly	predicts	the	index	of	home	possessions,	which	is	the	best	pupil-level	predictor	of	pupil	happiness	and	a	key	predictor	of	test	scores.	Overall,	the	controls	thus	add	considerable	value	by	increasing	the	relevance	and	validity	of	the	instrument.	17	When	analysing	PISA	 scores,	we	 follow	 the	OECD’s	 (2014)	 recommendation	and	account	 for	 the	 fact	that	scores	are	estimated	from	five	separate	‘plausible	values’,	created	via	an	item	response	theory	model.	
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affect	each	other,	but	the	assumptions	are	the	same.	Indeed,	if	our	strategy	does	ensure	bona	 fide	 exogenous	 variation	 in	 school	 competition,	 the	 fundamental	 cause	 of	 the	effects	 on	 the	 separate	 outcomes	 is	 independent-school	 competition	 rather	 than	 the	instrument	 itself	 –	 irrespectively	 of	 whether	 the	 outcome	 variables	 then	 affect	 each	other	as	a	result	of	this	competition.	The	crucial	aspect	 is	thus	to	investigate,	as	far	as	possible,	whether	 the	 instrument	 affects	 the	 outcome	 variables	 apart	 from	via	 school	competition	or	any	mechanism	through	which	school	competition	operates.	We	explain	how	we	seek	to	do	so	below.		
3.4.3. Catholicism	and	wellbeing		The	 specification	 above	 hinges	 on	 that	 historical	 Catholic	 population	 shares	 are	conditionally	 unrelated	 to	 contemporary	 pupil	 wellbeing,	 in	 countries	 where	Catholicism	was	not	the	state	religion,	apart	from	via	contemporary	independent-school	competition.	We	believe	this	is	a	tenable	assumption.	If	anything,	the	strategy	may	bias	results	against	 supporting	our	hypothesis	 that	 competition	decreases	pupil	wellbeing.	This	 is	 because	 research	 finds	 Catholic	 population	 shares	 to	 have	 positive	 spill-over	effects	 on	 the	 wellbeing	 of	 Catholics	 and	 most	 non-Catholics,	 including	 Protestants	(Clark	and	Lelkes	2009).18		It	is	thus	more	likely	that	our	research	strategy	would	bias	results	 in	the	opposite	direction	compared	with	what	our	hypothesis	predicts.	We	can	also	 indirectly	 test	 whether	 or	 not	 this	 is	 correct.	 If	 the	 assumption	 holds	 true,	 the	contemporary	version	of	the	instrument,	which	is	controlled	for	in	equation	(3),	should	be	positively	associated	with	pupil	wellbeing.	If	the	contemporary	version’s	relationship	with	pupil	wellbeing	is	positive,	the	instrument	is	likely	to	be	only	negatively	related	to	pupil	 wellbeing	 via	 its	 impact	 on	 the	 level	 of	 independent-school	 competition	 today,	once	we	adjust	for	the	control	variables	in	the	model.		
3.4.4. Catholicism	and	academic	efficiency																																																										18	This	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	Catholics	have	higher	wellbeing	than	other	people.	Controlling	for	a	 range	 of	 background	 characteristics,	 Clark	 and	 Lelkes	 (2009)	 find	 that	 Catholics	 have	 equally	 high	wellbeing	as	Protestants,	but	that	both	Catholics	and	Protestants	have	higher	wellbeing	than	adherents	of	other	religions	and	non-religious	people.	Other	research	finds	similar	albeit	slightly	different	results	(see	Graham	and	Crown	2014).	On	the	other	hand,	Becker	and	Woessmann	(2015)	 find	that	Protestants	are	more	likely	to	commit	suicide	than	Catholics,	which	they	argue	is	due	to	Catholics’	stronger	levels	of	social	cohesion.	Regardless,	for	our	purposes,	the	direct	association	between	religious	affiliation	and	wellbeing	is	 less	 important	 since	 our	 instrument	 is	 based	 on	 historical	 Catholic	 population	 shares	 –	 which,	 if	anything,	appear	to	be	positively	related	to	wellbeing.	
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Our	analysis	of	a	wellbeing-efficiency	trade-off	hinges	upon	a	causal	interpretation	also	of	 the	 effects	 of	 independent-school	 competition	 on	 academic	 efficiency.	 Again,	 the	strategy	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 work	 against	 finding	 evidence	 for	 our	 hypothesis.	 This	 is	because	 Catholics	 historically	 emphasised	 cognitive	 achievement	 less	 compared	 with	other	 groups,	 as	 indicated	 by	 the	 direct	 negative	 correlation	 between	 Catholic	population	 shares	 and	 literacy	 rates	 in	 the	 early	 20th	 century	 (see	 West	 and	Woessmann	2010).	This	makes	it	 likely	that	our	estimates	for	academic	outcomes	will	be	 negatively	 biased.	 Since	 the	 instrument’s	 logic	 partly	 hinges	 on	 that	 Catholics	historically	 lobbied	 governments	 to	 increase	 public	 funding	 for	 independent	 schools,	our	 strategy	 is	 also	 more	 likely	 to	 bias	 effects	 upward	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 per-pupil	educational	 expenditures	 (and	 thus	 against	 our	 hypothesis).	 Again,	 we	 can	 indirectly	test	 whether	 or	 not	 these	 intuitions	 are	 correct.	 If	 so,	 we	 expect	 the	 contemporary	version	 of	 our	 instrument,	 which	 is	 controlled	 for	 in	 equation	 (3),	 to	 be	 negatively	(positively)	related	to	achievement	(expenditures)	today.	 If	 this	holds	true,	 it	suggests	that	 our	 historical	 instrument	 is	 only	 positively	 (negatively)	 related	 to	 contemporary	PISA	 scores	 (expenditures)	 through	 independent-school	 competition.	 If	 anything,	 the	results	should	then	be	biased	against	finding	evidence	supporting	our	hypothesis.		
3.4.5. Balancing	tests		Another	way	 to	explore	whether	or	not	 the	 instrument	 is	exogenous,	once	controlling	for	the	other	relevant	country-	and	school-level	variables,	is	to	carry	out	balancing	tests	on	 the	pupil-background	characteristics	 that	are	 included	 in	 the	models	analysing	 the	effects	of	 independent-school	competition	on	pupil	wellbeing	and	academic	efficiency.	We	do	 so	 by	 swapping	 these	 indicators	 as	 dependent	 variables	 for	 each	 of	 the	 pupil-background	variables	included	in	the	main	regressions,	while	simultaneously	excluding	all	other	pupil-level	variables	on	the	right-hand	side	of	the	equation.19	If	the	variation	in	independent-school	competition	predicted	by	the	instrument	is	not	significantly	related	to	 the	 pupil-background	 indicators,	 once	 adjusting	 for	 the	 other	 country-	 and	 school-level	variables	included	in	the	model,	it	indicates	that	the	instrument	is	indeed	likely	to	be	exogenous.	
																																																								19	Note	 that	 we	 do	 not	 use	 any	 imputed	 data	 in	 these	 analyses.	 In	 the	 models	 analysing	 immigrant	background,	we	also	exclude	pupils	from	the	other	immigrant	category	to	ensure	that	we	compare	each	category	with	natives	only.	
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3.5. Results		
3.5.1. Pupil	happiness		As	a	starting	point,	Columns	1	and	2	in	Table	3.1	show	the	results	from	the	OLS	model	when	 analysing	 our	 measure	 of	 pupil	 wellbeing:	 happiness	 at	 school.	 The	 estimates	indicate	 that	 independent-school	 competition	 is	 negatively	 associated	 with	 pupil	happiness,	 regardless	of	whether	we	control	only	 for	broader	regional-fixed	effects	or	also	 include	 controls	 for	 regions	within	 Europe.	 Thus,	 there	 is	 a	 negative	 correlation	between	competition	and	pupil	wellbeing	across	OECD	countries.						Turning	to	the	IV	model,	the	first-stage	results	suggest	our	instrument	is	strong,	with	the	F	statistics	displaying	values	of	about	46.	Meanwhile,	the	second	stage	displays	that	the	coefficient	for	independent-school	competition	increases	in	size	compared	with	the	OLS	 estimates,	 indicating	 that	 the	 latter	 are	 biased	 downwards.	 Our	 preferred	specification,	which	includes	within-European	regional-fixed	effects,	indicates	that	a	10	percentage-point	 increase	 in	 independent-school	 enrolment	 shares	 lowers	 pupil	happiness	by	0.13	points	on	the	ordinal	1–4	scale,	which	corresponds	to	0.17	standard	deviations	 (SD).	 The	 estimate	 is	 not	 very	 precise,	 but	 we	 can	 rule	 out	 an	 effect	 size	lower	than	0.09	SD.	The	reduced-form	estimates	in	the	lower-left	panel	further	support	the	results.						One	 potential	 reason	 why	 the	 OLS	 models	 underestimate	 the	 causal	 impact	 of	independent-school	 competition	on	pupil	wellbeing	may	be	 that	 competition	emerges	as	a	response	to	low	test	scores	(see	Hoxby	1994;	West	and	Woessmann	2010).	This,	in	turn,	 may	 be	 due	 to	 lower	 focus	 on	 academic	 achievement	 and	 higher	 focus	 on	wellbeing,	 as	 suggested	 by	 the	 trade-off	 hypothesis	 discussed	 in	 Section	 3.2	 and	analysed	 further	 in	 Section	 3.5.4.	 If	 so,	 one	 would	 expect	 OLS	 estimates	 to	 bias	 the	effects	 of	 competition	 towards	 zero	 both	 when	 analysing	 pupil	 wellbeing	 and	 test	scores,	albeit	from	different	directions.						Thus,	 our	 analysis	 shows	 that	 independent-school	 competition	 has	 an	 important	negative	 impact	on	pupil	wellbeing.	 In	contrast,	we	note	 that	 the	association	between	the	 contemporary	 version	 of	 the	 instrument	 and	 pupil	 happiness	 is	 positive.	 This	
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supports	 the	 idea	 that	our	 strategy	 if	 anything	may	bias	 the	estimates	against	 finding	evidence	in	favour	of	our	hypothesis.20		
Table	3.1:	The	impact	of	independent-school	competition	on	pupil	happiness			 (1)	 (2)	 	 (3)	 (4)			 OLS	 OLS	 Second	stage	 IV	 IV	Independent-school	share	 -0.52**	 -0.69***	 Independent-school	share	 -0.79***	 -1.28***		 (0.24)	 (0.17)	 	 (0.22)	 (0.32)	Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 0.22**	 0.36***	 Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 0.33***	 0.49***		 (0.11)	 (0.10)	 	 (0.08)	 (0.10)	Within-European		regional-fixed	effects	 NO	 YES	 	 NO	 YES	
	 (5)	 (6)	 	 	 	
Reduced	form	 OLS	 OLS	 First	stage	 	 	Catholic	share	1900	*no	state	religion	 -0.24***	 -0.29***	 Catholic	share	1900	*no	state	religion	 0.31***	 0.23***		 (0.06)	 (0.08)	 	 (0.05)	 (0.03)	Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 0.15***	 0.21*	 Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 0.22***	 0.21***		 (0.06)	 (0.11)	 	 (0.05)	 (0.08)		 		 		 F	statistic	on	the	excluded	instrument	 46.33	 45.87	n	 190,348	 190,348	 	 190,348	 190,348	Countries	 34	 34	 	 34	 34	Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	country	level	in	parentheses.	All	regressions	include	the	controls	described	in	Sections	3.3.5	and	3.4.1.	
3.5.2. Robustness	tests		In	Table	3.2,	we	display	results	from	several	robustness	tests.21	Column	1	only	includes	pupils	in	government-operated	schools.	Note	that	these	results	reflect	both	competition	effects	 and	 the	 impact	of	potential	differential	pupil	 sorting	 into	 the	 independent	and	state	 sectors.	 It	 is	 plausible	 that	 state	 schools	 could	 be	 especially	 sensitive	 to	independent-school	 competition,	 since	 independent	 schools	 themselves	may	 to	 some	extent	always	face	competition	from	the	government	sector.	We	find	that	the	effect	on	pupils	in	state	schools	is	in	fact	very	similar	compared	to	the	overall	impact,	suggesting	that	 the	 main	 results	 primarily	 reflect	 system-level	 effects	 of	 independent-school	competition	rather	than	the	impact	of	attending	an	independent	school	per	se.	
																																																								20	As	displayed	in	Table	3.A.2,	we	find	similar	effects	on	alternative	measures	of	pupil	wellbeing,	such	as	school	satisfaction	and	peer	relations.	21	In	unreported	robustness	 tests,	we	also	 included	additional	 country-level	 controls,	 including	 the	Gini	coefficient,	the	share	of	population	in	urban	areas,	and	the	relative	size	of	the	immigrant	population.	The	results	were	very	similar	compared	to	the	baseline	models.	
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					Next,	in	Column	2,	we	exclude	all	non-European	countries	in	the	equation,	dropping	ten	countries	and	36	per	cent	of	 the	 total	pupil	 sample.	The	results	are	 robust	 to	 this	exercise,	despite	controlling	for	within-European	regional-fixed	effects.	In	Column	3,	we	instead	 exclude	 Belgium	 and	 the	 Netherlands,	 which	 are	 perhaps	 the	most	 canonical	examples	of	successful	Catholic	struggles	for	independent-school	access,	to	ensure	these	countries	do	not	drive	the	results.	The	findings	are	essentially	identical	when	excluding	these	 countries.22	We	 thus	 conclude	 that	 the	 results	 are	 robust	 to	 excluding	 a	considerable	and	important	part	of	the	sample.23		
Table	3.2:	Robustness	tests			 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)			 Only	pupils	in	state	schools	 Only	Europe	 Excluding	Belgium	and	the	Netherlands	 Excluding	pupil-background	variables	Independent-school	share	 -1.37***	 -1.27***	 -1.30***	 -1.24***		 (0.38)	 (0.43)	 (0.32)	 (0.33)	Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 0.46***	 0.54***	 0.47***	 0.52***		 (0.09)	 (0.13)	 (0.08)	 (0.10)	F	statistic	 48.62	 42.27	 42.5	 45.23	
n	 150,231	 121,050	 182,146	 190,348	Countries	 34	 24	 32	 34	Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	country	level	in	parentheses.	All	 regressions	 include	 the	 controls	 outlined	 in	 Sections	 3.3.5	 and	3.4.1,	 including	within-European	regional-fixed	effects.	The	exception	is	Column	4,	which	excludes	pupil-background	variables.							Finally,	 in	 Column	 4,	 we	 exclude	 all	 pupil-background	 controls	 and	 find	 that	 the	coefficient	 is	 essentially	 identical	 to	 the	 baseline,	 although	 it	 becomes	 slightly	 less	precise.	This	is	expected	if	some	or	all	of	the	excluded	background	characteristics	both	affect	 the	outcome	variable,	which	unreported	estimates	show	 is	 indeed	 the	case,	and	are	uncorrelated	with	our	instrument	(Angrist	and	Pischke	2009).	Overall,	these	results	thus	support	the	idea	that	the	instrument	is	not	significantly	correlated	with	the	pupil-background	characteristics,	once	controlling	for	the	other	variables.24	
																																																								22	When	dropping	Ireland,	another	example	of	successful	Catholic	resistance,	the	coefficient	increased	in	size	somewhat	and	remained	significant	at	the	1	per	cent	level,	while	the	F	statistics	drops	just	under	20.	Similarly,	excluding	Ireland	together	with	Belgium	or	the	Netherlands	–	or	excluding	all	three	countries	at	the	 same	 time	 –	 generated	 similar	 results.	 The	 same	 holds	 true	 when	 excluding	 the	 within-European	regional-fixed	effects	and	the	F	statistic	never	fell	under	25	in	these	instances.	23	In	 unreported	 regressions,	we	 also	 dropped	 all	 countries	 one	 by	 one	 –	 and	 various	 combinations	 of	countries	–	and	the	estimates	were	always	robust	to	this	exercise.	24	We	also	 tested	 the	 idea	 that	our	 instrument	 isolates	similar	 types	of	 independent-school	competition	across	 countries	 by	 adding	 relevant	 variables	 that	may	 affect	 the	 type	 of	 competition.	 The	 results	 are	reported	in	Table	3.A.3.	All	estimates	are	basically	identical	compared	to	the	relevant	baseline	models.	
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3.5.3. Balancing	tests		As	discussed	 in	 Section	3.4.5,	 to	 further	 explore	 the	 exogeneity	of	 the	 instrument,	we	analyse	the	pupil-background	characteristics	as	dependent	variables	instead	of	controls,	while	simultaneously	excluding	all	other	pupil-level	variables	on	the	right-hand	side	of	the	equation.	We	do	not	expect	the	variation	in	independent-school	competition	that	is	explained	 by	 our	 instrument	 to	 be	 significantly	 related	 to	 these	 variables,	 once	 other	country-level	 factors	 are	held	 constant,	 at	 least	not	 in	 a	direction	 that	would	bias	 the	estimates	 in	 favour	 of	 finding	 evidence	 of	 our	 hypothesis.25	The	 results	 from	 the	 IV	models	in	Table	3.3	display	that	this	is	indeed	the	case.	We	are	unable	to	predict	any	of	the	background	variables	using	 the	variation	 in	 independent-school	enrolment	 shares	that	 is	 explained	 by	 our	 instrument.	 In	 other	 words,	 there	 is	 little	 evidence	 that	 the	instrument	is	significantly	correlated	with	potentially	important	predictors	of	wellbeing	in	a	direction	that	would	bias	the	estimates	in	favour	of	our	hypothesis.26		
Table	3.3:	Balancing	tests			 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
		 Gender	 Age	 Index	of	home	possessions	 Parental	occupational	status	 Parental	education	 Immigrant	(1st	gen)	 Immigrant	(2nd	gen)	Independent-school	share	 0.02	 0.06	 0.01	 -1.41	 3.07	 -0.07	 -0.16		 (0.04)	 (0.10)	 (0.49)	 (9.69)	 (2.36)	 (0.12)	 (0.11)	Catholic	share	2010*no	state	religion	 -0.02	 0.00	 0.38***	 1.81	 -0.95	 -0.05	 -0.05		 (0.02)	 (0.03)	 (0.13)	 (2.15)	 (0.62)	 (0.05)	 (0.04)	F	statistic	 47.19	 47.18	 46.99	 46.71	 46.54	 46.27	 44.73	
n	 295,416	 295,330	 291,731	 280,796	 285,877	 244,043	 269,794	Countries	 34	 34	 34	 34	 34	 34	 34	Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	country	level	in	parentheses.	All	regressions	include	the	controls	described	in	Sections	3.3.5	and	3.4.1,	 including	within-European	regional-fixed	effects,	apart	from	pupil-level	variables.																																																											25	The	validity	of	our	results	hinges	on	the	instrument	being	exogenous	once	the	country-level	variables	are	held	constant,	which	we	test	by	studying	the	pupil-background	characteristics	as	dependent	variables.	Nevertheless,	 in	unreported	robustness	 tests,	we	also	analysed	 the	correlation	between	 the	 instrument	and	 relevant	 country-level	 variables,	 such	 as	 (log)	 GDP	 per	 capita,	 income	 inequality,	 the	 share	 of	 the	population	 who	 live	 in	 urban	 areas,	 and	 the	 relative	 size	 of	 the	 immigrant	 population,	 including	 and	excluding	 the	 contemporary	 version	 of	 the	 instrument	 and	 regional-fixed	 effects.	 The	 results	 did	 not	indicate	consistently	significant	correlations.	26	In	contrast,	we	note	that	the	contemporary	version	of	the	instrument	is	positively	correlated	with	the	index	of	home	possessions,	which	 is	 the	pupil-level	 variable	 that	has	 the	 strongest	positive	 association	with	the	wellbeing	measures	of	all	pupil-level	controls	in	the	regressions	in	Tables	3.1–3.2.	
72		
3.5.4. The	trade-off	with	academic	efficiency		Thus	 far,	 we	 have	 shown	 that	 independent-school	 competition	 has	 a	 negative	 causal	impact	 on	 pupil	 wellbeing.	 Since	 previous	 research	 using	 a	 similar	 strategy	 finds	positive	 effects	 on	 pupil	 performance	 in	 PISA	 and	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 educational	expenditures	(West	and	Woessmann	2010),	this	is	sufficient	to	provide	general	support	for	our	hypothesis	of	a	wellbeing-efficiency	trade-off.	Still,	 since	we	analyse	data	 from	PISA	2012	rather	 than	 from	PISA	2003,	and	use	a	modified	 IV	set-up,	we	also	explore	the	 effects	 of	 competition	 on	 PISA	 test	 scores	 and	 per-pupil	 expenditure,	 using	 our	preferred	specification	for	the	analysis	of	pupil-wellbeing.						The	upper	panel	in	Table	3.4	shows	OLS	estimates,	which	indicate	that	independent-school	 competition	 does	 not	 have	 a	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	 with	 pupil	performance,	apart	from	being	marginally	correlated	with	reading	literacy,	but	that	it	is	negatively	associated	with	educational	expenditures.	However,	turning	to	the	preferred	IV	 estimates	 in	 the	 lower	panel,	 the	 coefficients	 increase	 in	 size	 and	become	 strongly	significant	 in	 all	 models:	 a	 10	 percentage-point	 increase	 in	 independent-school	enrolment	 shares	 raises	 mathematical	 literacy	 by	 21	 PISA	 points	 (0.23	 SD),	 reading	literacy	by	26	PISA	points	(0.28	SD),	and	scientific	literacy	by	18	PISA	points	(0.19	SD).	Simultaneously,	 it	 lowers	 expenditures	by	 $13,155	 (0.48	 SD).	These	 effects	 are	 larger	than	those	found	by	West	and	Woessmann	(2010),	which	is	mainly	due	to	our	inclusion	of	within-European	regional-fixed	effects.	 Indeed,	when	excluding	 these	dummies,	 the	effects	are	very	similar	to	their	results.27	We	also	note	that	the	contemporary	version	of	the	 instrument	 is	 positively	 associated	 with	 expenditures,	 while	 its	 association	 with	achievement	is	negative	but	not	statistically	significant.28	Overall,	the	results	are	in	line	with	 West	 and	 Woessmann’s	 (2010)	 findings	 and	 thus	 support	 our	 hypothesis	 that	school	competition	involves	a	causal	wellbeing-efficiency	trade-off.29	
																																																								27	They	obtain	point	estimates	of	58.99-121.69	and	-45,736	for	PISA	scores	and	expenditures	respectively	in	their	equivalent	analyses	(see	Column	2	in	their	Tables	2	and	5	and	Columns	2	and	5	in	their	Table	4),	whereas	 we	 obtain	 68.96–126.65	 and	 -74,201	 respectively	 when	 excluding	 within-European	 regional	effects.	None	of	the	differences	are	statistically	significant.	28	Again,	Table	3.A.4	shows	that	the	results	comfortably	survive	the	other	robustness	tests	conducted	in	regard	to	pupil	wellbeing	in	Table	3.2.	Unreported	regressions	also	showed	that	the	findings	were	robust	to	 adding	 the	 additional	 variables	 in	 Table	 3.A.3.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 coefficient	 of	 the	 contemporary	instrument	changes	depending	on	the	specification	and	sample	(see	Tables	3.A.4	and	3.A.5).	This	further	supports	the	idea	that	the	historical	instrument	is	exogenous,	while	its	contemporary	version	is	not.	29	We	 also	 carried	 out	 a	 basic	 placebo	 test	 on	 per-capita	military	 expenditures	 in	 2011,	 obtained	 from	SIPRI	 (2016)	 and	 adjusted	 for	 different	 price	 levels	 using	 2011	 GDP	 per	 capita	 PPPs.	 Military	
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Table	3.4:	The	impact	of	independent-school	competition	on	academic	efficiency	
		 Mathematics	 Reading	 Science	 Educational	expenditures/pupil			 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)			 OLS	 OLS	 OLS	 OLS	Independent-school	share	 46.86	 56.70*	 41.84	 -37,214***		 (33.30)	 (31.24)	 (32.82)	 (13,064)	Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 21.97	 9.04	 23.43	 14,466		 (20.71)	 (24.51)	 (17.01)	 (12,918)			 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
		 IV	 IV	 IV	 IV	Independent-school	share	 209.57***	 262.10***	 177.03***	 -131,546***		 (51.62)	 (69.56)	 (50.14)	 (28,377)	Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 -12.13	 -34.01	 -4.90	 34,235***		 (20.59)	 (27.97)	 (18.94)	 (10,801)	n	 295,416	 295,416	 295,416	 295,416	Countries	 34	 34	 34	 34	Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	country	level	in	parentheses.	The	regressions	include	the	controls	described	in	Sections	3.3.5	and	3.4.1,	including	within-European	regional-fixed	effects.	F	statistics	in	Columns	5–8:	46.54.		
3.5.5. Potential	mechanisms	behind	the	trade-off		Finally,	we	turn	to	the	potential	mechanisms	discussed	 in	Section	3.3.3.	The	results	 in	Table	3.5	indicate	that	a	10	percentage-point	increase	in	independent-school	enrolment	shares	induces	less	individualisation	of	teaching,	corresponding	to	0.16	points	on	the	1–4	ordinal	scale	(0.15	SD);	less	project	work,	corresponding	to	0.09	points	(0.10	SD);	and	less	group	work,	corresponding	to	0.08	points	(0.08	SD).	However,	there	is	no	impact	on	the	 extent	 to	 which	 teachers	 ask	 pupils	 to	 help	 plan	 classroom	 activities.	 Also,	 a	 10	percentage-point	 increase	 in	 independent-school	 enrolment	 shares	 decreases	perceptions	that	pupils	get	along	with	teachers	by	0.08	steps	on	the	1–4	ordinal	scale	(0.12	SD)	and	perceptions	that	teachers	listen	to	what	pupils	have	to	say	by	0.07	steps	(0.09	SD).30	Meanwhile,	it	raises	parental	achievement	pressure	by	0.19	steps	on	the	1–3	 ordinal	 scale	 (0.26	 SD).	 This	 indicates	 that	 competition	 makes	 teaching	 more	traditional	 and	 pupil-teacher	 relations	 more	 hierarchical,	 while	 sharpening	 parents’	focus	 on	 achievement	 –	 which	 are	 clear	 mechanisms	 behind	 the	 wellbeing-efficiency	trade-off.	
																																																																																																																																																																												expenditures	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 related	 to	 educational	 expenditures	 and	 appear	 to	 be	 an	 appropriate	placebo	outcome.	We	found	no	evidence	indicating	that	the	variation	in	independent-school	competition	that	is	explained	by	our	instrument	was	related	to	military	expenditures.	30	In	 unreported	 regressions,	 we	 found	 very	 similar	 effects	 on	 the	 overall	 index	 of	 pupil-teacher	relationships	and	headteachers’	perceptions	of	such	relationships.	
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Table	3.5:	The	impact	on	potential	mechanisms	behind	the	trade-off	
Teaching	practices			 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)			 Individualisation	of	teaching		 Project	work	 Group	work	 Pupils	help	to	plan		Independent-school	share	 -1.57***	 -0.90**	 -0.81***	 1.10		 (0.37)	 (0.43)	 (0.28)	 (1.04)	Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 -0.05	 -0.17	 0.07	 -0.60		 (0.10)	 (0.13)	 (0.10)	 (0.36)	n	 191,806	 191,799	 191,865	 191,832	Countries	 34	 34	 34	 34	
Pupil-teacher	relations,	parental	achievement	pressure,	and	homework			 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
		 Pupils	get	along	with		teachers	 Teachers	listen	to	pupils	 Parental	achievement	pressure	 Hours	of	homework		Independent-school	share	 -0.84***	 -0.68***	 1.86***	 8.18**		 (0.17)	 (0.16)	 (0.46)	 (3.30)	Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 -0.02	 -0.01	 -0.47**	 1.95		 (0.08)	 (0.06)	 (0.23)	 (1.24)	n	 187,146	 191,320	 282,606	 187,146	Countries	 34	 34	 34	 34	
Instructional	time			 (9)	 (10)	 (11)	 (12)			 Class	periods		(total)	 Class	periods	(mathematics)	 Class	periods		(test	language)	 Class	periods	(science)	Independent-school	share	 23.43***	 4.53***	 5.00**	 -2.83***		 (6.75)	 (1.47)	 (1.94)	 (0.98)	Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 2.32	 -1.12*	 -0.71	 -1.31***		 (2.09)	 (0.59)	 (0.73)	 (0.40)	n	 162,430	 184,354	 183,030	 179,223	Countries	 34	 34	 34	 34	Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	country	level	in	parentheses.	The	regressions	include	the	controls	described	in	Sections	3.3.5	and	3.4.1,	including	within-European	regional-fixed	effects.	The	F	statistic	ranges	between	40.46	and	46.06	in	all	regressions.							We	 also	 find	 that	 competition	 increases	 instructional	 time	 and	 homework.	 An	increase	in	independent-school	enrolment	shares	by	10	percentage	points	increases	the	total	number	of	class	periods	by	2.43	periods	per	week	(0.30	SD),	while	inducing	pupils	to	 complete	 0.82	 hours	 (0.16	 SD)	 more	 homework	 per	 week.	 However,	 there	 is	heterogeneity	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 effects	 on	 the	 number	 of	 class	 periods	 in	 the	 subjects	tested	in	PISA.	While	the	number	of	periods	in	mathematics	and	test	language	increases	by	0.45	periods	(0.32	SD)	and	0.50	periods	(0.34	SD)	per	week	respectively,	the	number	of	 class	 periods	 decreases	 in	 science	 by	 0.28	 periods	 (0.13	 SD).	 This	 indicates	 that	competition	 increases	 instructional	 time	 in	 mathematics	 and	 test	 language,	 but	
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decreases	it	in	science.31	This	could	suggest	that	competition	increases	schools’	focus	on	core	 subjects	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 other	 subjects.	 Still,	 instruction	 in	 the	 test	 language	and	 mathematics	 (and	 other	 subjects)	 may	 improve	 performance	 also	 in	 science.32	Overall,	we	thus	conclude	that	competition	has	positive	effects	on	instructional	time	and	homework,	two	plausible	mechanisms	behind	the	wellbeing-efficiency	trade-off.		
3.5.6. A	tentative	cost-benefit	analysis		Ultimately,	 the	 study’s	 findings	 demand	 the	 question:	 should	 policymakers	 increase	independent-school	 competition	 and	 thus	 raise	 academic	 efficiency	 or	 should	 they	ignore	such	reforms	and	instead	prioritise	pupil	wellbeing?	The	answer	depends	on	the	relative	 long-term	 societal	 and	 economic	 value	 of	 pupil	 wellbeing	 versus	 cognitive	achievement	 in	 adolescence.	 In	 this	 section,	 we	 thus	 provide	 a	 basic	 back-of-the-envelope	 calculation	 to	 analyse	 whether	 the	 benefits	 of	 competition	 in	 terms	 of	academic	efficiency	outweigh	its	costs	in	terms	of	pupil	wellbeing.						Recent	research	indicates	that	cognitive	achievement	in	childhood	and	adolescence	is	a	much	better	predictor	than	wellbeing	in	childhood	and	adolescence	of	adult	 income.	According	 to	Layard	et	al.’s	 (2014)	estimates,	one	standard	deviation	higher	cognitive	achievement	in	childhood	and	adolescence	predicts	0.14	SD	higher	income	at	the	age	of	34,	while	such	an	increase	in	youth	wellbeing	is	associated	with	0.07	SD	higher	income	at	 the	 same	 age.	 Our	 estimates	 indicate	 that	 a	 10	 percentage-point	 increase	 in	independent-school	 competition	 raises	 average	 test	 scores	 by	 0.23	 SD	 and	 decreases	pupil	wellbeing	by	0.17	SD.	One	would	thus	expect	a	benefit	in	terms	of	adult	income	by	0.03	SD	via	higher	test	scores	and	a	cost	of	0.01	SD	via	lower	pupil	wellbeing.	Since	we	also	 find	 that	 independent-school	 competition	 decreases	 per-pupil	 cumulative	education	 expenditures	 between	 ages	 6–15,	 such	 competition	 thus	 appears	 to	 make	sense	from	an	economic	perspective.						At	the	same	time,	Layard	et	al.	(2014)	also	find	that	youth	wellbeing	is	considerably	more	 important	 than	 cognitive	 achievement	 for	 adult	 life	 satisfaction.	 A	 cost-benefit	analysis	 using	 adult	 subjective	wellbeing	 rather	 than	money	 as	 unit	 of	measurement	
																																																								31	In	 unreported	 regressions,	 we	 found	 no	 effects	 on	 average	 minutes	 per	 period	 in	 any	 of	 the	 test	subjects,	supporting	the	idea	that	our	estimates	capture	the	impact	of	competition	on	total	learning	time.	32	However,	 note	 that	 the	 point	 estimate	 in	 Table	 3.4	 is	 smaller	 when	 analysing	 science	 scores.	 The	negative	 impact	 we	 find	 on	 instructional	 time	 in	 science	 may	 thus	 lower	 the	 positive	 effects	 of	competition.	
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would	suggest	 that	a	10	percentage-point	 increase	 in	 independent-school	competition	should	generate	0.01	SD	higher	life	satisfaction	via	higher	cognitive	achievement	–	but	this	is	outweighed	by	the	cost	of	0.03	SD	via	lower	pupil	wellbeing.33	In	other	words,	if	we	hold	 subjective	wellbeing	 as	 the	 primary	 goal	 of	 policy,	 the	 costs	 of	 independent-school	competition	may	outweigh	its	benefits.						Certainly,	given	the	tentative	nature	of	the	above	cost-benefit	analysis,	it	is	important	to	pursue	 further	 research	before	drawing	 strong	 conclusions	 regarding	 the	potential	longer-term	effects	of	 independent-school	competition	on	adult	wellbeing	and	 labour-market	outcomes.34	Yet	 the	analysis	at	 least	 indicates	 that	 the	attractiveness	of	school	competition	as	an	education-reform	strategy	may	depend	on	which	goals	policymakers	seek	to	advance,	which	is	beyond	this	paper	to	determine.	
3.6. Conclusion		As	 governments	 worldwide	 have	 sought	 to	 inject	 competition	 from	 independent	providers	into	their	countries’	education	systems,	an	expanding	literature	has	begun	to	evaluate	 the	 effects	 of	 such	 competition.	 Yet	 existing	 research	 focuses	 on	 academic	outcomes	and	no	one	has	thus	far	analysed	how	independent-school	competition	affects	pupil	wellbeing,	which	has	become	an	increasingly	important	policy	goal	recently.	Since	effective	learning	involves	many	activities	that	are	not	necessarily	fun	or	inspiring,	and	since	market	incentives	are	likely	to	sharpen	schools’	focus	on	academic	achievement,	it	is	 plausible	 that	 competition	 involves	 a	 trade-off	 between	 wellbeing	 and	 education	performance.						Analysing	pupil-level	PISA	data	across	34	OECD	countries,	 this	paper	has	sought	 to	investigate	 the	 existence	 of	 such	 a	 trade-off	 and	 potential	 mechanisms	 behind	 it.	 It	utilised	 an	 IV	 strategy	 based	 on	Catholic	 resistance	 to	 state	 schooling	 in	 the	 19th	 and	early	 20th	 centuries	 to	 predict	 enrolment	 shares	 in	 independently-operated	 schools	today,	while	simultaneously	controlling	for	the	contemporary	version	of	the	instrument	itself	 and	 other	 important	 variables	 that	 threaten	 its	 validity.	 We	 found	 that																																																									33	Note	 that	 the	 calculation	 is	 based	 on	 the	 direct	 correlation	 between	 youth	 wellbeing/cognitive	achievement	and	adult	 life	 satisfaction,	which	means	 that	any	effects	 that	operate	via	higher	 income	 in	adulthood	 are	 incorporated	 in	 the	 calculation	 automatically.	 Similarly,	 the	 calculation	 regarding	 the	impact	 of	 independent-school	 competition	 on	 adult	 income	 incorporates	 the	 latter’s	 effect	 on	 life	satisfaction	automatically.	34	For	 example,	 the	 cost-benefit	 analysis	 treats	 wellbeing	 in	 school	 as	 equal	 to	 the	more	 general	 child	wellbeing	metrics	employed	by	Layard	et	al.	 (2014).	Further	research	 is	necessary	 to	establish	 to	what	extent	this	matters	for	the	results.	
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independent-school	 competition	 has	 a	 sizeable	 negative	 impact	 on	 pupil	 wellbeing,	which	 survives	 a	 number	 of	 robustness	 tests.	 The	paper	 further	 confirmed	 a	 positive	effect	on	PISA	 scores	and	a	negative	 impact	on	education	 spending	 found	 in	previous	research,	thus	providing	clear	evidence	of	a	trade-off.						We	 also	 showed	 that	 balancing	 tests	 on	 pupil-background	 variables	 support	 the	causal	interpretation	of	our	findings.	In	fact,	if	anything,	there	are	more	indications	that	our	 strategy	may	bias	 estimates	 against	 finding	 evidence	 in	 favour	 of	 our	hypothesis.	Nevertheless,	 future	 research	 should	 investigate	whether	 or	 not	 alternative	 data	 and	identification	strategies	generate	similar	results.						Analysing	 relevant	mechanisms	behind	 the	wellbeing-efficiency	 trade-off,	we	 found	that	 independent-school	 competition	 makes	 teaching	 more	 traditional	 and	 pupil-teacher	 relationships	 more	 hierarchical,	 while	 also	 increasing	 parental	 achievement	pressure.	In	addition,	we	found	positive	effects	on	instructional	time	and	time	spent	on	homework.	 These	 are	 all	 features	 that	 previous	 research	 suggests	 generate	 higher	achievement	 and	 lower	 wellbeing.	 Future	 research	 should	 investigate	 other	mechanisms	 linking	 competition	 to	 lower	wellbeing	 and	 higher	 academic	 efficiency	 –	and	to	what	extent	similar	trade-offs	apply	to	other	education-reform	strategies.						A	 tentative	back-of-the-envelope	calculation	 indicated	that	 the	economic	benefits	of	independent-school	 competition	 via	 its	 positive	 impact	 on	 cognitive	 achievement	appear	to	outweigh	its	cost	via	lower	pupil	wellbeing.	At	the	same	time,	the	calculation	also	indicates	that	the	costs	of	competition	may	outweigh	its	benefits	when	using	adult	life	 satisfaction	 as	 the	 unit	 of	 measurement.	 While	 more	 research	 into	 this	 issue	 is	necessary,	justifying	the	higher	direct	and	indirect	costs	of	a	non-competitive	education	system	may	hinge	on	upholding	subjective	wellbeing	as	a	primary	goal	for	public	policy.	While	we	refrain	from	drawing	strong	conclusions	in	this	respect,	our	results	highlight	the	 potential	 for	 a	more	 general	 trade-off	 between	 the	 traditional	 goals	 of	 education	policy	 and	 the	 wellbeing	 agenda	 to	 which	 policymakers	 should	 pay	 attention	 –	regardless	of	what	goals	they	ultimately	choose	to	pursue.								
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Appendix	A:	Additional	tables		
Table	3.A.1:	Descriptive	statistics	
Wellbeing	and	academic	efficiency			 Mean	 SD	 		 Mean	 SD	Happiness	at	school	 3.00	 0.76	 PISA	science	 501.14	 93.78	PISA	mathematics	 494.03	 93.93	 Educational	expenditure/pupil	 69,130	 28,217	PISA	reading	 496.45	 93.91	
Country-	and	regional-level	variables	 Pupil-background	variables			 Mean	 SD	 		 Mean	 SD	Independent-school	share	 0.19	 0.21	 Girl	 0.50	 0.50	Catholic	share	1900		(no	state	religion)	 0.29	 0.36	 Age	 15.77	 0.29	Catholic	share	2010		(no	state	religion)	 0.27	 0.30	 Index	of		home	possessions	 0.00	 1.00	(log)	GDP/capita	2011	 10.43	 0.35	 Parental		occupational	status	 50.66	 21.61	Population	1900	 13,800,000	 18,200,000	Parental	education	 13.49	 3.04	Calvinist	share	1900	 0.06	 0.13	 Immigrant	(1st	generation)	 0.05	 0.21	Early	Catholic	defeat	(soft)	 0.08	 0.27	 Immigrant	(2nd	generation)	 0.15	 0.36	Early	Catholic	defeat	(hard)	 0.06	 0.24	 Pupil-level	variables	(institutional	characteristics)	Grade	 9.62	 0.73	Nazi	annexation	 0.18	 0.38	 School	starting	age	 6.10	 0.85	Pro-Catholic	Nazi	ally	 0.10	 0.29	 School	location	Village	 0.09	 0.29	Jesuit	ban	 0.16	 0.36	 Small	town	 0.21	 0.41	Communist		 0.18	 0.38	 Town	 0.35	 0.48	Post-Soviet		 0.03	 0.17	 City	 0.24	 0.43	For-profit	voucher/	mass	conversion		 0.08	 0.28	 Large	city	 0.11	 0.31	
Mechanisms			 Mean	 SD	 		 Mean	 SD	Individualisation	of	teaching	 1.94	 1.06	 Achievement	pressure	(headteacher)	 1.88	 0.73	Project	work	 1.65	 0.89	 Class	periods	(total)	 31.03	 7.82	Group	work	 1.84	 0.96	 Class	periods	(language)	 4.13	 1.48	Help	planning	 1.66	 0.88	 Class	periods	(mathematics)	 4.16	 1.40	Get	along	with	teachers	 3.01	 0.67	 Class	periods	(science)	 3.76	 2.13	Teachers	listen	to	pupils	 2.89	 0.74	 Hours	of	homework	 4.89	 4.69	Note:	 The	 descriptive	 statistics	 display	 each	 variable’s	 international	 mean	 and	 standard	 deviation	(weighted	by	sampling	probabilities	with	all	countries	given	equal	weight)	without	any	imputed	values.												
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Table	3.A.2:	Alternative	measures	of	pupil	wellbeing	 	 	General	pupil	wellbeing	
		 Pupil	happiness	 Satisfaction	with	school	 Things	are	ideal	at	school	 Belong	at	school	 Overall	wellbeing	index	Independent-school	share	 -1.28***	 -1.31***	 -1.93***	 -1.69***	 -2.22***		 (0.32)	 (0.22)	 (0.52)	 (0.48)	 (0.60)	Catholic	share	2010*no	state	religion	 0.49***	 0.40***	 -0.07	 0.30	 0.55**		 (0.10)	 (0.11)	 (0.25)	 (0.19)	 (0.24)	F	statistic	 45.87	 45.88	 45.92	 45.83	 45.97	
N	 190,348	 190,616	 190,585	 190,639	 191,913	Countries	 34	 34	 34	 34	 34	
Peer	relations/specific	reasons	for	general	pupil	wellbeing			 Outsider	at	school	 Make	friends	easily	at	school	 Feel	awkward	at	school	 Liked	by	other	pupils	 Lonely	at		school	Independent-school	share	 0.81***	 -0.69***	 0.36	 -0.76***	 0.53**		 (0.28)	 (0.18)	 (0.29)	 (0.24)	 (0.24)	Catholic	share	2010*no	state	religion	 -0.40***	 0.23***	 -0.23**	 0.12	 -0.22***		 (0.11)	 (0.06)	 (0.10)	 (0.09)	 (0.08)	F	statistic	 45.64	 45.94	 45.92	 45.77	 45.95	
N	 191,058	 191,282	 190,762	 190,521	 190,905	Countries	 34	 34	 34	 34	 34	Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	country	level	in	parentheses.	All	regressions	include	the	controls	described	in	Sections	3.3.5	and	3.4.1,	 including	within-European	 regional-fixed	 effects.	 Items	 analysed:	 (1)	 ‘I	 am	happy	 at	 school’;	 (2)	 ‘I	 am	 satisfied	with	my	school’;	(3)	‘Things	are	ideal	in	my	school’;	(4)	‘I	feel	like	I	belong	at	school’;	and	(5)	the	overall	wellbeing	index.	The	overall	wellbeing	index	is	constructed	from	responses	to	all	statements	in	Columns	1–4	as	well	as	 those	 in	 Columns	 6-10,	 which	 tap	 into	 specific	 reasons	 behind	 the	 level	 of	 wellbeing,	 such	 as	 peer	relations:		‘I	feel	like	an	outsider	(or	left	out	of	things)	at	school’;	‘I	make	friends	easily	at	school’;	‘Other	students	seem	to	like	me’;	‘I	feel	awkward	and	out	of	place	in	my	school’;	and	‘I	feel	lonely	at	school’.			
Table	3.A.3:	Further	robustness	tests	for	pupil	happiness	
Control	added	for	
		
Enrolment	share	of	privately-funded	independent	schools	
Share	of	state	funding	in	independent	schools	
Average	level	of	independent-school	autonomy	 Exit	exams	Independent-school	share	 -1.29***	 -1.02***	 -1.20***	 -1.25***		 (0.36)	 (0.32)	 (0.28)	 (0.35)	Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 0.50***	 0.40***	 0.31***	 0.47***		 (0.12)	 (0.09)	 (0.11)	 (0.10)	Added	control	 -0.31	 0.04	 -0.18**	 -0.03		 (1.57)	 (0.22)	 (0.09)	 (0.08)	F	statistic	 33.09	 39.10	 23.27	 25.63	
n	 190,348	 184,292	 187,217	 190,348	Countries	 34	 32	 33	 34	Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	country	level	in	parentheses.	All	regressions	include	the	controls	described	in	Sections	3.3.5	and	3.4.1,	 including	within-European	regional-fixed	effects.	Data	on	centralised	exit	examinations	are	obtained	from	Bol	and	Van	de	Werfhorst	(2013).	This	source	lacks	data	on	Chile	and	Mexico,	which	we	obtain	from	Brandt	(2010)	and	the	OECD	(2009)	respectively.	The	other	variables	are	obtained	from	OECD	(2016a).		
86		
Table	3.A.4:	Robustness	tests	for	academic	efficiency	
		 Mathematics	 Reading	 Science	 Educational	expenditures/pupil	
Only	state	schools	Independent-school	share	 214.24***	 255.56***	 162.70**	 -130,083***		 (67.01)	 (85.30)	 (63.43)	 (28,477)	Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 -14.70	 -39.18	 -6.35	 35,867***		 (25.13)	 (32.71)	 (22.56)	 (9,998)	F	statistic	 49.73	 49.73	 49.73	 49.73	
n	 233,309	 233,309	 233,309	 233,309	Countries	 34	 34	 34	 34	
Only	Europe	Independent-school	share	 249.64***	 285.28***	 184.02***	 -141,424***		 (49.06)	 (57.99)	 (48.29)	 (27,638)	Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 -48.42**	 -74.75***	 -28.99	 53,427***		 (22.24)	 (24.12)	 (20.45)	 (10,285)	F	statistic	 42.52	 42.52	 42.52	 42.52	
n	 188,173	 188,173	 188,173	 188,173	Countries	 24	 24	 24	 24	
Belgium	and	the	Netherlands	excluded	Independent-school	share	 252.03***	 329.56***	 230.67***	 -157,986***		 (79.18)	 (92.01)	 (63.02)	 (29,633)	Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 -3.44	 -25.64	 1.66	 32,225***		 (26.81)	 (34.08)	 (22.72)	 (11,545)	F	statistic	 42.87	 42.87	 42.87	 42.87	
n	 282,359	 282,359	 282,359	 282,359	Countries	 32	 32	 32	 32	
Excluding	pupil-background	characteristics	Independent-school	share	 260.22***	 321.27***	 233.39***	 -132,297***		 (58.22)	 (76.71)	 (53.85)	 (28,644)	Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 -9.69	 -33.75	 -2.88	 34,861***		 (22.42)	 (31.19)	 (20.72)	 (10,927)	F	statistic	 45.88	 45.88	 45.88	 45.88	
n	 295,416	 295,416	 295,416	 295,416	Countries	 34	 34	 34	 34	
Reduced	form	Catholic	share	1900	*no	state	religion	 47.77***	 59.74***	 40.35***	 -29,984***		 (10.24)	 (14.45)	 (10.61)	 (3,929)	Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 33.08**	 22.52	 33.29**	 5,862		 (16.39)	 (18.49)	 (15.51)	 (4,545)	n	 295,416	 295,416	 295,416	 295,416	Countries	 34	 34	 34	 34	Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	country	level	in	parentheses.	All	regressions	include	pupil-,	school-,	and	country-level	controls	described	in	Sections	3.3.5	and	3.4.1,	including	within-European	regional-fixed	effects.							
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Table	3.A.5:	Including	the	school	average	of	all	pupil-level	variables			 Pupil	happiness	 Mathematics	 Reading	 Science	 Educational	expenditures/pupil	Independent-school	share	 -1.26***	 127.33***	 187.35***	 104.97***	 -118,247***		 (0.32)	 (37.23)	 (54.44)	 (38.92)	 (24,941)	Catholic	share	2010	*no	state	religion	 0.43***	 -14.75	 -36.32*	 -9.29	 31,192***		 (0.10)	 (14.71)	 (21.80)	 (13.72)	 (9,143)	F	statistic	 46.04	 45.96	 45.96	 45.96	 45.96	
n	 190,348	 295,416	 295,416	 295,416	 295,416	Countries	 34	 34	 34	 34	 34	Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.10;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	country	level	in	parentheses.	All	 regressions	 include	 indicators	 for	 the	 school-	 and	 country-level	 variables	 described	 in	Sections	3.3.5	and	3.4.1,	 including	within-European	regional-fixed	effects.	They	also	 include	 the	school-level	 shares	 of	 girls,	 first-generation	 immigrants,	 and	 second-generation	 immigrants,	 age,	 parental	education,	 parental	 occupational	 status,	 the	 index	 of	 home	 possessions,	 grade	 attended,	 and	 school	starting	age.			
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Appendix	B:	Ensuring	relevance	and	validity	of	the	instrument		In	 order	 to	 maximise	 the	 relevance	 and	 validity	 of	 the	 instrument	 used	 in	 the	 third	chapter,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 control	 for	other	historical	 factors,	which	have	determined	the	 extent	 to	 which	 Catholic	 resistance	 in	 the	 late	 19th	 and	 early	 20th	 centuries	generated	higher	 independent-school	 competition	 –	 and,	 if	 it	 did,	 the	 extent	 to	which	this	competition	has	survived	to	this	day.	This	problem	is	generally	ignored	in	previous	research,	 with	 the	 sole	 exception	 being	 the	 most	 obvious	 example:	 the	 rise	 of	Communist	regimes	from	the	October	Revolution	 in	1917	onwards,	which	undid	most	progress	made	by	Catholics	 in	 the	 late	19th	and	early	20th	centuries.	We	take	this	 into	account	by	controlling	for	countries’	Communist	background,	obtained	from	Barro	and	McCleary	(2005),	and	post-Soviet	background.1	The	former	applies	Czech	Republic,	East	Germany,	Estonia,	Hungary,	Poland,	Slovakia,	and	Slovenia,	whereas	the	latter	applies	to	Estonia	only.2						But	there	are	more	nuanced	historical	issues,	which	are	important	to	consider	for	the	purpose	 of	 generating	 a	 relevant	 and	 valid	 instrument	 for	 independent-school	competition	based	on	the	basic	 intuition	described	 in	Section	3.4.1.	To	begin	with,	we	control	for	the	share	of	Calvinists	(reformed	Protestants)	in	1900,	obtained	from	Brown	and	James	(2015).	This	is	to	account	for	the	fact	that	Calvinists	in	some	countries,	such	as	 the	 Netherlands,	 joined	 the	 Catholics’	 more	 general	 resistance	 to	 secular	 state	schooling	 (Glenn	2011,	1989).	 In	 those	countries,	with	 such	 reinforcements,	Catholics	could	 obtain	 successes	 in	 the	 educational	 sphere	 that	 were	 disproportionate	 to	 the	relative	size	of	their	own	community.						We	also	control	for	population	size	in	1900,	obtained	from	Brown	and	James	(2015),	to	 account	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 Catholics	 in	 larger	 countries	 often	 faced	more	 formidable	coordination	 problems	 and	 higher	 transaction	 costs	 to	 mobilise	 successfully	 (e.g.	Wilkinson	 et	 al.	 2006).	 Further	building	on	 this	 intuition,	we	note	 that	 the	 success	 of																																																									1	The	post-Soviet	indicator	is	included	to	account	for	the	fact	that	Soviet	annexation	throughout	the	latter	part	 of	 the	 20th	 century	 ensured	 an	 especially	 extreme	 form	 of	 centralisation	 and	 makeover	 of	 the	education	 system,	 while	 also	 ensuring	 mass	 migration	 and	 a	 new	 parallel	 education	 system	 along	linguistic	 lines	 (e.g.	 Krull	 and	 Trasberg	 2006;	 Stevick	 2006).	 Today,	 this	may	 affect	 both	 demand	 and	supply	for	independent	schooling	as	well	as	pupil	outcomes	in	ways	that	do	not	apply	to	post-Communist	countries	more	generally.	2	Whenever	an	indicator	only	affected	parts	of	a	country,	we	assign	the	share	of	the	population	affected.	This	strategy	follows	Barro	and	McClearly	(2005)	who	assign	a	value	of	0.204	for	Germany	in	terms	of	its	Communist	background,	representing	the	East	German	population	share.	The	only	exception	is	when	the	PISA	data	allow	us	 to	 identify	 the	relevant	within-country	regions,	such	as	England	 in	 the	UK,	 in	which	case	we	assign	a	value	of	1	for	all	pupils	in	the	region	for	which	the	indicator	applies	and	0	for	the	rest.	
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Catholics	 in	 defending	 their	 interests	 in	 countries	 with	 strong	 anticlerical	 currents	depended	 on	 their	 actual	 success	 of	 early	 political	 mobilisation	 (see	 Kaiser	 and	Wohnout	 2004).	 In	 countries	where	 Catholics	 failed	 to	 effectively	mobilise	 politically	against	 anti-clerical	 forces	 early	 on,	 and	 thus	 faced	 defeat,	 state	 monopolisation	 of	schooling	 was	 more	 successful	 than	 in	 countries	 where	 Catholics	 mobilised	 more	effectively	at	an	early	stage.						For	example,	whereas	Belgian	and	Dutch	Catholics	were	able	to	successfully	lobby	for	access	 to	 and	 public	 funding	 for	 independent	 schools	 in	 the	 latter	 part	 of	 the	 19th	century	 –	 and	 German	 and	 Swiss	 Catholics	 ensured	 access	 to	mostly	 public,	 but	 also	independent,	 religious	 schools	 following	 decades	 of	 setbacks	 –	 due	 to	 the	 success	 of	Catholic	political	mobilisation	(e.g.	Evans	1999;	Glenn	1989,	2011;	Kaiser	and	Wohnout	2004),	 French	 Catholics	 struggled	 to	 develop	 a	 coherent	 political	 strategy	 and	 were	consequently	less	successful	in	this	endeavour.	Indeed,	as	the	concept	of	laïcité	came	to	dominate	 education	 policy	 in	 France	 in	 the	 latter	 part	 of	 the	 19th	 century,	 French	Catholics	 suffered	 consecutive	 defeats	 due	 to	 their	 inability	 to	 mount	 a	 successful	political	defence	(Boyer	2004).	Consecutive	decrees	in	the	1880s	decreased	the	role	of	the	Church	in	state	schooling	considerably,	and	the	1904	law	pushed	through	by	Prime	Minister	 Émile	 Combes	 sought	 to	 end	 it	 entirely	 in	 both	 the	 public	 and	 independent	sectors.	Many	publicly-funded	schools	that	had	been	maintained	by	congregations	were	thus	 reopened	 as	 fee-based	 schools	 that	 hired	 lay	 teachers	 but	 still	 maintained	 a	‘Catholic	character’.	Overall,	however,	the	1904	law	led	to	a	considerable	decrease	in	de	facto	 independently-operated	school	enrolment	shares.	 In	1902,	21.6	per	cent	of	boys	and	42	per	cent	of	girls	attended	such	schools;	 in	1912,	 these	 figures	had	declined	 to	12.8	per	cent	and	24.8	per	cent	respectively,	not	far	from	the	situation	at	the	end	of	the	20th	century	(Judge	2001).	Furthermore,	the	abrogation	of	Napoleon’s	concordat	with	the	Vatican	in	1905,	which	finally	marked	the	de	jure	separation	of	church	and	state	in	France,	meant	that	a	system	of	public	funding	for	independent	schools	similar	to	those	in	 Belgium	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 was	 never	 developed	 in	 the	 Third	 Republic	 (Teese	1986).	Consequently,	despite	the	fact	that	France	had	similar	Catholic	population	shares	as	 Belgium	 in	 the	 late	 19th	 century,	 and	 considerably	 higher	 shares	 than	 the	Netherlands,	 the	 inability	of	French	Catholics	 to	 successfully	mobilise	politically	 at	 an	early	stage	of	state	centralisation	appears	to	be	an	important	reason	why	independent-school	competition	never	reached	similar	levels	in	France.	
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					A	 similar,	 but	 more	 radical,	 story	 applies	 to	 Mexico,	 where	 Catholic	 political	mobilisation	only	really	took	shape	following	the	Mexican	Revolution	in	1910.	However,	this	 ended	abruptly	after	 the	ouster	of	pro-Catholic	Victoriano	Huerta	 in	1914.	 In	 the	1917	 constitution,	 religious	 institutions	 were	 banned	 from	 running	 independent	schools,	 and	 the	 strict	 enforcement	of	 this	ban	 in	 the	 latter	part	of	 the	1920s	–	when	Catholic	 schools	 were	 forcibly	 closed	 –	 was	 an	 important	 contributory	 factor	 to	 the	Cristero	War	(see	Curley	2008;	Hamnet	2006;	Schell	2003).	In	1929,	the	Church	finally	caved	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 religious	 education	 in	 schools	 and	 agreed	 to	 carry	 it	 out	 in	churches	 only	 (Fernández	 2007).	 The	 ban	 on	 religious	 independent	 schools	 was	 not	revoked	until	1992,	although	its	enforcement	varied	over	the	decades,	and	there	is	still	essentially	no	public	funding	available	(Blancarte	1993;	OECD	2016).	The	early	Catholic	defeat	 and	 the	 inability	 to	 successfully	 mount	 a	 political	 defence	 later	 on	 thus	 had	similar,	 albeit	 more	 severe,	 consequences	 for	 independent	 schooling	 in	 Mexico	 as	 in	France.	 We	 thus	 control	 for	 an	 indicator	 of	 these	 significant	 early	 Catholic	 political	defeats	 in	 France	 and	Mexico	 in	 the	 late	 19th	 and	 early	 20th	 centuries,	 which	 appear	important	for	today’s	levels	of	independent-school	competition.							In	other	countries,	early	Catholic	pressure	for	access	to	independent	schools	suffered	less	 draconian	 defeats.	 Instead,	 laws	 were	 passed	 to	 ensure	 that	 independent	confessional	 schools	 would	 simply	 not	 be	 eligible	 for	 public	 funding,	 precisely	 to	decrease	 the	 alternative	 schooling	 opportunities	 for	 Catholics.	 For	 example,	 anti-Catholic	 sentiments	 in	 the	US	 during	 the	 1800s	 led	 to	 increased	 political	 pressure	 to	legislate	against	public	funding	for	parochial	schools,	while	still	maintaining	essentially	Protestant	 state	 schools.	 Thus,	 from	 the	 mid-1800s	 onwards,	 most	 US	 states	 began	passing	amendments	to	their	constitutions,	or	joined	the	Union	with	such	amendments,	which	 banned	 government	 funding	 for	 independent	 religious	 schools.	 In	 the	 end,	 41	states	and	the	District	of	Columbia	incorporated	such	measures	in	their	constitutions	at	some	 point	 in	 time	 (Duncan	 2003;	 Katz	 2011),	 covering	 86	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 relevant	population	 in	 the	 US.	 Similar	 developments	 occurred	 throughout	 Australia	 and	 New	Zealand,	albeit	these	changes	were	not	constitutionally	enshrined	(Buckley	et	al.	2011;	Wilkinson	et	al.	2006).	Thus,	we	control	for	indicators	for	areas	that	experienced	these	less	radical	early	Catholic	defeats	in	the	political	realm	separately.3																																																									3	That	 is,	 Australia,	New	Zealand,	 and	 the	 relevant	 part	 of	 the	US.	Note,	 however,	 that	 results	 are	 very	similar	if	we	merely	include	one	indicator	for	all	countries	where	Catholics	suffered	early	political	defeats.	
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					Similarly,	we	also	control	for	indicators	of	19th	century	national	bans	on	the	Society	of	Jesus	and	its	associate	orders,	as	long	as	they	remained	in	the	early	20th	century.4	The	Society	 of	 Jesus	 was	 the	 first	 teaching	 order	 of	 the	 Catholic	 Church	 and	 has	 been	especially	 devoted	 to	 education	 from	 its	 inception,	 having	 founded	 hundreds	 of	independent	 schools	 worldwide,	 while	 also	 inspiring	 other	 orders	 in	 this	 direction	(Duminuco	2000).	During	the	struggle	between	secular	and	religious	forces	in	the	19th	century,	 several	 countries	 banned	 Jesuits	 and	 their	 associate	 orders	 from	 their	territories	 for	 longer	 periods	 of	 time,	 often	 specifically	 because	 of	 their	 educational	influence	 (e.g.	Chadwick	1998;	Healy	2003).	Due	 to	 the	 importance	of	 the	 Jesuits	 and	their	associate	orders	in	opening	and	maintaining	independent	schools,	we	control	for	these	bans	in	our	set-up	to	ensure	maximum	instrument	relevance.						Furthermore,	 we	 take	 into	 account	 the	 unique	 impact	 of	 World	 War	 II	 on	 the	independent-education	 systems	 in	many	 countries.	 First,	 we	 control	 for	 indicators	 of	Nazi	 takeover	and	de	 facto	annexation	of	regions	 into	the	Greater	German	Reich.	Nazi	ideologues	 strongly	 emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	 education	 in	 socialising	 young	people	into	their	worldview,	thus	opposing	independent	or	denominational	schools	and,	indeed,	any	religious	elements	in	education	whatsoever.	Inevitably,	this	led	to	a	radical	persecution	of	the	Catholic	Church	in	Germany	as	well	as	all	territories	that	were	either	de	jure	or	de	facto	annexed	into	the	Reich.	Indeed,	in	these	areas,	the	Nazis	closed	down	all	denominational	schools,	public	and	independent	(see	Mariaux	1940;	Pine	2010).	For	example,	just	months	after	the	Anschluss,	all	independent	schools	in	Austria	were	closed	and	 taken	over	by	 the	Nazi	Party.	Reichskommissar	 Josef	Bürckel	explained:	 ‘We	must	take	care	of	the	preservation	of	our	nation	in	this	world.	This	only	is	possible	if	care	is	total	 care,	 therefore	 the	 school	 must	 belong	 to	 the	 state,	 upon	 which	 devolves	 the	responsibility	for	the	future’	(Chicago	Daily	Tribune	1938,	p.	1).	Similarly,	following	the	annexation	 of	 Alsace-Lorraine,	 the	 Vatican	 complained:	 ‘There	 are	 no	 longer	 any	Catholic	private	schools	in	Alsace.	All	Catholic	educational	institutions	run	by	members	of	 the	Holy	Order,	 priests	 or	 laymen,	 have	been	dissolved’	 (The	Tablet	 1941,	 p.	 290).	Similar	 fates	 afflicted	 other	 de	 facto	 annexed	 regions,	 including	 Eupen-Malmedy	 in	Belgium,	Luxembourg,	Czech	lands,	most	of	Slovenia,	and	the	whole	of	Poland,	including	
																																																								4	More	specifically,	this	applies	to	regions	that	belonged	to	the	German	Empire,	France,	Mexico,	Norway,	and	Switzerland.	
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the	quasi-colony	 in	 the	 eastern	parts	 that	 became	known	as	 the	General	Government	(see	Lapomarda	2005;	NCWC	1942;	OUSSCCPAC	1946).5						However,	the	same	story	does	not	apply	to	areas	that	were	solely	under	military	or	civil	administrative	control.	For	example,	in	Belgium	and	the	Netherlands,	‘the	churches	were	 given	 a	 degree	 of	 leeway	 that	 allowed	 them	 to	 maintain	 their	 influence	 and	preserve	 confessional	 institutions’	 (Bank	 and	 Gevers	 2016,	 p.	 182).	 While	 the	 Nazis	threatened	to	close	Catholic	schools	in	the	Netherlands,	due	to	anti-Nazi	activities	of	the	episcopacy,	 they	 refrained	 from	 doing	 so,	 leaving	 most	 schools	 operating	 normally	during	the	occupation	(Warmbrunn	1963).	The	fates	of	independently-operated	schools	in	Belgium	and	the	Netherlands	nicely	display	the	differences	in	regions	and	countries	that	were	merely	occupied	by,	compared	with	regions	and	countries	that	were	de	facto	annexed	into,	the	Greater	German	Reich.						At	 the	 same	 time,	 in	 pro-Catholic	 fascist	 and	 quasi-fascist	 countries	 allied	 to	 Nazi	Germany,	 or	 acting	 as	 client	 states	 to	 Nazi	 Germany,	 the	 reverse	 situation	 occurred	during	 and	 right	 before	World	War	 II:	 the	 Catholic	 Church	 again	 reached	 privileged	status	 in	public	 life,	which	meant	that	pressure	for	 independent	schools	decreased	for	quite	 some	 time	 in	 countries	 that	 turned	away	 from	 fascist	 and	quasi-fascist	 ideology	following	 World	 War	 II.	 The	 canonical	 example	 here	 is	 the	 clerico-fascist	 Slovak	Republic,	 led	 by	 the	 Catholic	 priest	 Josef	 Tiso,	who	 restored	 Church	 privileges	 in	 the	public	education	system	between	1938	and	1945	(Conway	1974;	Ward	2013).	Similar	stories	apply	to	Vichy	France,	Hungary,	and	Italy	following	the	Lateran	Treaty	of	1929	(see	Fazekas	2004;	Sweets	1994;	Wolff	1980).6	Thus,	whereas	territories	annexed	into	Nazi	 Germany	 experienced	 Catholic	 persecution,	 pro-Catholic	 regimes	 allied	with	 the	country	rather	defused	such	pressure	for	independent	schools	for	quite	some	time.	This	often	had	implications	for	Catholic	influence	in	education	also	after	the	war	(e.g.	Wolff	1992).	We	 thus	 also	 include	 an	 indicator	 for	 pro-Catholic	 Nazi	 client	 states	 or	 allies,	
																																																								5	A	 small	part	of	north-eastern	Slovenia,	 covering	about	6	per	cent	of	 today’s	population,	was	never	de	facto	annexed	by	Nazi	Germany,	but	was	instead	part	of	Hungary,	a	country	we	code	as	being	pro	Catholic.	Nevertheless,	the	Hungarians	were	hardly	pro	Catholic	in	this	annexed	region:	they	closed	all	Slovenian	schools,	imprisoned	Slovenian	Catholic	leaders,	and	made	Protestants	the	new	elite,	since	the	latter	were	perceived	 to	be	more	amenable	 to	 forced	Magyarisation	(Kranjc	2013).	We	 thus	do	not	code	 this	small	part	of	Slovenia	as	being	pro	Catholic,	although	results	are	unsurprisingly	almost	identical	if	we	do.	6	The	 Vichy	 regime	 did	 authorise	 communes	 to	 support	 independent	 schools	 financially,	 but	 this	happened	 only	 rarely	 and,	 when	 it	 did,	 the	 subsidies	 were	 very	 small.	 Consequently,	 there	 was	 no	increase	in	independent-school	enrolment	in	France	during	the	Vichy	regime’s	tenure	(Sweets	1994).	
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before	 and	 during	World	War	 II,	 which	 abandoned	 fascist	 and	 quasi-fascist	 ideology	after	the	war.						Finally,	we	also	 include	 indicators	 for	countries	or	 regions	 that	 in	 the	 latter	part	of	the	 20th	 century	 implemented	 voucher	 programmes	 in	 which	 for-profit	 operators	participate	on	an	equal	basis,	or	very	recent	reforms	that	enabled	mass	conversions	of	state	 schools	 to	 independently-operated	 status	 essentially	 overnight.	 There	 are	 two	countries	 that	 allow	 for-profit	 operators	 on	 an	 equal	 basis	 –	 Chile	 and	 Sweden	 –	 and	only	one	nation	in	one	country	that	has	allowed	mass	conversions	of	publicly-operated	schools	 to	 independently-operated	 status:	 England.	 As	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 the	 2010	Academies	 Act,	 which	 allowed	 essentially	 all	 English	 schools	 to	 become	 autonomous	‘academies’,	 the	share	of	15-year	old	pupils	attending	 independently-operated	schools	in	the	United	Kingdom	increased	from	6.31	per	cent	in	2009	to	45.16	per	cent	in	2012	(OECD	 2016).	 Neither	 the	 enrolment	 growth	 in	 for-profit	 independently-operated	schools	 nor	 such	 mass	 conversions	 has	 much	 to	 do	 with	 the	 independent-school	competition	 that	we	 aim	 to	 capture	with	 the	 instrument	 based	 on	 historical	 Catholic	resistance	to	state	schooling	in	the	19th	century.		
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4. Group	Threat	and	Voter	Turnout:	Evidence	from	a	Refugee	
Placement	Programme*	
		
Abstract		We	study	 the	 impact	of	 refugee	 inflows	on	voter	 turnout	 in	Sweden	 in	a	period	when	shifting	 immigration	patterns	made	 the	previously	homogeneous	country	 increasingly	heterogeneous.	Analysing	individual-level	panel	data	and	exploiting	a	national	refugee	placement	programme	to	obtain	plausibly	exogenous	variation	in	immigration,	we	find	that	refugee	inflows	significantly	raise	the	probability	of	voter	turnout.	Balancing	tests	on	 initial	 turnout	 as	 well	 as	 placebo	 tests	 regressing	 changes	 in	 turnout	 on	 future	refugee	 inflows	 support	 the	 causal	 interpretation	 of	 our	 findings.	 The	 results	 are	consistent	with	group-threat	theory,	which	predicts	that	increased	out-group	presence	spurs	political	mobilisation	among	in-group	members.		
																																																								*	The	 author	 thanks	Michael	 Bruter,	 Karin	 Edmark,	 Björn	Tyrefors	Hinnerich,	Henrik	 Jordahl,	 Julian	 Le	Grand,	Per	Pettersson-Lidbom,	and	Olmo	Silva	 for	 comments	and	discussions,	 as	well	 as	Karin	Edmark	and	Per	Pettersson-Lidbom	for	kindly	sharing	their	data.	
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4.1. Introduction	
	In	 the	 past	 decades,	 immigration	 to	 European	 countries	 has	 increased	 considerably.	Between	 the	 periods	 1960–69	 and	 1990–99,	 net-migration	 flows	 increased	 from	 1.1	million	 to	 about	 10	 million,	 generating	 large	 demographic	 shifts	 in	 many	 societies	throughout	the	continent.	The	increased	flows	also	reflect	a	new	pattern	of	immigration	since	the	1980s.	Following	World	War	II,	migration	in	Europe	consisted	mostly	of	intra-continental	 labour	 flows,	 especially	 from	 southern	 to	 northern	 countries,	which	were	frequently	reversed	after	employment	contracts	ended.	However,	 since	 the	end	of	 the	1970s,	such	flows	have	been	replaced	by	immigration	from	the	developing	world,	which	led	to	more	permanent	settlement	in	the	host	countries	(Dustmann	and	Frattini	2012;	Wanner	2002).	In	the	latter	part	of	the	20th	century,	previously	ethnically	homogeneous	countries	 thus	 became	 increasingly	 heterogeneous	 –	 and	 the	 consequences	 of	 this	change	have	been	the	subject	of	intense	debate.						One	 important	 possible	 consequence	 of	 immigration	 could	 be	 altered	 political	engagement	 among	 natives.	 In	 America,	 over	 half	 a	 century	 ago,	 Key	 (1949)	 noted	 a	positive	 correlation	 between	 the	 presence	 of	 African	 Americans	 and	 voter	 turnout	among	 whites;	 the	 perception	 of	 ‘group	 threat’	 allegedly	 stimulated	 higher	 political	mobilisation.	However,	other	scholars	have	instead	suggested	that	inter-ethnic	contact	under	 certain	 conditions	 may	 instead	 decrease	 existing	 perceptions	 of	 threat	 (e.g.	Allport	 1954;	Williams	 1947),	 implying	 that	 immigration	 if	 anything	 may	 reduce	 in-group	bias	as	a	source	of	political	engagement	and	 thus	 lower	 turnout	among	natives	(e.g.	 Zingher	 and	 Thomas	 2014).	 These	 opposing	 perspectives	 have	 generated	 an	expanding	empirical	literature	with	mixed	results.	Yet	identification	problems	involved	in	analysing	the	effect	of	ethnic	diversity	are	severe	because	of	potential	endogeneity	in	settlement	and	mobility	patterns	as	well	as	other	sources	of	unobserved	heterogeneity.						This	paper	provides	new	evidence	on	the	impact	of	increasing	ethnic	diversity	due	to	immigration	 on	 individual-level	 voter	 turnout	 in	 Sweden.	 In	 1985,	 increasing	 refugee	inflows	led	the	government	to	enact	a	placement	programme,	through	which	most	new	refugees	were	contracted	to	the	country’s	municipalities	each	year	until	the	programme	was	 dismantled	 in	 1994.	 It	 is	 possible	 to	 exploit	 the	 municipal	 contracts	 to	 obtain	variation	 in	 refugee	 inflows	 that	 is	 free	 from	 bias	 due	 to	 endogenous	 settlement	patterns	and	measurement	error,	and,	once	we	adjust	 for	municipal-fixed	effects,	also	plausibly	exogenous	to	changes	in	individual-level	turnout	more	generally.	
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					Combining	 the	 municipal-level	 contracts	 with	 data	 from	 the	 Swedish	 National	Election	 Studies	 Programme,	 carried	 out	 in	 conjunction	 with	 every	 Swedish	 election	since	1956,	 the	paper	analyses	how	refugee	 inflows	due	to	 the	placement	programme	affected	changes	in	individual-level	voter	turnout	between	the	national,	municipal,	and	county	 elections	 in	 1985	 and	 1988,	 1988	 and	 1991,	 as	 well	 as	 1991	 and	 1994.	 Two	features	 of	 this	 survey	 are	 especially	 useful:	 (1)	 each	 individual	 is	 observed	 in	 two	elections	in	a	row,	which	allows	us	to	adjust	for	individual-fixed	effects	and	ensure	that	native	mobility	does	not	bias	our	findings,	while	(2)	data	on	voter	turnout	are	obtained	directly	 from	official	 records,	which	gets	rid	of	potential	 response	bias	and	minimises	panel	attrition.	To	ensure	that	that	the	sample	analysed	is	in	fact	representative	of	the	Swedish	voting-age	population,	we	weight	each	individual	with	the	inverse	probability	of	selection	in	the	population	of	eligible	voters.	Still,	since	the	survey	was	designed	to	be	representative	at	the	national	rather	than	municipal	level,	the	estimated	effects	should	primarily	be	seen	as	valid	for	the	randomly	sampled	population	in	each	municipality.						Our	study	thus	analyses	whether	refugee	immigration	in	one	period,	spurred	by	the	placement-programme	contracts,	altered	individuals’	propensity	to	vote	over	the	same	period.	The	results	display	 that	 larger	 refugee	 inflows	raise	 individuals’	propensity	 to	vote	 in	national	and	 local	elections:	a	rise	 in	 the	refugee	 inflow	by	1	percentage	point	increases	 the	 likelihood	of	voter	 turnout	by	5–7	percentage	points.	Balancing	 tests	on	initial	turnout	and	placebo	tests	regressing	changes	in	turnout	on	future	refugee	inflows	support	 the	 causal	 interpretation	 of	 our	 findings,	 as	 do	 several	 robustness	 checks.	 In	addition,	 supporting	our	 expectations,	we	 find	 that	OLS	estimates	 are	biased	 towards	zero,	 indicating	 that	 it	 is	 important	 to	 take	 into	 account	 endogenous	 settlement	 and	mobility	patterns	and/or	measurement	error	in	refugee	inflows.						Overall,	our	findings	thus	provide	support	for	group-threat	theory:	natives	appear	to	mobilise	 politically	 as	 a	 result	 of	 refugee	 immigration.	 While	 silent	 on	 the	 effects	 of	involuntary	contact,	 the	study	provides	new	evidence	of	how	real-world	demographic	changes	 –	which	 do	 not	 necessarily	 generate	 voluntary	 contact	 between	 in-	 and	 out-group	members	–	affect	political	engagement.	Given	the	relative	scarcity	of	convincing	research	 on	 the	 relevance	 of	 group	 threat	 for	 understanding	 individual-level	 voter	turnout	in	general,	the	paper	provides	an	important	contribution	to	the	literature.						The	 paper	 proceeds	 as	 follows.	 Section	 4.2	 discusses	 the	 theoretical	 mechanisms	linking	 refugee	 immigration	 to	 voter	 turnout	 and	 reviews	 the	 empirical	 literature;	
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Section	 4.3	 describes	 the	 Swedish	 setting	 and	 the	 refugee	 placement	 programme;	Section	 4.4	 discusses	 the	 data	 and	 methodology	 utilised;	 Section	 4.5	 outlines	 the	estimation	strategy;	Section	4.6	presents	the	results;	and	Section	4.7	concludes.	
4.2. Theory	and	literature	review	
	Why	would	refugee	immigration	affect	voter	turnout?	One	theoretical	mechanism	rests	on	 the	 social	 psychological	 concept	 of	 social	 identity,	 defined	 as	 ‘that	 part	 of	 an	individual’s	 self-concept	 which	 derives	 from	 his	 knowledge	 of	 his	 membership	 in	 a	social	group’	(Tajfel	1978:63).	People’s	social	identity	may	in	turn	be	connected	to	the	formation	 of	 their	 preferences,	 generating	 ‘in-group	 bias’.	 Such	 group	 identification	could	be	based	on,	 for	 example,	 ethnicity,	 religion,	nation,	 or	 class.	The	 implication	 is	that	 political	 mobilisation	 among	 in-group	 members	 may	 increase	 as	 a	 result	 of	increased	out-group	presence,	in	accordance	with	group-threat	theory	(Key	1949).						However,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 whether	 voting	 preferences	 as	 such	 would	 change	 in	 the	equilibrium.	 In	 traditional	 explanations,	 increased	 diversity	 spurred	 by	 immigration	may	lower	preferences	for	redistribution	overall	(e.g.	Alesina	and	Glaeser	2004;	Alesina	and	 La	 Ferrara	 2000;	 Costa-Font	 and	 Cowell	 2014),	 which	 should	mobilise	 voters	 in	favour	of	right-wing	parties.	However,	it	is	also	possible	that	diversity	increases	natives’	support	 for	redistribution	because	of	perceived	 threats	of	economic	competition	 from	immigrants	(Brady	and	Finnigan	2014),	thus	making	them	more	likely	to	vote	for	left-wing	parties.	Additionally,	since	immigrants	are	generally	seen	as	the	least	deserving	of	welfare	(van	der	Waal	et	al.	2010;	van	Oorschot	2006),	populist	right-wing	parties	that	appeal	to	welfare	chauvinism	may	benefit	disproportionally.						Of	course,	these	theoretical	explanations	are	not	necessarily	incompatible	since	they	may	be	relevant	for	different	parts	of	the	population.	For	example,	high-income	earners	may	be	especially	susceptible	to	decrease	their	support	for	redistribution	(e.g.	Dahlberg	et	 al.	 2012,	 2017),	 and	 therefore	 mobilise	 for	 right-wing	 parties,	 while	 low-income	earners,	 who	 are	 more	 directly	 affected	 by	 welfare	 policies,	 may	 be	 more	 likely	 to	mobilise	 in	 favour	of	 left-wing	parties	 (Brady	and	Finnigan	2014).	Alternatively,	 both	may	mobilise	for	anti-immigration,	welfare	chauvinist	parties	in	support	of	welfare	for	in-group	members	only	(see	Bay	et	al.	2013;	Harrison	and	Bruter	2011).	However,	most	importantly	for	our	purposes,	also	differential	mobilisation	patterns	would	be	expected	to	increase	turnout	in	the	equilibrium	if	group-threat	theory	is	correct.	
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					Another	potential	mechanism	linking	group	threat	to	higher	turnout	 is	via	electoral	competition	 from	 out-group	members.	 This	 could	 occur	 if	 immigrants	 have	 different	political	preferences	and	vote	for	different	parties	compared	with	natives.	Sweden	has	a	comparatively	 high	 naturalisation	 rate,	 with	 82	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 total	 foreign-born	population,	 and	 fully	 94	per	 cent	 of	 immigrants	 from	 countries	 outside	 the	European	Economic	 Area,	 holding	 citizenship	 in	 2007	 (OECD	 2011).	 Furthermore,	 the	 country	also	allows	some	immigrants	without	citizenship	to	vote	in	local	elections.	In	this	story,	natives’	 propensity	 to	 vote	 would	 increase	 as	 a	 result	 of	 larger	 inflows	 of	 out-group	members	because	of	perceptions	that	the	latter	threaten	to	alter	the	political	situation.						While	 group-threat	 theory	 predicts	 increased	 turnout	 as	 a	 result	 of	 immigration,	there	 are	 other	 reasons	 to	 believe	 the	 impact	 may	 be	 the	 opposite.	 The	 ‘contact	hypothesis’	holds	that	increased	interaction	between	in-	and	out-group	members	under	certain	circumstances	reduces	prejudices	and	conflicts	(Allport	1954;	Williams	1947).	If	this	 holds	 true,	 existing	 perceptions	 of	 group	 threat	 and,	 in	 the	 end,	 political	mobilisation	among	in-group	members	may	in	fact	decrease	as	the	share	of	out-group	members	 increases	 (see	 Zingher	 and	 Thomas	 2014).	 In	 this	 story,	 immigration	 thus	lowers	 turnout:	 increased	 diversity	 stimulates	 greater	 inter-ethnic	 contact,	 which	reduces	 perceptions	 of	 threat	 and	 in-group	 bias	 as	 sources	 of	 political	 engagement	among	 natives.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 generally	 decreasing	 turnout	 across	 industrialised	countries	(Blais	and	Rubenson	2013;	Gray	and	Caul	2000),	this	means	that	the	decline	is	expected	 to	 be	 more	 significant	 in	 communities	 with	 larger	 inflows	 of	 immigrants	compared	 to	 communities	 with	 smaller	 inflows.	 Natives	 in	 the	 former	 experience	increased	contact	with	out-group	members,	as	a	result	of	greater	opportunities	for	such	contact,	which	could	lower	in-group	bias	via	lowered	perceptions	of	threats,	leading	to	lower	mobilisation	and	turnout.	In	contrast,	natives	in	the	latter	may	be	aware	that	their	country	is	getting	increasingly	diverse,	but	have	little	opportunity	for	direct	inter-ethnic	day-to-day	 contact	 through	 which	 such	 diversity	 could	 help	 ameliorate	 negative	perceptions.	 Consequently,	 their	 in-group	 bias	 and	 mobilisation	 remain	 strong,	resulting	in	higher	turnout	relative	to	more	diverse	communities.						At	a	general	level,	empirical	studies	analysing	the	effects	of	diversity	on	inter-ethnic	attitudes	display	mixed	findings	(e.g.	Avery	and	Fine	2012;	Bobo	and	Hutchings	1996;	Dustmann	 and	 Preston	 2001;	 Fox	 2004;	 Hopkins	 2010;	 Markaki	 and	 Longhi	 2012;	McLaren	 2003;	 McLaren	 and	 Johnson	 2007;	 Newman	 2013;	 Oliver	 and	 Mendelberg	
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2000;	 Oliver	 and	 Wong	 2003;	 Schlueter	 and	 Scheepers	 2010).	 A	 similarly	heterogeneous	 picture	 emerges	 from	 research	 exploring	 the	 effects	 of	 diversity	 and	immigration	on	 (1)	 public	 spending	 and	 attitudes	 towards	 redistribution	 and	welfare	(Costa-Font	 and	Cowell	2014;	 Stichnoch	and	Van	der	Straeten	2011;	 Schaeffer	2013);	(2)	 vote	 outcomes	 (Arzheimer	 2009;	 Della	 Posta	 2013;	 Gerdes	 and	Wadensjö	 2010;	Giles	and	Buckner	1993;	Harrison	and	Bruter	2011;	Roch	and	Rushton	2008;	Rydgren	and	Ruth	2011,	2013;	Voss	1996;	Voss	and	Miller	2001);	and	(3)	political	engagement	and	 turnout	 (Bhatti	 et	 al.	 2017;	 Fieldhouse	 and	 Cutts	 2008;	 Hill	 and	 Leighley	 1999;	Leighley	and	Vedlitz	1999;	Matthews	and	Prothro	1963;	Schlichting	et	al.	1998;	Zingher	and	 Thomas	 2014).	 Yet	 this	 research	 does	 not	 generally	 exploit	 plausibly	 exogenous	variation	in	diversity	and	thus	 likely	fails	to	 isolate	causal	relationships.1	For	example,	settlement	 patterns	 of	 ethnic	 minorities	 and	 immigrants	 are	 not	 random,	 but	 often	depend	on	community	characteristics	(e.g.	Bracco	et	al.	2018;	Damm	2009)	–	which	may	also	affect	the	outcomes	under	investigation.						Focusing	on	methodologically	advanced	research,	studies	analysing	American	college	students	who	are	randomly	allocated	to	roommates	of	different	ethnicities	indicate	that	contact	 often	 breeds	 more	 positive	 inter-group	 attitudes	 (see	 Boisjoly	 et	 al.	 2006;	Carrell	et	al.	2015;	Shook	and	Fazio	2008;	Van	Laar	et	al.	2005).	However,	the	extent	to	which	these	findings	are	relevant	for	real-world	demographic	changes	is	questionable.	This	 is	 because	 in-group	members	 are	 usually	 not	 forced	 to	 interact	 with	 out-group	members,	 and	 the	 choice	 to	 do	 so	 is	 endogenous	 to	 inter-group	 attitudes.	 In	 other	words,	 for	 the	 contact	hypothesis	 to	be	 relevant	 for	 real-world	demographic	 changes,	diversity	 itself	should	stimulate	greater	 inter-group	contact	and,	 in	 this	way,	decrease	perceived	group	threat.2						Yet	available	evidence	does	not	necessarily	suggest	this	is	the	case.	In	one	interesting	study,	 Enos	 (2014)	 analyses	 the	 impact	 of	 randomly	 increasing	 the	 daily	 presence	 of																																																									1	This	appears	to	include	Dahlberg	et	al.’s	(2012)	study,	which	utilises	the	Swedish	placement	programme	analysed	 here	 and	 finds	 negative	 effects	 of	 diversity	 on	 redistributive	 preferences.	 Yet	 Nekby	 and	Pettersson-Lidbom	(2012,	2017)	show	that	the	results	are	unreliable	because	of	a	partially	endogenous	instrument	and	sample	selection	bias	due	to	considerable	attrition	(see	Dahlberg	et	al.	[2013,	2017]	for	rejoinders).	 As	 discussed	 in	 Section	 4.4.2,	we	 circumvent	 these	 problems	by	 (1)	 using	 the	 endogenous	instrument	 as	 our	 primary	 independent	 variable	 capturing	 refugee	 inflows,	 while	 (2)	 exploiting	 an	alternative	instrument	developed	by	Nekby	and	Pettersson-Lidbom	(2012,	2017)	that	is	more	likely	to	be	exogenous,	(3)	analysing	a	dependent	variable	with	very	little	attrition,	and	(4)	weighting	respondents	by	the	inverse	of	their	probability	of	being	selected	for	the	survey	in	the	relevant	election.	2	While	 the	effects	of	residential	segregation	may	make	studies	analysing	 larger	geographical	areas	 less	likely	to	pick	up	significant	inter-group	interaction	(see	Enos	2016;	Zingher	and	Thomas	2014),	voluntary	contact	is	always	endogenous	regardless	of	geographical	area	analysed.	
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Hispanics	 at	 Boston	 train	 stations	 in	 homogeneously	 white	 neighbourhoods,	 finding	that	 treatment	 induced	 stronger	 exclusionary	 attitudes	 among	 residents.	 This	 type	 of	experiment	 is	more	 relevant	 for	understanding	 the	 effects	of	 real-world	demographic	changes	on	exclusionary	attitudes	than	studies	analysing	various	 forms	of	 involuntary	inter-ethnic	 interactions,	 but	 the	 external	 validity	 for	 settings	 outside	 the	 very	 local	context	of	Boston	train	stations	is	clearly	questionable.						In	 general,	 group-threat	 theory	 also	 often	 receives	 support	 in	 studies	 analysing	aggregate	vote	outcomes,	which	tend	to	find	that	diversity	boosts	aggregate	vote	shares	for	right-wing	and	anti-immigration	parties	(Barone	et	al.	2016;	Dustmann	et	al.	2016:	Halla	et	al.	2017;	Harmon	2017;	 Jofre-Monsey	et	al.	2011;	Otto	and	Steinhardt	2014),	although	 some	 research	 reaches	 different	 conclusions	 (Mendez	 and	 Cutillas	 2014;	Steinmayer	 2016).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 studies	 analysing	 aggregate	 turnout	 find	mixed	effects	(Barone	et	al.	2016;	Bratti	et	al.	2017;	Dustmann	et	al.	2016:	Mendez	and	Cutillas	2014).	 Regardless,	 research	 studying	 aggregate	 outcomes	 cannot	 normally	 separate	voter	responses	from	the	effects	of	mobility	due	to	immigration.3						While	most	studies	focus	on	the	effects	of	increasing	diversity	on	vote	outcomes	and	turnout,	 some	 research	 investigates	 the	 effects	 of	 decreasing	 diversity	 instead.	 In	 an	interesting	 contribution,	 Enos	 (2016)	 analyses	 a	 natural	 experiment	 in	 Chicago	when	the	 reconstruction	 of	 public	 housing	 displaced	 African	 Americans	 living	 close	 to	neighbourhoods	 predominantly	 inhabited	 by	 whites.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 African-American	outflow	from	nearby	communities,	turnout	decreased	by	over	10	percentage	points	 among	 whites,	 who	 also	 became	 less	 likely	 to	 vote	 Republican.	 These	 effects	decrease	 the	 farther	 away	 voters	 lived	 from	 the	 housing	 projects.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	turnout	and	party	choices	among	African	Americans	nearby	were	unaffected.							Overall,	 the	empirical	 literature	on	 the	effects	of	diversity	on	 inter-group	attitudes	and	 political	 behaviour	 is	 thus	 mixed.	 Stronger	 studies	 analysing	 political	 behaviour	tend	 to	 support	 the	 notion	 of	 group	 threat	 rather	 than	 the	 contact	 hypothesis	 more	generally,	 but	 effects	 on	 turnout	 specifically	 are	 not	 consistent	 across	 these	 studies	either.	 Furthermore,	 prior	methodologically	 advanced	 research	on	 the	 attitudinal	 and	political	 effects	 of	 diversity	 generally	 focuses	 on	 very	 local	 settings,	 which	 makes	 it																																																									3	It	 is	 also	 often	 unclear	 whether	 the	 identification	 strategies	 work	 as	 intended.	 For	 example,	 some	research	 exploits	 historical	 levels	 of	 immigration	 and	 housing	 stock	 as	 instruments	 (e.g.	 Barone	 et	 al.	2016;	 Harmon	 2017),	 which	 may	 generate	 bias	 because	 of	 potential	 serial	 correlation	 in	 unobserved	regional	characteristics	that	both	attract	immigrants,	or	change	the	housing	stock,	and	affect	outcomes.	
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difficult	 to	 draw	 general	 conclusions,	 and/or	 analyses	 aggregate	 outcomes,	 which	makes	 it	 impossible	 to	 separate	 voter	 responses	 from	 the	 effects	 of	 native	 mobility,	which	may	also	change	as	a	result	of	diversity.	Finally,	 the	preponderance	of	research	has	 focused	 on	 immigration	 or	 ethnic	 diversity	 in	 a	 broader	 sense	 rather	 than	 on	refugee	immigration	specifically.	In	this	paper,	we	exploit	a	national	refugee	placement	programme	 as	 well	 as	 individual-level	 panel	 data	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 mitigate	 these	problems	and	gaps	in	the	existing	literature.	
4.3. Swedish	immigration	and	the	refugee	placement	programme		To	 study	 the	 causal	 effects	 of	 refugee	 immigration	 on	 voter	 turnout,	 we	 exploit	 data	from	 Sweden,	 which	 has	 seen	 significant	 changes	 in	 its	 immigration	 patterns	 since	World	War	 II.	 After	 a	 brief	 period	 of	 refugee	 influx	 from	 Eastern	 Europe	 in	 the	 late	1940s,	 intra-European	labour	migrants	dominated	inflows	between	the	1950s	and	the	1970s.	 These	 migrants	 came	 primarily	 from	 Nordic	 countries	 (especially	 Finland).	However,	as	a	result	of	more	restrictive	rules	and	a	 less	 favourable	economic	climate,	economic	 immigration	 gradually	 decreased	 in	 the	 1970s,	 while	 refugee	 immigration	from	 the	 developing	world	 increased,	 first	 gradually	 and	 then	 rapidly	 from	 the	mid-1980s	onwards	(Lundh	and	Ohlsson	1999;	Nilsson	2004).	Indeed,	Sweden	accepted	the	highest	 number	 of	 refugees	 per	 capita	 in	 Europe	 each	 year	 between	 1983	 and	 2003	(Ruist	 2015).	 Unsurprisingly,	 this	 development	 has	 generated	 an	 increasingly	heterogeneous	population.	In	1960,	4	per	cent	of	the	population	were	born	abroad;	by	2014,	this	figure	had	increased	to	17	per	cent	(Statistics	Sweden	2015).						As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 shifting	migration	 patterns,	 the	 immigrant	 population	 has	also	become	increasingly	ethnically	different	from	native	Swedes.	As	late	as	1970,	only	5	per	cent	of	the	foreign-born	population	came	from	outside	Europe,	a	figure	that	had	increased	to	12	per	cent	in	1980,	28	per	cent	in	1990,	39	per	cent	in	2000,	and	48	per	cent	in	2012	(Aldén	and	Hammarstedt	2014).	In	other	words,	in	the	last	thirty	years	of	the	20th	century,	Sweden	was	transformed	from	an	ethnically	homogeneous	country	to	an	ethnically	diverse	country.						The	 refugee	 situation	 changed	especially	 from	1986	onwards,	which	 is	 the	 starting	point	for	the	period	under	investigation	in	this	paper.	Whereas	on	average	fewer	than	5,000	refugees	arrived	annually	in	the	period	1982–85,	this	figure	increased	radically	to	19,000	 refugees	 annually	 in	 the	 period	 1986–91,	 and	 further	 to	 35,000	 refugees	
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annually	in	the	period	1992–94	(Dahlberg	et	al.	2012).	To	cope	with	the	unprecedented	situation,	 the	 Swedish	 government	 implemented	 a	 refugee	 placement	 programme,	which	 lasted	 between	 1985	 and	 July	 1994,	 with	 the	 intention	 to	 distribute	 refugees	more	 evenly	 across	 the	 country’s	 then	 284	municipalities	 and	 especially	 break	 their	concentration	to	large	cities.	The	idea	was	first	to	contract	about	60	municipalities,	but	more	 came	 to	 participate	 as	 the	 number	 of	 refugees	 increased	 radically	 (Edin	 et	 al.	2003).	 According	 to	 the	 data	 utilised	 in	 this	 paper	 –	 which	 were	 extracted	 from	 the	official	 contracts	 by	Nekby	 and	Pettersson-Lidbom	 (2012,	 2017)	 –	196	municipalities	agreed	 to	accept	at	 least	some	refugees	 in	1986,	a	 figure	 that	 increased	 to	243	only	a	year	 later	 and	 to	 279	 in	 1990.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 placement	 programme	 affected	essentially	the	entire	country,	although	to	different	degrees.						It	also	appears	clear	 that	 the	goal	 to	distribute	 incoming	refugees	more	evenly	was	achieved:	there	is	a	clear	trend	break	in	1985	in	terms	of	the	share	of	refugees	settling	in	 Stockholm,	 Gothenburg,	 and	 Malmö.	 Between	 1982	 and	 1984,	 the	 share	 of	 new	refugees	who	moved	into	these	three	municipalities	increased	from	about	50	to	60	per	cent.	 In	1985,	however,	 the	figure	decreased	to	about	35	per	cent,	and	it	continued	to	decrease	to	just	over	10	per	cent	in	1990,	while	it	increased	slightly	again	from	1991	to	just	below	20	per	cent	in	1994.	Meanwhile,	the	share	of	incoming	refugees	who	ended	up	 in	municipalities	with	 fewer	 than	50,000	 inhabitants	 increased	 from	below	20	per	cent	 in	1984	 to	over	50	per	 cent	 in	1989	 (Dahlberg	et	al.	2012).	Thus,	 the	placement	programme	 both	 altered	 settlement	 patterns	 and,	 in	 a	 context	 of	 rapidly	 increasing	refugee	inflows,	induced	considerable	within-municipality	variation	over	time.						Importantly,	 refugees	 who	 were	 allocated	 via	 the	 programme	 were	 assigned	 to	municipalities	 based	 on	 contracts	 rather	 than	 being	 able	 to	 choose	 where	 to	 settle	initially.	While	they	were	allowed	to	move	after	the	initial	assignment,	by	exploiting	the	number	 of	 contracted	 refugees	 as	 an	 instrument	 for	 refugee	 inflows	 in	 the	municipalities,	 it	 is	possible	 to	circumvent	 the	problem	of	endogenous	settlement	and	mobility	 patterns	 during	 this	 period.	 More	 generally,	 while	 the	 programme	 did	 not	place	(or	contract)	refugees	randomly	across	municipalities	(see	Dahlberg	et	al.	2013,	2017;	Nekby	 and	Pettersson-Lidbom	2012,	 2017),	 for	 this	 paper’s	 purposes	 it	 is	 only	necessary	 that	 predicted	 refugee	 inflows	 based	 on	 the	 contracts	 are	 exogenous	 to	changes	in	individual-level	turnout	once	other	relevant	variables	are	held	constant.	We	present	evidence	in	support	of	this	assumption.	
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4.4. Data	and	methodology	
	During	 the	period	analysed,	elections	occurred	every	 three	years,	 always	on	 the	 third	Sunday	in	September.	All	elections	–	national,	municipal,	and	county	–	are	held	on	the	same	 day.	 Non-citizens	 are	 eligible	 to	 vote	 in	municipal	 and	 county	 elections	 if	 they	have	been	officially	registered	as	 living	 in	Sweden	for	at	 least	 three	years	prior	to	the	election.4	Immigrants	 (refugees)	 are	 required	 to	 be	 officially	 registered	 as	 living	 in	Sweden	 for	 five	 (four)	 years	 prior	 to	 being	 eligible	 to	 apply	 for	 Swedish	 citizenship,	which	 gives	 them	 the	 right	 to	 vote	 also	 in	 national	 elections.	 The	 paper’s	 estimation	strategy,	 described	 formally	 in	 Section	 4.5,	 hinges	 on	 being	 able	 to	 link	 data	 on	individual-level	turnout	to	municipal-level	variables,	 including	the	measure	we	exploit	to	 obtain	plausibly	 exogenous	 variation	 in	 refugee	 inflows.	This	 section	describes	 the	data	and	methodology	utilised	in	the	analysis.5	The	descriptive	statistics	are	displayed	in	Table	4.1	at	the	end	of	this	section.6		
4.4.1. Voter	turnout		Data	 on	 voter	 turnout	 are	 obtained	 from	 the	 Swedish	 National	 Election	 Studies	Programme	(SNES	2015),	a	survey	that	has	been	carried	out	in	conjunction	with	every	election	since	1956.7	Since	1973,	the	surveys	are	carried	out	as	rotating	panels	in	which	individuals	are	 interviewed	at	 two	elections	 in	a	 row,	with	a	new	panel	 sample	being	drawn	on	each	occasion.	The	panel	sample	is	randomly	selected	and	is	representative	of	the	Swedish	population	of	eligible	voters	 in	national	elections	at	 the	time	of	selection.	The	 survey	 contains	 information	 on	 political	 and	 voting	 preferences	 as	 well	 as	background	characteristics	of	the	respondents.	
																																																								4	Citizens	of	EU/Nordic	countries	must	only	be	officially	registered	in	Sweden	at	the	time	of	the	election	to	be	able	to	vote	in	these	elections.	5	We	thank	Karin	Edmark	and	Per	Pettersson-Lidbom	who	kindly	supplied	data	on	most	municipal-level	variables	used	 in	 the	paper,	which	are	obtained	 from	Statistics	Sweden,	 the	Swedish	Migration	Agency,	and	the	Swedish	Public	Employment	Service.	We	obtained	the	remaining	municipal-level	variables,	and	updated	some	variables	supplied	by	the	authors,	using	Statistics	Sweden’s	(2016)	database.	6	The	 negative	 minimum	 value	 for	∆%Refugees	 is	 due	 to	 (1)	 two	 observations	 where	 the	 municipal	population	 increased	 faster	 during	 the	 period	 than	 the	 refugee	 inflow	 over	 that	 period	 and	 (2)	 28	observations	 covering	 respondents	 who	moved	 to	 a	 municipality	 with	 a	 smaller	 accumulated	 refugee	inflow	 in	 the	 year	 of	 the	 second	 election	 than	 the	 initial	 accumulated	 refugee	 inflow	 in	 the	 home	municipality.	If	these	observations	are	excluded,	the	minimum	is	zero.	7	The	 election-survey	 data	 were	 originally	 collected	 within	 a	 research	 project	 at	 the	 Department	 of	Political	 Science,	 University	 of	 Gothenburg.	 For	 the	 main	 years	 analysed	 in	 this	 study,	 the	 principal	investigators	were	Sören	Holmberg	and	Mikael	Gilljam.	Neither	bears	any	responsibility	for	the	analyses	and	findings	in	this	paper.	
106		
						The	 paper	 analyses	 data	 from	 the	 elections	 in	 1985,	 1988,	 1991,	 and	 1994	 in	 the	main	analysis,	and	exploits	the	rotating	panel	structure	to	create	three	different	survey	panels	for	pairwise	samples:	1985/88,	1988/91,	and	1991/94.	Each	panel	thus	includes	respondents	who	were	surveyed	in	both	years	only.	This	is	necessary	since	we	focus	on	the	 individual-level	 voter	 responses	 to	 immigration	 rather	 than	 effects	 on	 aggregate	turnout,	 which	 risk	 mixing	 the	 impact	 on	 turnout	 with	 demographic	 changes	 across	communities.	 If	 people	 who	 feel	 more	 threatened	 by	 refugee	 immigration	 ‘vote	 with	their	 feet’	 and	 move	 to	 municipalities	 with	 less	 immigration,	 or	 avoid	 moving	 to	municipalities	with	higher	immigration,	the	comparison	groups	become	contaminated.	This	 is	not	a	 trivial	concern	 in	this	context	since	prior	Swedish	research	suggests	that	non-European	immigration	induces	both	native	flight	and	avoidance	(Aldén	et	al.	2015),	which	is	also	confirmed	in	our	data	as	shown	in	Table	4.A.1.8	Focusing	on	respondents	in	the	panel	sample	allows	us	to	take	into	account	mobility	bias	directly	by	assigning	all	movers	 –	 corresponding	 to	 393	 individuals	 or	 8	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 final	 sample	 –	 to	 the	municipality	 in	which	they	 lived	at	 the	time	of	 the	 first	election.	This	ensures	that	 the	comparison	groups	 are	defined	based	on	 individuals’	municipality	of	 residence	 at	 the	first	election,	which	gets	rid	of	any	potential	mobility	bias	due	to	differential	treatment	intensity	(see	Angrist	and	Pischke	2009).9							However,	such	an	intention-to-treat	analysis	assumes	that	movers	were	exposed	to	the	full	refugee	inflow	in	the	municipality	of	origin,	even	though	they	relocated	between	the	 elections.	 Thus,	 as	 outlined	 in	 Section	 4.5,	 we	 calculate	 the	 variable	 capturing	refugee	 inflows	 using	 data	 from	 the	 municipality	 of	 residence	 at	 the	 time	 of	 each	election,	while	 calculating	 the	 instrument	 predicting	 that	 change	 using	 data	 from	 the	municipality	 of	 origin	 only.	 In	 robustness	 tests,	 we	 also	 provide	 estimates	 from	 an	
																																																								8	For	 example,	 our	 results	 indicate	 that	 a	 1	 percentage	 point	 larger	 accumulated	 share	 of	 contracted	refugees	 in	 the	 municipality	 of	 origin	 at	𝑡 − 1	is	 associated	 with	 a	 10–11	 percentage	 point	 higher	likelihood	of	moving.	Movers	 are	 also	 exposed	 to	 a	0.14–0.19	percentage	point	 smaller	 increase	 in	 the	accumulated	 contracted	 refugee	 share	 relative	 to	 non-movers,	 which	 amounts	 to	 an	 18–24	 per	 cent	decrease	 compared	with	 the	mean.	 As	 the	 findings	 in	 Table	 4.A.1	 display,	 the	 results	 are	 very	 similar	when	studying	the	share	of	refugees	for	which	municipalities	received	a	grant.	Also,	unreported	findings	show	 that	movers	 display	more	 positive	 changes	 in	 turnout	 on	 average,	 are	 younger,	 and	 have	 lower	income	 than	 non-movers.	 This	 shows	 the	 importance	 of	 accounting	 for	 mobility	 bias	 –	 which	 is	 only	possible	when	analysing	individual-level	panel	data.	9	Of	course,	our	choice	to	focus	on	individual-level	turnout	also	means	that	the	estimated	effects	cannot	necessarily	be	extrapolated	 to	 the	average	municipal	population.	This	 is	because	 the	 survey	we	exploit	was	designed	to	be	representative	of	the	national	population	rather	than	the	municipal	populations.	Thus,	the	 estimated	 effects	 should	 primarily	 be	 seen	 as	 valid	 for	 the	 randomly	 sampled	 population	 in	 each	municipality.	
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intention-to-treat	analysis	as	well	as	a	reduced-form	analysis	where	the	 instrument	 is	used	as	the	main	predictor.							While	 all	 panel	 surveys	 normally	 contain	 significant	 non-response	 rates	 and	attrition,	we	 circumvent	 this	 problem	by	 exploiting	 a	 useful	 feature	 of	 this	 particular	survey:	 certain	 information	 is	 collected	directly	 from	administrative	 records,	 and	 this	includes	voter	 turnout	 in	national,	municipal,	and	county	elections.	As	a	consequence,	data	 are	 also	 available	 for	 individuals	 who	 were	 sampled,	 but	 who	 did	 not	 end	 up	participating	in	the	survey.	However,	the	probability	of	selection	in	the	second	survey	of	the	rotating	panel	sample	for	respondents	who	did	not	respond	in	the	first	survey	was	50	 per	 cent,	 which	 means	 that	 half	 of	 them	 disappeared	 by	 the	 second	 election.	 In	addition,	a	few	observations,	totalling	less	than	1	per	cent	of	the	sample,	have	missing	voting	 records.	 Overall,	 therefore,	 the	 attrition	 rate	 is	 just	 14	 per	 cent	 out	 of	 a	 total	panel	 sample	 of	 5,571	 individuals,	 which	 is	 comparatively	 low	 and	 means	 that	endogenous	 sampling	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 a	 problem.	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 since	 the	principal	 reason	 for	 attrition	 is	 that	 sampled	 individuals	 who	 did	 not	 end	 up	participating	 in	 the	 first	survey	were	randomly	unselected	as	potential	participants	 in	the	second	survey.10							Yet	to	make	sure	that	attrition	does	not	threaten	the	validity	of	our	findings,	we	also	employ	inverse	probability	weighting	(Horvitz	and	Thompson	1952;	Solon	et	al.	2015).	This	means	 that	all	 individuals	are	weighted	according	 to	 the	 inverse	probability	 that	they	were	randomly	drawn	from	the	entire	population	of	eligible	Swedish	voters	at	the	time	 of	 the	 second	 election	 in	 the	 panel.11	By	 definition,	 if	 attrition	 or	 changes	 in	 the	underlying	 population	 between	 two	 consecutive	 elections	 have	 made	 the	 sample	unrepresentative,	 inverse	 probability	 weighting	 restores	 its	 representativeness.	 To	ensure	 that	 attrition	 does	 not	 induce	 sample-selection	 bias,	 we	 always	 include	 such	weights	in	the	regressions.						Taking	 into	 account	 that	 there	 are	 three	 observations	 with	missing	 values	 on	 our	primary	independent	variable	described	in	Section	4.4.2,	the	total	sample	in	the	analysis																																																									10	The	 available	 panel	 sample	 with	 voting	 records	 totalled	 1,599	 individuals	 in	 1988	 (compared	 with	1,901	 individuals	 in	 the	 original	 1985	panel	 sample),	 1,700	 individuals	 in	 1991	 (compared	with	 1,956	individuals	 in	 the	original	1988	panel	 sample),	and	1,481	 in	1994	(compared	with	1,714	 individuals	 in	the	 original	 1991	 panel	 sample),	 giving	 a	 total	 available	 panel	 sample	 of	 4,780	 individuals	 out	 of	 the	original	panel	sample	of	5,571.	11	The	 inverse	 probability	 of	 selection	 is	 defined	 as:	 1/(eligible	 voters	 in	 the	 municipality	 of	origin/eligible	voters	in	the	country).	We	obtain	data	on	the	number	of	eligible	voters,	nationally	and	in	the	different	municipalities,	from	Statistics	Sweden	(2016).	
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of	 the	 national	 and	 municipal	 elections	 includes	 4,777	 individuals	 from	 284	municipalities,	 each	 observed	 in	 two	 elections	 in	 a	 row.	 For	 the	 analysis	 of	 county	elections,	 the	 sample	 is	 reduced	 to	 4,366	 individuals	 because	 three	 municipalities	 –	Gothenburg,	Gotland,	and	Malmö	–	carried	out	the	responsibilities	of	the	counties	in	the	period	 analysed,	 and	 their	 inhabitants	 therefore	 had	 no	 county	 elections	 in	which	 to	vote.		
4.4.2. Refugee	inflows	and	the	placement	programme	as	instrument		To	capture	refugee	inflows,	we	utilise	the	number	of	refugees	for	whom	municipalities	received	 a	 grant	 from	 the	 government	 for	 the	 cost	 of	 initial	 integration.	 While	 this	variable	 has	 previously	 been	 used	 as	 an	 exogenous	 measure	 for	 the	 placement	programme	 itself	 (e.g.	 Dahlberg	 and	 Edmark	 2008;	 Dahlberg	 et	 al.	 2012),	 it	 in	 fact	covers	 all	 newly	 arrived	 refugees	 rather	 than	 just	 those	 who	 arrived	 in	 the	municipalities	via	the	placement	programme.12	This	means	that	the	measure	is	likely	to	be	 partly	 endogenous	 since	 it	 suffers	 from	 some	 self-selection	 of	 refugees	 into	 the	municipalities.	In	addition,	since	grants	were	sometimes	paid	out	with	a	time	lag,	there	is	 some	 measurement	 error	 in	 the	 variable	 in	 terms	 of	 precisely	 when	 the	 refugees	arrived	in	the	municipality	(see	Nekby	and	Pettersson-Lidbom	2012,	2017).13	For	these	reasons,	we	prefer	 to	 treat	 the	variable	as	an	endogenous	measure	of	 refugee	 inflows	rather	than	as	an	exogenous	measure	of	such	inflows.							In	order	to	solve	the	problems	of	endogenous	settlement	patterns	and	measurement	error,	 and	hopefully	 other	 sources	 of	 omitted	 variable	 bias,	we	 exploit	 the	placement	programme	as	an	 instrument,	 captured	by	 the	number	of	 refugees	 that	municipalities	were	 contracted	 to	 receive	 over	 each	 period	 (Nekby	 and	 Pettersson-Lidbom	 2012,	2017).14	This	variable	by	definition	gets	rid	of	any	endogenous	settlement	patterns	and																																																									12	This	 is	supported	by	a	comparison	of	 the	total	number	of	refugees	received	 in	the	municipalities	and	the	total	number	of	refugees	for	which	municipalities	received	grant	payments	in	the	period	1991–94:	in	1991,	 1992,	 1993,	 and	 1994	 respectively,	 a	 total	 of	 18,961,	 18,472,	 25,300,	 and	 61,500	 refugees	were	received	(Swedish	Migration	Agency	2018)	and	there	were	18,842,	18,546,	25,218,	and	62,853	refugees	for	which	municipalities	received	grants,	according	to	our	data.	The	slight	discrepancies	between	the	two	measures	are	 likely	explained	by	 the	 fact	 that	 there	was	 sometimes	a	 time	 lag	between	refugee	arrival	and	the	grant	payment,	as	noted	below.	13	As	indicated	by	the	previous	footnote,	measurement	error	due	to	the	time	lag	between	refugee	arrival	and	the	grant	payment	appears	to	be	relevant	for	a	relatively	small	proportion	of	refugees	in	total,	at	least	in	 the	period	1991–94,	but	we	cannot	rule	out	 that	 there	are	differences	between	 the	municipalities	 in	this	respect.	14	Further	 showing	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 contracts	 and	 grant	 payments,	 yearly	 changes	 in	 the	absolute	 number	 of	 contracted	 refugees	 are	 not	 always	 strongly	 correlated	with	 yearly	 changes	 in	 the	
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measurement	error	in	refugee	inflows,	as	it	is	solely	based	on	pre-determined	contracts	covered	by	the	placement	programme.	The	paper	thus	exploits	the	number	of	refugees	contracted	to	arrive	in	the	municipalities	during	the	panel	periods	as	instrument	for	the	number	of	refugees	for	which	municipalities	received	grant	payments	during	the	same	periods,	both	normalised	by	the	municipality	population.							Since	 we	 utilise	 two	 ratios	 with	 (almost)	 the	 same	 divisor	 as	 main	 independent	variable	 and	 instrument,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 correlation	 between	 them	does	 not	merely	 arise	 because	 of	 the	 common	 divisor	 (see	 Bazzi	 and	 Clemens	 2013;	Hunt	and	Clemens	2017).15	We	test	whether	or	not	this	is	the	case	by	creating	a	placebo	instrument,	 where	 we	 replace	 the	 number	 of	 refugees	 contracted	 to	 arrive	 in	 the	municipalities	 during	 the	 panel	 periods	 as	 numerator	with	 Poisson-distributed	white	noise	with	the	same	mean.	If	the	findings	are	solely	due	to	variation	in	the	divisor,	we	expect	 them	 to	 be	 similar	 when	 using	 the	 placebo	 instrument.	 In	 addition,	 we	 test	whether	 the	 results	 are	 robust	 to	 splitting	 the	 two	 ratios	 into	 separate	 variables,	instrumenting	the	absolute	 inflow	of	refugees	with	changes	 in	the	absolute	number	of	contracted	 refugees,	 while	 simultaneously	 adjusting	 for	 changes	 in	 the	 municipal	populations	 (see	 Kronmal	 1993).	 If	 the	 findings	 depend	 entirely	 on	 variation	 in	 the	divisor	rather	than	the	numerator,	one	would	expect	them	to	change	considerably	when	doing	so.		
4.4.3. Control	variables	
	As	noted	in	Section	4.3,	the	placement	programme	did	not	contract	refugees	randomly	across	different	municipalities,	but	it	is	still	potentially	possible	to	extract	variation	that	is	exogenous	to	individual-level	turnout,	at	least	if	we	adjust	for	a	couple	of	municipal-level	 controls.	 Apart	 from	 breaking	 the	 concentration	 of	 new	 refugees	 in	 the	 larger	cities,	 one	 goal	 was	 to	 place	 refugees	 in	 municipalities	 with	 good	 housing	 and	 local	labour-market	 conditions.	 In	 interviews	 with	 Swedish	 Migration	 Board	 officials,	available	housing	has	been	upheld	as	a	key	factor	(see	Bengtsson	2002;	Dahlberg	et	al.	
																																																																																																																																																																												absolute	number	of	refugees.	However,	they	are	strongly	correlated	over	the	panel	periods,	which	is	what	is	 relevant	 for	 this	 paper	 (see	Dahlberg	 et	 al.	 2013;	Nekby	 and	 Pettersson-Lidbom	2012,	 2017).	 Apart	from	the	micro-level	regressions	reported	here,	we	also	found	support	for	this	relationship	in	unreported	municipal-level	panel	regressions	over	the	periods	analysed.	15	The	ratios	do	not	have	exactly	the	same	divisor	because	of	how	we	calculate	the	endogenous	variable	for	movers,	as	explained	in	Section	4.4.1.	
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2012).16	Both	may	in	turn	impact	turnout	and	are	thus	included	as	controls	in	our	main	models.	The	former	is	captured	by	the	local	unemployment	rate,	while	the	latter	is	(at	least	 partly)	 captured	 by	 the	 rate	 of	 vacancies	 in	 public	 housing	 or	 rental	 flats,	 both	measured	 as	 period	 averages.17	Similarly,	 to	 account	 for	 the	 aim	 of	 the	 placement	programme	 to	 distribute	 refugees	 more	 evenly	 around	 the	 country,	 we	 include	 the	period	average	of	the	municipal-population	size	as	control.							In	 addition,	 it	 is	 conceivable	 that	 preferences	 for	 redistribution	 in	 the	 different	municipalities,	 possibly	 linked	 to	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 welfare	 system,	 affected	 the	number	of	refugees	they	were	willing	to	contract.	Indeed,	refugees	had	to	be	supported	by	welfare	benefits	 in	 the	 short	 run	and	were	also	generally	more	welfare	prone	 in	a	longer-term	perspective	(Dahlberg	and	Edmark	2008).	Differential	preferences	for,	and	ability	to	engage	in,	welfare	spending	may	also	be	linked	to	turnout	–	and	we	therefore	include	the	period	average	of	per-capita	welfare	spending	as	a	control.18							Furthermore,	 it	 is	plausible	 that	 the	 local	political	situation	affected	 the	contracted	number	of	refugees.	Indeed,	Folke	(2014)	finds	that	the	local	political	makeup	generally	affected	 the	 influx	 of	 refugees	 into	municipalities	 in	 the	 period	 1985-2006.	 Thus,	we	include	the	shares	of	municipal	government	seats	held	by	the	Social	Democratic	Party,	the	 Left	 Party,	 the	Moderate	 Party,	 the	 New	 Democracy	 Party,	 the	 Liberal	 Party,	 the	Centre	Party,	and	the	Christian	Democrats	during	each	election	period	in	the	analysis.19	Finally,	 we	 also	 include	 the	 initial	 accumulated	 share	 of	 contracted	 refugees	 and	 the	initial	 total	 share	 of	 foreign	 citizens	 to	 account	 for	 the	 possibility	 that	municipalities	may	 have	 been	 more	 or	 less	 likely	 to	 contract	 a	 higher	 number	 of	 refugees	 in	 the	subsequent	 period	 if	 they	 already	 had	 contracted	 a	 large	 number	 of	 refugees	 to	 the																																																									16	The	empirical	 evidence	on	whether	available	housing	 in	 fact	was	 important	 for	 refugee	placement	 is	inconclusive	 (Dahlberg	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Nekby	 and	 Pettersson-Lidbom	 2012,	 2017).	 However,	 we	 present	evidence	 indicating	 that	 initial	 levels	 of	 available	 housing	 predict	 changes	 in	 the	 contracted	 refugee	shares,	suggesting	that	available	housing	at	least	played	a	role	in	determining	the	contracts.	17	We	use	 the	rate	of	vacancies	 in	public	housing	or	rental	 flats	 in	September	each	year,	but	results	are	essentially	identical	if	we	use	the	rate	of	vacancies	in	March	each	year.	18	Data	on	welfare	spending	are	missing	for	38	respondents	in	five	municipalities	in	1991	and	1994	in	our	sample,	which	we	deal	with	by	inter-	and	extrapolating	welfare	spending	based	on	the	municipal-specific	trend	in	such	spending.	However,	results	are	unsurprisingly	essentially	identical	if	we	instead	drop	these	respondents	from	the	sample.	In	unreported	regressions,	we	also	adjusted	for	the	period	average	of	the	per-capita	tax	base,	which	theoretically	may	affect,	and	be	affected	by,	the	share	of	contracted	refugees	as	well	as	voter	turnout	for	similar	reasons.	However,	the	results	were	almost	identical	when	doing	so	and	the	per-capita	tax	base	was	not	related	to	refugee	inflows	in	the	first	stage.	19	The	excluded	category	 is	 thus	the	shares	of	municipal	government	seats	held	by	the	Green	Party	and	small	political	parties	that	were	never	represented	at	the	national	level	in	the	period	analysed.	Results	are	almost	 identical	 if	we	also	 include	the	Green	Party	seat	share,	with	or	without	exclusion	of	some	of	 the	other	parties’	shares.	
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municipality	and/or	seen	high	overall	immigration	in	the	recent	past	–	which	may	also	affect	changes	in	voter	turnout.							To	study	whether	or	not	the	variables	above	are	 in	fact	relevant	for	understanding	the	 placement	 programme,	we	 regressed	 changes	 in	 the	 share	 of	 contracted	 refugees	over	the	panel	periods	on	the	initial	levels	of	the	variables.20	The	results	are	reported	in	Table	 4.A.2.	 As	 expected,	 when	 excluding	 municipal-fixed	 effects	 and	 the	 initial	accumulated	share	of	 contracted	 refugees,	higher	 rates	of	vacancies	 in	public	housing	and	per-capita	welfare	spending	predict	 larger	 increases	 in	contracted	refugee	shares,	whereas	 larger	populations	and	higher	unemployment	rates	predict	 smaller	 increases	in	the	contracted	refugee	shares.	However,	the	initial	share	of	foreign	citizens	appears	unrelated	to	changes	in	contracted	refugee	shares.							There	 is	 also	 evidence	 that	 municipalities	 with	 larger	 shares	 of	 municipal	government	 seats	 held	 by	 New	 Democracy,	 a	 populist	 anti-immigration	 party,	experienced	smaller	increases	in	the	shares	of	contracted	refugees,	while	larger	shares	of	municipal	government	seats	held	by	the	Christian	Democrats	predict	larger	positive	changes	 in	 contracted	 refugee	 shares.	Unsurprisingly,	 the	 joint	 F	 test	 for	 all	 variables	combined	thus	strongly	rejects	the	null	hypothesis	of	no	relationship.	When	adding	the	initial	accumulated	share	of	contracted	refugees,	which	is	strongly	positively	related	to	future	 changes	 in	 the	 contracted	 refugee	 shares,	 the	 coefficients	 of	most	 of	 the	 other	variables	decrease	in	size	and	sometimes	become	statistically	insignificant,	but	the	joint	F	test	continues	to	reject	the	null	hypothesis.							However,	 when	 we	 include	 municipality	 dummies	 in	 the	 regression,	 the	 picture	changes	 substantially.	 The	 only	 variables	 that	 remain	 statistically	 significant	 are	 the	share	 of	 municipal	 government	 seats	 held	 by	 the	 New	 Democracy	 Party	 and	(marginally)	population	size.	Consequently,	 the	 joint	F	 test	now	fails	 to	reject	 the	null	hypothesis,	 albeit	 only	 marginally	 so	 (𝑝 = 0.12).	 Thus,	 while	 the	 initial	 levels	 of	 our	control	variables	appear	to	matter	 for	changes	 in	the	contracted	refugee	shares	 in	the	expected	ways,	these	effects	mostly	disappear	when	including	municipal-fixed	effects.							Overall,	this	exercise	suggests	that	the	municipal-level	variables	discussed	above	are	indeed	 relevant	 for	 understanding	 the	 distribution	 of	 changes	 in	 contracted	 refugee	shares	across	the	country.	However,	it	also	suggests	that	our	instrument	is	much	more																																																									20	Using	 the	 initial	 levels	 rather	 than	 period	 averages	 in	 this	 analysis	 is	 important	 to	 decrease	 the	probability	of	reverse	causality,	which,	as	noted	below,	may	be	an	issue.	
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likely	 to	 be	 exogenous	 once	 we	 condition	 on	 time-invariant	 unobserved	 differences	across	municipalities.	Of	course,	despite	doing	so,	it	is	possible	that	the	municipal-level	controls	 still	have	 some	 impact	on	 the	evolution	of	 the	placement	programme.	 In	our	main	 empirical	 strategy,	 formally	 outlined	 in	 Section	 4.5,	 we	 thus	 adjust	 for	 these	controls	as	well	as	municipal-fixed	effects.							Certainly,	 the	municipal-level	 controls,	 especially	 those	 that	 are	 averaged	 over	 the	panel	 period,	 may	 to	 some	 extent	 be	 affected	 by	 immigration	 –	 and	 could	 thus	potentially	act	as	‘bad	controls’	in	the	regressions	(Angrist	and	Pischke	2009).	Yet	since	we	 are	 interested	 in	 turnout	 responses	 to	 refugee	 immigration	 itself	 –	 rather	 than	indirect	 responses	 via	 changes	 in	 the	 economic	 and	 demographic	 environment	 –	 we	believe	 the	 controls	 are	 relevant	 for	 retrieving	 the	 parameter	 of	 interest.	 Our	 main	results	thus	most	likely	capture	psychological	effects	on	turnout	of	increasing	diversity,	once	 the	 impact	 on	 any	 potentially	 endogenous	 variables	 are	 held	 constant.	 Such	psychological	 effects	 are	 also	 the	 most	 theoretically	 relevant	 for	 the	 implications	 of	group-threat	theory	for	voter	turnout	(Enos	2016).							Nevertheless,	 in	robustness	checks,	we	also	report	estimates	from	models	in	which	we	 (1)	 only	 adjust	 for	 the	 pre-determined	 local	 political	makeup	 and	 (2)	 exclude	 all	municipal-level	controls	entirely.	This	serves	as	a	test	of	the	extent	to	which	potentially	endogenous	 controls	 affect	 the	 estimates,	 and	more	 generally	 the	 likelihood	 that	 our	instrument	 is	 exogenous.	 If	 potentially	 endogenous	 municipal-level	 controls	 are	 not	crucial	for	our	methodology,	we	expect	the	findings	to	be	robust	to	these	exercises.							Finally,	 we	 include	 a	 couple	 of	 individual-level	 variables	 measured	 at	 the	 first	election	in	each	panel	as	noise	controls.	These	may	affect	future	changes	in	turnout	but	should	not	be	affected	by	our	instrument,	at	least	once	we	condition	on	the	municipal-level	 controls.21	More	 specifically,	 we	 adjust	 for	 respondents’	 year	 of	 birth,	 gender,	marital	status,	labour-market	status,	blue-collar	status,	whether	they	live	in	villa	areas	or	 in	 high-rise	 apartments,	 and	 an	 indicator	 for	 high	 income.22	The	 latter	 represents	roughly	the	top	20	per	cent	in	the	income	distribution	at	each	election.	We	also	include	
																																																								21	As	noted	in	Section	4.6.3,	the	results	are	very	similar	when	excluding	most	noise	controls	although	they	do	become	slightly	 less	precise.	This	 is	 expected	 since	 they	 should	be	 related	 to	 changes	 in	 individual-level	turnout,	but	at	the	same	time	not	be	related	to	our	municipal-level	instrument.	22	There	are	some	missing	values	on	the	marriage,	labour-market,	blue-collar,	and	housing	indicators.	We	replace	these	with	zero	and	include	separate	indicators	for	missing	values	in	the	regressions.	
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interactions	between	 these	variables	and	 the	year	dummies.23	In	addition,	as	noted	 in	Section	 4.5,	 we	 include	 turnout	 at	𝑡 − 1	in	 some	 models	 to	 test	 for	 potential	 mean	reversion	and	ensure	 that	 initial	 turnout	 at	 the	 individual	 level	does	not	 affect	 future	treatment	intensity.	
Table	4.1:	Descriptive	statistics	
	 Mean	 SD	 Min	 	Max	∆Turnout	(national	elections)	 -0.006	 0.317	 -1.000	 1.000	∆Turnout	(municipal	elections)	 -0.006	 0.324	 -1.000	 1.000	∆Turnout	(county	elections)	 -0.006	 0.328	 -1.000	 1.000	∆%Refugees	 0.823	 0.489	 -1.386	 7.465	∆%Contracted	refugees	 0.794	 0.417	 0.000	 11.801	Average	welfare	spending	per	capita	 317.288	 183.995	 34.813	 938.155	Average	population	 121,883	 185,723	 2,958	 693,719	%Average	unemployment	rate	 3.263	 2.202	 0.207	 10.080	%Average	vacant	public	housing	 1.805	 2.632	 0.000	 21.128	%Foreign	citizens	 5.457	 3.407	 0.401	 25.568	%Social	Democratic	Party	seats	 41.634	 8.514	 13.333	 66.667	%Left	Party	seats	 5.216	 3.281	 0.000	 21.951	%New	Democracy	Party	seats	 0.930	 1.968	 0.000	 15.385	%Moderate	Party	seats	 20.533	 8.196	 3.226	 61.224	%Liberal	Party	seats	 11.414	 3.652	 2.041	 29.268	%Centre	Party	seats	 11.969	 7.899	 0.000	 46.939	%Christian	Democratic	Party	seats	 3.022	 3.303	 0.000	 20.000	Note:	n	=	4,777	 for	 all	 variables	 apart	 from	∆Turnout	 (county	 elections),	where	n	=	4,366.	The	variable	denoting	welfare	 spending	 is	 given	 in	 SEK.	The	descriptive	 statistics	 for	 the	 independent	 variables	 are	calculated	based	on	the	sample	for	the	national	elections.	∆%Refugees	 is	calculated	using	data	from	the	municipality	of	 residence	at	 the	 time	of	 each	election,	while	∆%Contracted	 refugees	 is	 calculated	using	data	from	the	home	municipality	only.	
4.5. Estimation	strategy		The	 key	 problem	 in	 research	 studying	 the	 relationship	 between	 ethnic	 diversity	 and	voter	turnout	consists	of	endogenous	settlement	patterns	and	other	sources	of	omitted	variable	bias.	To	address	these	 issues,	as	discussed	 in	Sections	4.3	and	4.4,	we	exploit	the	 placement	 programme	 contracts	 as	 instrument	 for	 refugee	 inflows,	 while	 taking	advantage	of	the	panel	structure	in	the	data	to	analyse	the	dynamics	of	individual-level	voter	 turnout.	 The	 following	 are	 thus	 our	 formal	 baseline	 equations,	 estimated	 in	 a	regular	2SLS	set-up:																																																									23	This	means	that	we	allow	the	effects	of	all	noise	controls	to	differ	depending	on	the	year	of	the	election.	Since	 the	 income	 information	 provided	 is	 not	 entirely	 consistent	 across	 survey	 years,	 these	 indicators	vary	 slightly	 across	 years.	 Also,	 the	 income	 information	 in	 the	 1988	 survey	was	 calculated	 from	 1986	rather	 than	 from	 the	 year	 of	 the	 election,	 as	 in	 the	 other	 surveys.	 Including	 interactions	 between	 the	indicators	and	the	year	dummies	picks	up	the	effects	of	these	slight	differences	across	years.	
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	 ∆𝑟gH = 	𝛽)∆𝑐gH+𝛽+𝑥gH+𝛽J𝑝gH+	𝛽K𝑏#g + 	𝛽L𝑖gHI) + 𝜇H + 𝜀#gH																						(1)		 ∆𝑣#gH = 	𝛽)∆𝑟gH+𝛽+𝑥gH+𝛽J𝑝gH+	𝛽K𝑏#g + 	𝛽L𝑖gHI) + 𝜇H + 𝜀#gH																					(2)		where	∆𝑣#gH	is	 the	 change	 in	 individual	 turnout	between	𝑡 − 1	and	𝑡;	∆𝑐gH	denotes	 the	change	in	the	accumulated	number	of	refugees	contracted	to	arrive	in	the	respondent’s	municipality	 of	 origin,	 normalised	 by	 the	 municipal	 population,	 which	 serves	 as	 the	excluded	instrument;	∆𝑟#g	represents	the	change	in	the	accumulated	share	of	refugees	for	which	municipalities	received	a	grant,	calculated	using	data	 from	the	respondent’s	municipality	of	residence	at	the	time	of	each	election;	∆𝑟gH	denotes	the	predicted	values	from	 the	 first	 stage;	𝑥gH	denotes	 a	 vector	 including	 the	period	averages	of	population	levels,	 public	 housing	 vacancies,	 the	 unemployment	 rate,	 and	 per-capita	 welfare	spending	in	the	municipality	of	origin;	𝑝gH	is	a	vector	of	variables	denoting	the	shares	of	municipal	 government	 seats	 held	 by	 the	 Social	 Democratic	 Party,	 the	 Left	 Party,	 the	New	Democracy	Party,	the	Moderate	Party,	the	Liberal	Party,	the	Centre	Party,	and	the	Christian	Democrats,	 in	 the	municipality	 of	 origin	 following	 the	 first	 election;	𝑏#g	is	 a	vector	including	the	individual-level	noise	controls;	𝑖gHI)	is	a	vector	including	the	initial	share	of	foreign	citizens	and	the	initial	accumulated	share	of	contracted	refugees	in	the	municipality	 of	 origin	 in	 each	 period;	 and	𝜇H	represents	 time-fixed	 effects,	 capturing	nation-wide	 trends	 in	 the	 dependent	 variable.	 Standard	 errors	 are	 clustered	 at	 the	municipality	level	to	allow	for	correlation	at	the	level	at	which	the	independent	variable	of	interest	is	measured.							By	differencing	the	dependent	and	main	independent	variables,	the	model	effectively	becomes	 a	 difference-in-difference	 instrumental-variable	 estimator	 with	 individual-	and	 municipal-fixed	 effects.24	The	 identification	 depends	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	predicted	 influx	 of	 refugees	 is	 exogenous	 to	 changes	 in	 individual	 turnout,	 when	conditioning	 on	 the	 control	 variables	 outlined	 above.	 We	 test	 whether	 or	 not	 our	assumptions	are	likely	to	hold	by	adding	turnout	at	𝑡 − 1.	Lagged	turnout	is	likely	to	be																																																									24	A	 possible	 alternative	 would	 be	 to	 aggregate	 the	 data	 at	 the	 municipal	 level	 and	 weight	 the	observations	 by	 the	number	 of	 respondents	 in	 the	panel	 sample,	 or	 the	 total	 voting-age	population,	 in	each	municipality	for	each	election	(see	Angrist	and	Pischke	2009;	Nekby	and	Pettersson-Lidbom	2017).	However,	 this	 is	 not	 possible	 in	models	 where	we	 calculate	∆𝑟gH	for	movers	 using	 the	municipality	 of	origin	in	𝑡 − 1	and	municipality	of	residence	in	𝑡,	since	the	primary	independent	variable	then	differs	also	between	 respondents	 originating	 in	 the	 same	 municipality.	 Furthermore,	 to	 increase	 precision,	 we	include	individual-level	noise	controls,	which	makes	 it	more	complicated	to	replicate	the	regressions	 in	aggregate	 form	 (Angrist	 and	 Piscke	 2009).	 Thus,	 since	 there	 is	 no	 inherent	 advantage	 in	 studying	aggregated	data,	we	stick	with	individual-level	data	and	cluster	the	standard	errors	at	the	municipal	level.	
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a	strong	predictor	of	changes	in	turnout	and	should	thus	increase	the	precision	of	our	coefficient	of	interest.	Yet,	if	the	results	are	causal,	we	should	not	expect	lagged	turnout	to	 affect	 the	 coefficient	 as	 such	 significantly	 (Angrist	 and	 Piscke	 2009).25	Including	lagged	turnout	also	means	that	we	can	test	whether	mean	reversion	is	likely	to	bias	our	findings	and	is	thus	an	important	robustness	check	of	our	results.						Based	on	the	above	intuition,	we	would	not	expect	that	changes	in	diversity	over	the	periods	analysed	should	affect	turnout	at	the	first	election	in	the	rotating	panel.	In	other	words,	the	sample	should	be	balanced	on	the	dependent	variable	at	the	outset.	We	thus	estimate	equations	(1)	and	(2)	but	swap	∆𝑣#gH	for	𝑣#gHI)	as	dependent	variable.	On	the	other	hand,	we	should	not	expect	the	same	sample	to	be	balanced	at	the	second	election	following	 treatment,	 which	 we	 test	 by	 swapping	∆𝑣#gH	for	𝑣#gH .	 If	 the	 samples	 are	balanced	at	 the	first	election	but	not	at	 the	second,	 this	 further	supports	the	 idea	that	our	main	estimates	capture	the	causal	effect	of	refugee	inflows	on	voter	turnout.						In	 addition,	 we	 estimate	 placebo	 tests	 in	 which	we	 regress	 changes	 in	 turnout	 on	future	 refugee	 inflows.	The	 idea	behind	 this	 exercise	 is	 simple:	 if	 our	 research	design	picks	up	the	causal	impact	of	refugee	immigration	on	turnout,	changes	in	refugee	shares	should	not	 affect	past	 changes	 in	 turnout.	 In	 the	placebo	 test,	we	 thus	 study	whether	changes	in	individual-level	turnout	between	𝑡 − 1	and	𝑡	are	affected	by	refugee	inflows	between	𝑡	and	𝑡 + 1.	 We	 then	 use	 changes	 in	 the	 accumulated	 number	 of	 contracted	refugees	in	the	municipality	of	origin,	normalised	by	the	municipal	population,	between	𝑡	and	𝑡 + 1	as	 an	 instrument	 for	 changes	 in	 the	 accumulated	 refugee	 share	 over	 the	same	period,	calculated	using	data	 from	the	respondents’	municipality	of	 residence	at	the	time	of	each	election.	Since	we	have	access	to	data	from	the	election	study	carried	out	 in	 1982,	 we	 are	 able	 to	 carry	 out	 also	 the	 placebo	 analysis	 using	 three	 panels	 –	1982/85,	1985/88,	and	1988/91	–	with	samples	of	similar	sizes	as	in	the	main	analyses.						Overall,	we	believe	our	research	design	is	likely	to	capture	a	causal	impact	of	refugee	immigration	 on	 individual-level	 turnout.	 Particularly,	 exploiting	 the	 contracts	 as	instruments	 entirely	 eliminates	 the	 problem	 of	 self-selection	 of	 refugees	 into	 certain	municipalities,	whereas	the	panel	structure	of	our	data	allows	us	to	ensure	that	native	mobility	 does	 not	 bias	 the	 findings.	 Importantly,	 we	 are	 able	 to	 test	 whether	 our	assumptions	hold	using	 the	balancing	 and	placebo	 tests	described.	However,	we	note																																																									25	Note	 that	 the	 inclusion	of	 voter	 turnout	at	𝑡 − 1	means	 that	 the	model	no	 longer	 includes	 individual-	and	municipal-fixed	effects.	If	the	results	are	very	similar	without	such	effects	included,	while	adjusting	for	individuals’	initial	turnout,	it	further	supports	the	causal	interpretation	of	the	findings.	
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that	 if	 there	 is	 any	 remaining	 bias,	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 drive	 coefficients	 in	 a	 direction	 that	would	 make	 it	 easier	 to	 reject	 the	 group-threat	 theory	 and	 confirm	 the	 contact	hypothesis.	This	is	because	municipalities	with	populations	who	are	less	threatened	and	more	 tolerant	 towards	 refugees	 should	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 accept	 larger	 contracted	refugee	inflows,	consequently	resulting	in	lower	political	mobilisation.	
4.6. Results	
	In	 this	 section,	 we	 report	 our	 main	 findings	 as	 well	 as	 results	 from	 the	 balancing,	placebo,	and	robustness	tests.		We	begin	by	noting	that	the	results	from	OLS	models	in	Table	 4.2,	 which	 assume	 that	 exposure	 to	 refugee	 inflows	 is	 exogenous,	 display	 a	positive	correlation	between	such	inflows	and	changes	in	voter	turnout:	a	1	percentage	point	increase	in	the	refugee	share	predicts	a	3	percentage	point	higher	probability	of	voter	turnout.	This	holds	true	whether	or	not	we	include	lagged	turnout	in	the	models,	which	makes	 the	 estimates	 slightly	more	 precise,	 and	 regardless	 of	 the	 election	 type	analysed.	However,	 since	 our	main	 independent	 variable	 to	 some	 extent	 suffers	 from	endogenous	 settlement	 patterns	 and	measurement	 error,	 and	 since	 the	 variable	 also	picks	 up	 the	 impact	 of	 changes	 in	 refugee	 exposure	 among	movers,	 these	 results	 are	likely	to	be	biased	towards	zero.	
Table	4.2:	The	relationship	between	refugee	inflows	and	changes	in	turnout	(OLS)	Panel	1:	Municipal-level	controls	and	individual-level	noise	controls	Election	type	 National	 Municipal	 County	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	∆%Refugees	 0.033**	 0.032*	 0.029*		 (0.016)	 (0.016)	 (0.017)	Panel	2:	Add	initial	turnout	
	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	∆%Refugees	 0.033**	 0.032**	 0.030**		 (0.014)	 (0.014)	 (0.015)	n	 4,777	 4,777	 4,366	Municipalities	 284	 284	 281	Note:	 Significance	 levels:	 *p<0.10;	 **p<0.05;	 ***p<0.01.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	 municipality	level	 in	 parentheses.	 All	 regressions	 include	 period-fixed	 effects.	 Respondents	 are	 weighted	 by	 the	inverse	of	the	probability	of	being	selected	for	the	survey	in	the	relevant	election.								Turning	to	the	2SLS	models	in	Table	4.3,	this	is	indeed	what	the	results	suggest.	The	estimates	in	the	first	panel	display	a	positive	impact	of	refugee	inflows	on	voter	turnout	that	 is	about	twice	as	 large	as	the	OLS	estimates:	a	1	percentage	point	 increase	 in	the	refugee	inflow	raises	the	probability	of	voter	turnout	by	5–6	percentage	points.	 In	the	
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second	panel,	which	 adds	 lagged	 turnout,	 the	 effects	 are	 again	 very	 similar	 but	more	precise.	This	 is	 expected	 if	 our	 strategy	captures	 causal	 effects,	 as	 lagged	 turnout	 is	 a	strong	predictor	of	changes	in	turnout.						Meanwhile,	 the	 Hausman	 tests	 generally	 display	 statistically	 significant	 values,	indicating	that	the	OLS	estimates	in	Table	4.2	are	biased	downwards,	while	the	F	tests	display	values	considerably	higher	than	23.1,	which	is	the	valid	threshold	when	utilising	cluster-robust	 standard	 errors	 (Olea	 and	 Pflueger	 2013).	 This	 indicates	 that	 refugees	self-select	 into	 municipalities	 where	 natives	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 respond	 by	 mobilising	politically,	 that	 natives	 leave/avoid	municipalities	 with	 larger	 refugee	 shares	 (as	 our	findings	 in	 Table	 4.A.1	 show),	 and/or	 that	measurement	 error	 drives	 the	OLS	 results	towards	zero.	It	also	shows	that	our	instrument	based	on	contracted	refugees	is	strong	enough	to	be	utilised.	Indeed,	the	estimates	indicate	that	a	1	percentage	point	increase	in	 the	 share	 of	 contracted	 refugees	 in	 the	 home	municipality	 raises	 the	 exposure	 to	refugee	 inflows	 by	 0.64	 percentage	 points.	 Our	 results	 thus	 suggest	 that	 refugee	immigration	has	causal	positive	effects	on	voter	turnout.	
Table	4.3:	The	causal	effect	of	refugee	inflows	on	changes	in	turnout	(IV)	Panel	1:	Municipal-level	controls	and	individual-level	noise	controls	Election	type	 National	 Municipal	 County	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 0.057***	 0.047**	 0.061**		 (0.022)	 (0.021)	 (0.026)	First	stage	 	 	 	∆%Contracted	refugees	 0.638***	 0.638***	 0.637***	
	 (0.043)	 (0.043)	 (0.043)	Hausman	test	 0.095	 0.312	 0.061	F	statistic	 225.02	 225.00	 218.72	Panel	2:	Add	initial	turnout	
	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 0.063***	 0.056***	 0.065***		 (0.020)	 (0.019)	 (0.023)	First	stage	 	 	 	∆%Contracted	refugees	 0.638***	 0.638***	 0.637***	
	 (0.043)	 (0.043)	 (0.043)	Hausman	test	 0.018	 0.061	 0.014	F	statistic	 224.93	 224.77	 218.72	
n	 4,777	 4,777	 4,366	Municipalities	 284	 284	 281	Note:	 Significance	 levels:	 *p<0.10;	 **p<0.05;	 ***p<0.01.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	 municipality	level	 in	 parentheses.	 All	 regressions	 include	 period-fixed	 effects.	 Respondents	 are	 weighted	 by	 the	inverse	of	the	probability	of	being	selected	for	the	survey	in	the	relevant	election.		
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4.6.1. Balancing	tests		If	 our	 research	 design	 isolates	 exogenous	 variation	 in	 refugee	 inflows	 during	 the	periods	 analysed,	 we	 do	 not	 expect	 future	 treatment	 to	 be	 related	 to	 initial	 turnout.	That	is,	the	sample	should	be	balanced	on	the	dependent	variable	at	the	first	election	in	the	 panel,	 once	 we	 adjust	 for	 the	 other	 variables	 in	 the	 model.	 However,	 the	 same	sample	should	not	be	balanced	following	treatment	at	the	second	election	in	the	panel.	Table	 4.4	 displays	 the	 findings	 from	 this	 exercise.	 There	 is	 little	 evidence	 that	 future	treatment	 is	 related	 to	 initial	 turnout,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 sample	 is	 indeed	 balanced.	However,	treatment	is	related	to	turnout	at	the	second	election	in	the	same	sample.	In	fact,	the	results	are	essentially	identical	to	our	main	findings,	even	though	these	models	analyse	the	level	of,	rather	than	change	in,	turnout	without	initial	turnout	as	a	control.	Overall,	the	results	thus	corroborate	the	idea	that	our	main	results	do	indeed	reflect	the	causal	effects	of	refugee	immigration	on	voter	turnout	at	the	individual	level.	
Table	4.4:	Balancing	tests	 Panel	1:	Turnout	at	the	first	election	(level)	Election	type	 National	 Municipal	 County	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 0.012	 0.017	 0.008		 (0.020)	 (0.020)	 (0.021)	First	stage	 	 	 	∆%Contracted	refugees	 0.640***	 0.640***	 0.638***	
	 (0.042)	 (0.042)	 (0.043)	Hausman	test	 0.500	 0.388	 0.713	F	statistic	 226.91	 226.89	 220.34	Panel	2:	Turnout	at	the	second	election	(level)	
	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 0.069***	 0.064***	 0.069***		 (0.023)	 (0.022)	 (0.024)	First	stage	 	 	 	∆%Contracted	refugees	 0.638***	 0.638***	 0.637***	
	 (0.043)	 (0.043)	 (0.043)	Hausman	test	 0.030	 0.051	 0.028	F	statistic	 225.02	 225.00	 218.72	
n	 4,777	 4,777	 4,366	Municipalities	 284	 284	 281	Note:	 Significance	 levels:	 *p<0.10;	 **p<0.05;	 ***p<0.01.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	 municipality	level	in	parentheses.	All	regressions	include	municipal-level	controls,	individual-level	noise	controls,	and	period-fixed	effects.	Respondents	are	weighted	by	the	inverse	of	the	probability	of	being	selected	for	the	survey	in	the	relevant	election.		
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4.6.2. Placebo	tests		To	provide	 further	 evidence	on	 the	 causality	 of	 our	 findings,	we	 carry	out	 the	 formal	placebo	test	in	treatment,	as	described	in	Section	4.5.	We	do	so	by	lagging	the	panel	of	voters	by	one	period	and	pretend	that	refugee	 inflows	occurred	 in	 the	previous	panel	period.	We	add	data	from	the	election	study	in	1982	in	order	to	carry	out	the	placebo	tests	over	three	panels	to	make	it	as	similar	as	possible	to	the	main	analysis.	This	means	that	 changes	 in	 voter	 turnout	 in	 the	 periods	 1982–85,	 1985–88,	 and	 1988–91	 are	regressed	on	refugee	inflows	due	to	the	placement	programme	in	the	periods	1985–88,	1988–91,	and	1991–94	respectively.	 If	our	assumptions	hold	 true,	we	should	not	 find	any	significant	estimates	in	this	analysis	since	treatment	occurs	in	the	periods	after	the	change	in	individual	turnout	is	observed.	Reassuringly,	the	results	in	Table	4.5	display	no	relationship	between	changes	in	individual	turnout	and	future	immigration	spurred	by	the	placement	programme.	The	point	estimates	are	negative	but	close	to	zero	and	far	from	statistically	significant.	Thus,	the	results	from	the	placebo	tests	support	the	causal	interpretation	of	our	main	findings.	
Table	4.5:	Placebo	tests	regressing	changes	in	turnout	on	future	refugee	inflows	Panel	1:	Municipal-level	controls	and	individual-level	noise	controls	Election	type	 National	 Municipal	 County	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugeest+1	 -0.007	 -0.009	 -0.012		 (0.011)	 (0.011)	 (0.011)	First	stage	 	 	 	∆%Contracted	refugeest+1	 0.672***	 0.672***	 0.672***	
	 (0.081)	 (0.081)	 (0.082)	Hausman	test	 0.693	 0.769	 0.444	F	statistic	 68.30	 68.22	 67.61	Panel	2:	Add	initial	turnout	
	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugeest+1	 -0.005	 -0.006	 -0.008		 (0.015)	 (0.015)	 (0.015)	First	stage	 	 	 	∆%Contracted	refugeest+1	 0.673***	 0.672***	 0.672***	
	 (0.081)	 (0.081)	 (0.081)	Hausman	test	 0.457	 0.452	 0.542	F	statistic	 69.68	 69.42	 68.87	
n	 4,930	 4,881	 4,450	Municipalities	 284	 284	 281	Note:	 Significance	 levels:	 *p<0.10;	 **p<0.05;	 ***p<0.01.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	 municipality	level	in	parentheses.	All	regressions	include	period-fixed	effects	and	weight	respondents	by	the	inverse	of	the	probability	of	being	selected	for	the	survey	in	the	relevant	election.		
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4.6.3. Robustness	tests		In	this	section,	we	provide	evidence	on	the	robustness	of	our	findings.	First,	we	test	to	what	 extent	 the	 results	 change	when	we	 utilise	 the	 placebo	 instrument	 described	 in	Section	4.4.2.	This	is	to	ensure	that	the	results	are	not	merely	a	consequence	of	changes	in	 the	 size	 of	 the	municipal	 population,	which	 serves	 as	 the	 divisor	 in	 both	 the	main	independent	variable	and	the	instrument.	We	also	test	whether	the	results	are	robust	to	splitting	 each	 of	 the	 two	 ratios	 into	 separate	 variables,	 instrumenting	 the	 absolute	inflow	of	 refugees	with	 changes	 in	 the	absolute	number	of	 contracted	 refugees,	while	simultaneously	adjusting	for	changes	in	the	municipal	population.	The	results	in	Table	4.A.3	 show	 that	 the	 second-stage	 results	 turn	 insignificantly	 negative	when	using	 the	placebo	instrument,	with	the	F	test	in	the	first	stage	showing	no	correlation	whatsoever	between	 the	 placebo	 instrument	 and	 the	 main	 independent	 variable.	 Furthermore,	when	splitting	the	ratios	into	separate	variables,	the	results	are	very	similar	to	our	main	findings.	Overall,	 these	robustness	 tests	 thus	confirm	that	our	main	results	are	due	 to	the	 variation	 in	 refugee	 inflows	 spurred	 by	 the	 placement	 programme,	 rather	 than	 a	spurious	correlation	arising	from	the	common	divisor.							In	further	robustness	tests,	as	noted	in	Section	4.4.3,	we	analysed	the	extent	to	which	the	results	were	affected	by	only	including	the	local	political	makeup	as	control	at	the	municipal	 level,	 and	by	 excluding	 all	municipal-level	 controls	 entirely.	We	 also	 tested	omitting	 all	 individual-level	 noise	 controls	 apart	 from	 respondents’	 year	 of	 birth.	Furthermore,	we	excluded	municipalities	with	more	than	50,000	 inhabitants	 from	the	analysis,	thus	halving	the	sample	size	to	2,382–2,389	respondents	in	244	municipalities.	As	 one	 of	 the	 aims	 behind	 the	 placement	 programme	 was	 to	 redistribute	 refugee	inflows	to	smaller	municipalities,	we	expect	results	 to	be	similarly	pronounced	 in	this	analysis.	Finally,	as	noted	in	Section	4.4.1,	we	carried	out	the	intention-to-treat	analysis,	in	which	 both	 changes	 in	 refugee	 shares	 and	 the	 instrument	 are	 calculated	 from	 the	municipality	of	origin,	as	well	as	a	reduced-form	analysis.	As	Tables	4.A.4–4.A.9	show,	the	results	are	entirely	robust	to	these	exercises.26	
																																																								26	However,	 the	 results	 are	 not	 robust	 to	 using	 the	 reduced	 samples	 in	 Dahlberg	 et	 al.’s	 (2013)	 study,	which	analyses	a	survey	response	as	dependent	variable	and	consequently	suffers	from	attrition.	When	analysing	their	samples,	giving	us	up	to	2,439	respondents	in	276	municipalities,	with	the	exact	number	depending	on	the	sample	restrictions,	our	estimates	are	closer	to	zero	and	not	statistically	significant.	The	bias	towards	zero	is	also	stronger	in	proportion	to	the	degree	of	attrition.	These	findings	support	Nekby	and	 Pettersson-Lidbom’s	 (2012,	 2017)	 argument:	 significant	 non-random	 attrition	 is	 likely	 to	 pose	 a	
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						Overall,	 all	 results	 thus	 point	 in	 one	 direction:	 (1)	 refugee	 inflows	 spurred	 by	 the	placement	programme	had	positive	effects	on	voter	turnout,	and	(2)	strategies	that	do	not	 properly	 deal	 with	 endogenous	 settlement	 and	 mobility	 patterns	 as	 well	 as	measurement	 error	 are	 likely	 to	 bias	 estimates	 towards	 zero.	 More	 generally,	 the	findings	 provide	 relatively	 strong	 evidence	 in	 favour	 of	 group-threat	 theory	 over	 the	contact	hypothesis,	 in	 the	 context	of	 changing	 immigration	patterns	 in	 Sweden	 in	 the	last	decades	of	the	20th	century.	
4.7. Conclusion	
	This	 paper	 has	 investigated	 the	 impact	 of	 refugee	 immigration	 on	 voter	 turnout	 in	Sweden	 in	 the	 period	 1985–94.	 Exploiting	 a	 placement	 programme	 through	 which	refugees	 were	 contracted	 to	 the	 country’s	 municipalities,	 and	 individual-level	 panel	data	 almost	 entirely	 free	 from	 attrition,	 we	 have	 sought	 to	 obtain	 conditionally	exogenous	 variation	 in	 refugee	 inflows,	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 draw	 conclusions	regarding	 causal	 inference.	 This	 is	 also	 our	 principal	 contribution	 to	 a	 literature	 that	thus	 far	 mostly	 has	 provided	 associational	 evidence	 and/or	 analysed	 aggregate	outcomes.						Our	 results	 showed	 that	 refugee	 inflows	 spurred	 by	 the	 placement	 programme	increased	 the	 probability	 of	 voter	 turnout.	 Balancing	 tests	 on	 initial	 turnout,	 and	placebo	 tests	 analysing	 whether	 refugee	 inflows	 predict	 prior	 changes	 in	 individual-level	 turnout,	 corroborate	 the	 causal	 interpretation	 of	 the	 results,	 as	 do	 several	robustness	 checks.	 The	 main	 findings	 also	 differ	 from	 OLS	 estimates,	 which	 are	considerably	 smaller.	 Endogenous	 settlement	 and	 mobility	 patterns	 and/or	measurement	 error	 thus	 appear	 to	 bias	 results	 towards	 zero,	 highlighting	 the	importance	of	obtaining	variation	in	refugee	inflows	free	from	these	problems	in	order	to	draw	credible	causal	inferences.							Certainly,	 since	 the	 survey	 we	 exploit	 was	 designed	 to	 be	 representative	 at	 the	country	level	rather	than	the	municipal	level,	the	external	validity	of	the	findings	may	be	questionable;	 the	 results	 should	primarily	be	 seen	as	 valid	 for	 the	 randomly	 sampled	population	in	each	municipality.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	the	effects	are	obtained	in	the	specific	context	of	increasing	refugee	immigration	in	a	previously	homogeneous																																																																																																																																																																													problem	for	studies	 linking	the	placement	programme	to	survey	data	more	generally.	A	key	strength	of	this	paper	is	that	we	are	able	to	circumvent	this	problem	almost	entirely.	
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country;	 whether	 other	 types	 of	 immigration	 have	 similar	 effects	 is	 unclear.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 whether	 the	 increased	 probability	 in	 individual-level	turnout	 translates	 into	 higher	 aggregate	 turnout,	 which	 partly	 depends	 on	 how	immigration	 affects	 overall	 demographic	 changes	 across	 communities.	 The	 extent	 to	which	these	issues	affect	our	conclusions	is	an	important	venue	for	future	research.							Since	 group-threat	 theory	 and	 the	 contact	 hypothesis	were	 formulated	 over	 half	 a	century	ago,	a	large	body	of	research	has	sought	to	evaluate	their	relative	relevance	for	understanding	various	social	and	political	outcomes.	Conceptually	and	empirically,	this	literature	 suggests	 the	 importance	 of	 distinguishing	 between	 the	 effects	 of	 voluntary	and	 involuntary	 contact.	 Perceptions	 of	 threat	may	 potentially	 be	 addressed	 through	increased	 inter-group	 interactions,	 which	 have	 been	 found	 to	 improve	 inter-group	attitudes	 in	 some	 contexts,	 but	 such	 interactions	 tend	 to	 be	 endogenous	 to	 existing	attitudes.	While	silent	on	the	effects	of	involuntary	contact,	our	study	provides	evidence	supporting	group-threat	theory	in	the	context	of	real-world	demographic	changes	that	do	 not	 necessarily	 generate	 more	 voluntary	 contact	 between	 in-	 and	 out-group	members.	 In	 light	 of	 intense	 debate	 regarding	 potential	 consequences	 of	 current	European	 immigration	 patterns,	 this	 is	 an	 important	 finding	 to	 which	 policymakers	should	pay	attention.		 	
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Appendix		
Table	4.A.1:	Refugee	inflows	and	native	mobility	
The	probability	of	moving	
		 No	controls	 Municipal	controls	 All	controls		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	%Refugees	(destination)t		 -0.050***	 -0.046**	 -0.040*		 (0.018)	 (0.021)	 (0.021)	%Refugees	(origin)t-1	 0.073**	 0.075**	 0.072**		 (0.037)	 (0.036)	 (0.035)		 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	%Contracted	refugees	(destination)t	 -0.057**	 -0.050**	 -0.039*		 (0.023)	 (0.023)	 (0.022)	%Contracted	refugees	(origin)t-1	 0.099**	 0.108**	 0.104**		 (0.046)	 (0.044)	 (0.043)	The	refugee/contracted	refugee	exposure	among	movers	relative	to	non-movers	
	 ∆%Refugees	(exposure)		 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	Mover	 -0.180***	 -0.157**	 -0.146**		 (0.060)	 (0.073)	 (0.072)		 ∆%Contracted	refugee	(exposure)		 (10)	 (11)	 (12)	Mover	 -0.190***	 -0.167**	 -0.136**		 (0.054)	 (0.066)	 (0.064)	n	 4,777	 4,777	 4,777	Municipalities	 284	 284	 284	Note:	 Significance	 levels:	 *p<0.10;	 **p<0.05;	 ***p<0.01.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	 municipality	level	in	parentheses.	All	regressions	include	period-fixed	effects	and	weight	respondents	by	the	inverse	of	the	 probability	 of	 being	 selected	 for	 the	 survey	 in	 the	 relevant	 election.	 The	municipal	 controls	 in	 the	upper/lower	 panel	 are	 the	 same	 as	 in	 Column	 1/2	 in	 Table	 4.A.2.	 All	 controls	 include	 the	 municipal	controls	as	well	as	the	individual	controls	outlined	in	Section	4.4.3.			 	
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Table	4.A.2:	Predictors	of	changes	in	contracted	refugee	shares	(%	of	municipal	population)	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	Welfare	spending	per	capita/1000t-1	 1.096***	 0.333	 0.749	
	 (0.316)	 (0.215)	 (0.958)	%Vacant	public	housingt-1	 0.043**	 0.032*	 0.015		 (0.021)	 (0.018)	 (0.023)	%Unemploymentt-1	 -0.052**	 -0.035*	 -0.097		 (0.024)	 (0.020)	 (0.116)	Population/1000t-1	 -0.001*	 -0.000	 -0.043*		 (0.006)	 (0.000)	 (0.023)	%Foreign	citizenst-1	 -0.007	 -0.005	 0.077		 (0.009)	 (0.008)	 (0.064)	%Social	Democratic	Party	seats	 0.007	 0.006	 -0.002		 (0.006)	 (0.004)	 (0.012)	%Left	Party	seats	 0.014	 0.012*	 0.030		 (0.009)	 (0.007)	 (0.027)	%New	Democracy	Party	seats	 -0.045***	 -0.031**	 -0.036**		 (0.016)	 (0.012)	 (0.015)	%Moderate	Party	seats	 -0.006	 -0.002	 0.003		 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.019)	%Liberal	Party	seats	 0.008	 0.002	 0.001		 (0.009)	 (0.007)	 (0.017)	%Center	Party	seats	 0.009	 0.006	 0.008		 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.013)	%Christian	Democratic	Party	seats	 0.029***	 0.021***	 0.012		 (0.009)	 (0.006)	 (0.026)	%Contracted	refugeest-1	 	 0.534***	 -0.025		 	 (0.098)	 (0.133)	Adjusted	R2	 0.364	 0.435	 0.482	Joint	F	test	of	all	variables	(p-value)	 <0.001	 <0.001	 0.120	Municipal-fixed	effects	 No	 No	 Yes	
n	 852	 852	 852	Municipalities	 284	 284	 284	Note:	Standard	errors	clustered	at	the	municipality	level	in	parentheses.	All	models	include	period-fixed	effects.		 	
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Table	4.A.3:	Using	the	placebo	instrument	and	analysing	levels	instead	of	ratios	
Placebo	instrument	Panel	1:	Municipal-level	controls	and	individual-level	noise	controls	Election	type	 National	 Municipal	 County	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 -0.121	 -0.138	 -0.118		 (0.141)	 (0.158)	 (0.148)	First	stage	 	 	 	∆%White	noise	 -0.000	 -0.000	 -0.000		 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	Hausman	test	 0.053	 0.042	 0.069	F	statistic	 2.05	 2.05	 2.07	Panel	2:	Add	initial	turnout	
	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 -0.085	 -0.099	 -0.080		 (0.125)	 (0.138)	 (0.130)	First	stage	 	 	 	∆%White	noise	 -0.000	 -0.000	 -0.000		 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	Hausman	test	 0.085	 0.065	 0.128	F	statistic	 2.05	 2.05	 2.07	
n	 4,777	 4,777	 4,366	Municipalities	 284	 284	 281	
Analysing	levels	instead	of	ratios	Panel	1:	Municipal-level	controls	and	individual-level	noise	controls	Election	type	 National	 Municipal	 County	
	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆Refugees/1000	 0.096**	 0.080*	 0.115**		 (0.044)	 (0.045)	 (0.051)	First	stage	 	 	 	∆Contracted	refugees/1000	 0.711***	 0.711***	 0.731***		 (0.137)	 (0.137)	 (0.112)	Hausman	test	 0.059	 0.133	 0.037	F	statistic	 26.88	 26.88	 42.37	Panel	2:	Add	initial	turnout	
	 (10)	 (11)	 (12)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆Refugees/1000	 0.104***	 0.091**	 0.123***		 (0.039)	 (0.038)	 (0.045)	First	stage	 	 	 	∆Contracted	refugees/1000	 0.711***	 0.711***	 0.731***		 (0.137)	 (0.137)	 (0.112)	Hausman	test	 0.014	 0.035	 0.008	F	statistic	 26.87	 26.88	 42.31	
n	 4,777	 4,777	 4,366	Municipalities	 284	 284	 281	Note:	 Significance	 levels:	 *p<0.10;	 **p<0.05;	 ***p<0.01.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	 municipality	level	in	parentheses.	All	regressions	include	period-fixed	effects	and	weight	respondents	by	the	inverse	of	the	probability	of	being	selected	for	the	survey	in	the	relevant	election.				
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Table	4.A.4:	Excluding	all	municipal-level	controls	apart	from	local	political	makeup	Panel	1:	Local	political	makeup	and	individual-level	noise	controls	Election	type	 National	 Municipal	 County	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 0.046**	 0.041**	 0.045**		 (0.019)	 (0.019)	 (0.021)	Hausman	test	 0.145	 0.296	 0.085	F	statistic	 179.27	 179.26	 175.58	Panel	2:	Add	initial	turnout	
	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 0.045***	 0.042***	 0.044**		 (0.016)	 (0.016)	 (0.017)	Hausman	test	 0.018	 0.048	 0.012	F	statistic	 179.79	 179.60	 176.08	
n	 4,777	 4,777	 4,366	Municipalities	 284	 284	 281	Note:	 Significance	 levels:	 *p<0.10;	 **p<0.05;	 ***p<0.01.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	 municipality	level	in	parentheses.	All	regressions	include	period-fixed	effects	and	weight	respondents	by	the	inverse	of	the	probability	of	being	selected	for	the	survey	in	the	relevant	election.			
Table	4.A.5:	Excluding	all	municipal-level	controls	Panel	1:	Individual-level	noise	controls	Election	type	 National	 Municipal	 County	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 0.036**	 0.032**	 0.035**		 (0.016)	 (0.015)	 (0.017)	Hausman	test	 0.239	 0.411	 0.146	F	statistic	 185.60	 185.63	 179.38	Panel	2:	Add	initial	turnout	
	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 0.035***	 0.033**	 0.034**		 (0.013)	 (0.014)	 (0.014)	Hausman	test	 0.047	 0.095	 0.029	F	statistic	 186.10	 185.90	 179.79	
n	 4,777	 4,777	 4,366	Municipalities	 284	 284	 281	Note:	 Significance	 levels:	 *p<0.10;	 **p<0.05;	 ***p<0.01.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	 municipality	level	in	parentheses.	All	regressions	include	period-fixed	effects	and	weight	respondents	by	the	inverse	of	the	probability	of	being	selected	for	the	survey	in	the	relevant	election.			 	
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Table	4.A.6:	Excluding	all	individual-level	noise	controls	apart	from	year	of	birth	Panel	1:	Municipal-level	controls	and	respondents’	year	of	birth	Election	type	 National	 Municipal	 County	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 0.050**	 0.041*	 0.055**		 (0.022)	 (0.022)	 (0.027)	Hausman	test	 0.149	 0.379	 0.079	F	statistic	 233.26	 233.23	 226.30	Panel	2:	Add	initial	turnout	
	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 0.061***	 0.054**	 0.064***		 (0.022)	 (0.021)	 (0.024)	Hausman	test	 0.020	 0.055	 0.011	F	statistic	 232.93	 232.72	 226.13	
n	 4,777	 4,777	 4,366	Municipalities	 284	 284	 281	Note:	 Significance	 levels:	 *p<0.10;	 **p<0.05;	 ***p<0.01.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	 municipality	level	in	parentheses.	All	regressions	include	period-fixed	effects	and	weight	respondents	by	the	inverse	of	the	probability	of	being	selected	for	the	survey	in	the	relevant	election.			
Table	4.A.7:	Excluding	municipalities	with	more	than	50,000	inhabitants	Panel	1:	Municipal-level	controls	and	individual-level	noise	controls	Election	type	 National	 Municipal	 County	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 0.055**	 0.049**	 0.058**		 (0.023)	 (0.022)	 (0.027)	Hausman	test	 0.095	 0.264	 0.082	F	statistic	 217.47	 217.43	 215.02	Panel	2:	Add	initial	turnout	
	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 0.066***	 0.061***	 0.065***		 (0.022)	 (0.020)	 (0.024)	Hausman	test	 0.016	 0.046	 0.020	F	statistic	 217.14	 217.02	 214.83	
n	 2,389	 2,389	 2,382	Municipalities	 244	 244	 244	Note:	 Significance	 levels:	 *p<0.10;	 **p<0.05;	 ***p<0.01.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	 municipality	level	in	parentheses.	All	regressions	include	period-fixed	effects	and	weight	respondents	by	the	inverse	of	the	probability	of	being	selected	for	the	survey	in	the	relevant	election.			 	
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Table	4.A.8:	Intention-to-treat	estimates	Panel	1:	Municipal-level	controls	and	individual-level	noise	controls	Election	type	 National	 Municipal	 County	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 0.054***	 0.045**	 0.058**		 (0.020)	 (0.020)	 (0.024)	Hausman	test	 0.332	 0.768	 0.264	F	statistic	 143.82	 143.80	 143.69	Panel	2:	Add	initial	turnout	
	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	Second	stage	 	 	 	∆%Refugees	 0.060***	 0.053***	 0.062***		 (0.019)	 (0.018)	 (0.021)	Hausman	test	 0.093	 0.230	 0.086	F	statistic	 143.96	 143.88	 143.89	
n	 4,777	 4,777	 4,366	Municipalities	 284	 284	 281	Note:	 Significance	 levels:	 *p<0.10;	 **p<0.05;	 ***p<0.01.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	 municipality	level	in	parentheses.	All	regressions	include	period-fixed	effects	and	weight	respondents	by	the	inverse	of	the	probability	of	being	selected	for	the	survey	in	the	relevant	election.			
Table	4.A.9:	Reduced-form	estimates	Panel	1:	Municipal-level	controls	and	individual-level	noise	controls	Election	type	 National	 Municipal	 County	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	∆%Contracted	refugees	 0.036**	 0.030**	 0.039**		 (0.015)	 (0.014)	 (0.017)	Panel	2:	Add	initial	turnout	
	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	∆%Contracted	refugees	 0.040***	 0.036***	 0.041***		 (0.014)	 (0.013)	 (0.015)	n	 4,777	 4,777	 4,366	Municipalities	 284	 284	 281	Note:	 Significance	 levels:	 *p<0.10;	 **p<0.05;	 ***p<0.01.	 Standard	 errors	 clustered	 at	 the	 municipality	level	in	parentheses.	All	regressions	include	period-fixed	effects	and	weight	respondents	by	the	inverse	of	the	probability	of	being	selected	for	the	survey	in	the	relevant	election.				
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5. Lifelong	Learning	and	Employment	Outcomes:	Evidence	from	
Sweden*	
	
	
Abstract	 	We	study	the	impact	of	adult	education	and	training	(AET)	on	employment	outcomes	in	Sweden.	 Exploiting	 unusually	 rich	 data	 from	 the	 Programme	 for	 the	 International	Assessment	 of	 Adult	 Competencies	 and	 using	 an	 inverse-probability	 weighted	regression-adjustment	estimator	to	deal	with	selection	bias,	we	find	that	AET	raises	the	probability	 of	 doing	 paid	 work	 by	 4	 percentage	 points	 on	 average.	 This	 impact	 is	entirely	 driven	 by	 non-formal,	 job-related	 AET,	 such	 as	 workshops	 and	 on-the-job	training.	We	also	find	that	the	effect	–	which	increases	with	training	intensity	–	is	very	similar	 across	 different	 types	 of	 non-formal,	 job-related	 AET.	 Specification	 and	robustness	 tests	 indicate	 the	 estimates	 are	 causal.	 Our	 results	 suggest	 that	 policies	stimulating	relevant	AET	take-up	have	promise	as	a	way	to	secure	higher	employment	rates	in	the	future.	
																																																								*	The	 author	 thanks	Henrik	 Jordahl,	 Julian	Le	Grand,	Olmo	Silva,	Anders	 Stenberg,	 and	 two	anonymous	referees	for	comments	and	discussions.	
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5.1. Introduction		In	 the	past	decades,	knowledge	requirements	on	developed	countries’	 labour	markets	have	changed	radically,	as	technological	innovation	has	displaced	many	low-skilled	jobs	and	 increased	 the	 required	skills	and	competencies	 in	 jobs	 that	 continue	 to	exist	 (e.g.	ILO	 2011).	 Sweden,	 an	 advanced	 export-oriented	 economy	with	 a	munificent	welfare	state,	serves	as	an	important	case	study	in	this	respect.	Between	the	1970s	and	the	early	2000s,	the	share	of	low-educated	workers	in	low-skilled	jobs	in	Sweden	decreased	from	48	per	cent	to	11	per	cent,	while	the	share	of	high-educated	workers	in	high-skilled	jobs	increased	from	28	per	cent	to	58	per	cent	(Tåhlin	2007).	In	2016,	only	4.8	per	cent	of	Swedes	 were	 employed	 in	 jobs	 with	 no	 or	 low	 education	 requirements,	 the	 lowest	figure	in	the	European	Union	(Schermer	2017).	In	addition,	a	comparatively	large	share	of	 Swedish	 employees	 report	 that	 their	 jobs	 have	 changed	 because	 of	 structural	 and	technological	 transformation	 (OECD	 2013a).	 Forecasts	 suggest	 these	 trends	 will	continue	 and	 accelerate	 in	 the	 coming	decades	 (Cefedop	2015).	Due	 to	 the	 structural	changes	on	the	labour	market,	it	is	not	surprising	that	Sweden	has	the	lowest	share	of	over-skilled	workers,	and	one	of	the	largest	shares	of	under-skilled	workers,	among	all	OECD	countries	for	which	there	are	comparable	data	(OECD	2013a,	2016).						Overall,	 these	 developments	 indicate	 the	 importance	 of	 knowledge	 and	 skills	 for	ensuring	 high	 employment	 and	 productivity	 levels	 in	 the	 future.	 While	 the	 school	system	is	likely	to	play	a	key	role	in	this	endeavour,	adult	education	and	training	(AET)	is	 also	 likely	 to	 be	 important.	 Indeed,	 people’s	 knowledge	 and	 skills	 are	 not	 only	developed	in	the	school	system	but	also	at	work	and	through	learning	later	in	life,	which	in	 turn	 may	 help	 people	 to	 maintain	 and	 continuously	 update	 their	 skills	 (Statistics	Sweden	2013).	And	on	the	knowledge-intensive	labour	markets	in	the	developed	world,	it	 is	 likely	 to	 become	 increasingly	 important	 for	 individuals	 to	 update	 their	competencies	during	their	working	lives.						There	are	thus	reasons	to	believe	that	lifelong	learning	could	play	an	important	role	for	 ensuring	 well-functioning	 labour	 markets	 in	 the	 future.	 Indeed,	 while	 existing	research	 display	mixed	 findings,	 some	 studies	 do	 suggest	 that	 AET	 can	 have	 positive	effects	 on	 individuals’	 labour-market	 outcomes.	 Yet	 no	 research	 investigates	 both	formal	and	non-formal	AET	simultaneously	or	separates	 the	effects	of	 job-related	and	non	job-related	AET.	This	is	important	in	the	Swedish	context:	in	2010–12,	fully	65	per	cent	of	the	adult	population	underwent	some	form	of	adult	education	and	training,	with	
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52	per	 cent	participating	 in	 job-related	AET	and	13	per	 cent	participating	 in	non	 job-related	AET.	 In	addition,	 the	most	popular	 form	of	AET	was	non-formal,	consisting	of,	for	example,	on-the-job	training,	courses,	and	workshops,	which	do	not	necessarily	lead	to	official	qualifications:	60	per	cent	of	the	adult	population	underwent	non-formal	AET	and	14	per	cent	underwent	 formal	AET.1	Whether	or	not	 the	 former	type	 is	related	to	labour-market	outcomes	in	the	Swedish	context	has	not	yet	been	investigated.	And,	as	noted,	 no	 research	 has	 thus	 far	 sought	 to	 disentangle	 the	 employment	 effects	 of	different	types	of	AET	at	a	more	general	level.						In	 this	 paper,	 we	 analyse	 how	 lifelong	 learning	 affects	 individuals’	 employment	prospects	 in	 Sweden.	 Using	 data	 from	 the	 2012	 round	 of	 the	 Programme	 for	 the	International	 Assessment	 of	 Adult	 Competencies	 (PIAAC)	 allows	 us	 to	 adjust	 for	 an	unusually	 large	 number	 of	 important	 observable	 characteristics,	 including	 cognitive	skills,	formal	education	levels,	and	work	history.	In	combination	with	our	exploiting	an	inverse-probability	 weighted	 regression-adjustment	 estimator,	 this	 increases	 the	probability	that	our	estimates	reflect	a	causal	impact.	Our	tests	show	that	the	weighting	procedure	 balances	 the	 rich	 covariates	 across	 the	 treatment	 and	 control	 groups,	suggesting	our	main	model	is	well	specified.	We	also	show	essentially	identical	results	when	we	 exclude	 all	 covariates	 apart	 from	 age,	 gender,	 and	work	 history,	 suggesting	differences	 in	 the	other	 covariates	–	 including	 social	background,	 cognitive	 skills,	 and	formal	educational	 levels	–	that	affect	both	the	probability	of	engaging	in	AET	and	the	probability	of	doing	paid	work	are	ironed	out	using	this	sparse	specification.	Although	we	 cannot	 conclusively	 rule	 out	 omitted-variable	 bias,	 there	 is	 little	 in	 our	 analysis	suggesting	 it	 is	 a	 serious	 problem	 for	 our	 findings.	 Still,	 some	 caution	 regarding	 the	results	is	naturally	warranted	and	future	research	should	further	investigate	the	effects	of	 AET	 using	 quasi-experimental	 variation	 to	 address	 potential	 selection	 on	unobservable	characteristics.	
																																																								1	These	 calculations,	 which	 do	 not	 include	 students	 aged	 16–24	 who	 are	 in	 their	 first	 formal	 cycle	 of	studies,	are	carried	out	using	micro-level	data	from	the	OECD’s	(2017)	PIAAC	database,	which	we	utilise	in	 this	paper.	The	data	 are	derived	 from	questions	 enquiring	whether	 respondents	 studied	 for	 (1)	 any	formal	 qualification	 at	 primary,	 secondary,	 university,	 or	 post-secondary	 level,	 and	 (2)	 whether	 they	participated	 in	 non-formal	 education	 through	 ‘Courses	 conducted	 through	 open	 or	 distance	 education,	‘Organised	 sessions	 for	 on-the-job	 training	 or	 training	 by	 supervisors	 or	 co-workers’,	 ‘Seminars	 and	workshops’,	 and/or	 ‘Other	 courses	 or	 private	 lessons’.	 Job-related	 AET	 is	 defined	 as	 training	 that	individuals	report	having	undergone	for	the	purposes	of	improving	their	employment	chances	in	general.	Statistics	Sweden	(2014)	reports	very	similar	figures	using	other	data.	
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					Our	 findings	show	that	 individuals	who	participated	 in	AET	in	the	year	prior	to	the	survey	are	about	4	percentage	points	more	likely	to	do	paid	work	in	the	week	before	the	survey	took	place	than	comparable	individuals	who	did	not	undergo	AET.	Intriguingly,	the	 findings	 are	 entirely	 driven	 by	 job-related	 AET,	 which	 raises	 the	 probability	 of	working	 by	 6	 percentage	 points	 –	 and	 this	 impact	 is	 in	 turn	 entirely	 driven	 by	 non-formal,	job-related	AET,	which	raises	the	probability	of	working	by	about	8	percentage	points.	If	anything,	the	positive	impact	is	even	larger	when	analysing	the	probability	of	working	 full	 time	 instead	of	 the	probability	of	doing	any	paid	work	at	 all.	We	 further	find	that	the	effect	is	very	similar	across	different	types	of	non-formal,	job-related	AET,	which	also	suggests	 that	potential	sources	of	omitted-variable	bias	 that	are	specific	 to	certain	types	of	such	AET	do	not	drive	the	results.	Interestingly,	the	effect	of	non-formal,	job-related	AET	varies	depending	on	training	intensity,	since	the	impact	increases	with	the	 number	 of	 such	 AET	 activities	 in	 which	 individuals	 have	 participated,	 further	indicating	 that	 omitted-variable	 bias	 does	 not	 drive	 the	 findings.	 Yet	 non-formal,	 non	job-related	 AET	 and	 formal	 AET	 of	 either	 type	 have	 no	 effects	 on	 employment	outcomes.	Several	robustness	tests	support	these	conclusions.						Of	 course,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 the	 context	 of	 our	 findings:	 we	 analyse	 data	collected	 in	 Sweden	 during	 the	 country’s	 economic	 recovery	 following	 the	 2008	financial	crisis.	Since	the	effects	of	AET	on	employment	outcomes	may	well	be	country	specific	 and	 interact	 with	 the	 business	 cycle,	 future	 research	 should	 investigate	 the	generalisability	of	the	results	in	these	respects.	Nevertheless,	the	findings	indicate	that	policies	stimulating	higher	non-formal,	job-related	AET	take-up	have	promise	as	a	way	to	increase	employment	in	similar	settings	–	and	reforms	to	increase	access	to	lifelong	learning	should	be	considered.	However,	more	research	into	what	works	in	this	respect	is	necessary.						The	 paper	 proceeds	 as	 follows.	 Section	 5.2	 discusses	 the	 theoretical	 mechanisms	linking	AET	and	employment	outcomes	and	reviews	the	empirical	literature;	Section	5.3	outlines	the	data	analysed;	Section	5.4	discusses	the	methodology	employed;	Section	5.5	presents	the	results;	and	Section	5.6	concludes.	
5.2. Theory	and	prior	literature		According	 to	 economic	 theory,	 individuals	 and	 companies	 invest	 in	 education	 and	training	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 human	 capital	 and	 in	 this	 way	 raise	 their	 earnings	 and	
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productivity	 respectively	 (Becker	 1964).	 Empirical	 research	 has	 established	 that	education	has	positive	effects	on	labour-market	outcomes,	and	there	is	much	to	suggest	that	an	important	part	of	this	impact	operates	via	higher	human	capital	(e.g.	Bhuller	et	al.	2017;	Brunello	et	al.	2016).	Similarly,	research	finds	that	average	knowledge	 levels	across	countries’	populations	are	strongly	related	to	economic	growth	(Hanushek	and	Woessmann	2015).	Since	education	does	not	only	create	value	for	the	individuals	who	participate	 in	 it,	 there	 are	 compelling	 reasons	 for	 the	 government	 to	 finance	 and	stimulate	investments	in	knowledge	and	skill	development	(see	McMahon	2010).						There	 are	 also	 reasons	 to	 believe	 that	 different	 forms	 of	 AET	 may	 be	 especially	important	for	maintaining	and	developing	individuals’	human	capital	over	the	course	of	their	 working	 lives,	 once	 they	 have	 completed	 their	 formal	 education	 at	 school	 and	university.	 AET	 makes	 the	 labour	 market	 and	 competence	 provision	 more	 effective,	since	it	‘facilitates	career	shifts	if	there	are	changes	to	demand	in	the	labour	market	or	in	individuals’	health’	(Stenberg	2016,	pp.	20–21).	Adult	education	does	not	have	to	be	formal	to	improve	individuals’	human	capital	–	also	non-formal	education	is	important.	As	Statistics	Sweden	(2013,	p.	41)	writes:		 The	 formal	 education	 system	 is	 not	 the	 only	 setting	 in	 which	 literacy,	numeracy,	 and	 digital	 problem-solving	 skills	 are	 developed.	 Learning	 also	occurs	in	several	other	settings,	such	as	within	the	family,	in	the	workplace,	or	 during	 recreational	 activities	 and	 self-studies.	 Adults	who	do	not	 utilise	their	 skills	 sufficiently	 at	 work	 or	 during	 leisure	 time	 risk	 losing	 their	competencies	and	abilities.	The	 longer	since	a	person	completed	his	or	her	studies,	 the	 weaker	 is	 the	 direct	 relationship	 between	 the	 level	 of	 formal	education	and	the	person’s	skills.	For	older	people,	other	factors	than	formal	education	 levels	 matter	 greatly	 for	 skill	 development,	 such	 as	 the	 type	 of	vocation,	 opportunities	 for	 learning	 in	 the	 workplace,	 and	 the	 social	environment.		In	other	words,	 it	 is	plausible	 that	AET	may	have	positive	effects	on	human	capital	of	relevance	 for	 individuals’	 labour-market	 outcomes.	 Indeed,	 some	 empirical	 research	does	 suggest	 that	 formal	 adult	 education	 has	 positive	 effects	 on	 salaries	 and	employment	 (see	 Stenberg	 2016).	 However,	 the	 results	 are	 still	 mixed.	 For	 example,	British	 research	shows	 that	 formal	education	at	 lower-	and	upper-secondary	 levels	 in	
140		
adulthood	only	generates	higher	 incomes	among	men	with	 low	 initial	 education.	 Still,	specifically	vocational	education	does	seem	to	 increase	the	probability	of	employment	more	 generally	 (Jenkins	 et	 al.	 2003).	 Recent	 Swedish	 studies	 using	 a	 similar	methodology	as	 this	paper	 tend	 to	 find	positive	effects	on	 labour-market	outcomes	of	formal	 adult	 education	 at	 the	 primary	 and	 secondary	 levels	 as	 well	 as	 employment-training	programmes,	at	least	in	a	slightly	longer-term	perspective	(Bergemann	and	van	den	Berg	2014;	Stenberg	2016;	Stenberg	and	Westerlund	2015).	The	evidence	on	non-formal	 learning,	 such	 as	 personnel	 training,	 is	 also	 somewhat	 mixed,	 but	 again	sometimes	shows	positive	effects	(e.g.	Albert	et	al.	2010;	Bassanini	et	al.	2005;	Blundell	et	al.	1999;	Dearden	et	al.	2006;	Haelermans	and	Borghans	2012;	Georgiadis	and	Pitelis	2016;	Konings	and	Vanormelingen	2015;	Schwerdt	et	al.	2012;	Vignoles	et	al.	2004).						However,	 to	 the	 best	 of	 our	 knowledge,	 no	 research	 has	 analysed	 both	 formal	 and	non-formal	 AET	 simultaneously	 –	 or	 investigated	 the	 effects	 of	 non-formal	 AET	 in	Sweden.	 Similarly,	 no	 studies	 separate	 the	 effects	 of	 job-related	 from	non	 job-related	AET	in	the	same	analysis.	These	gaps	are	important	since	the	impact	of	different	types	of	AET	may	differ.	For	example,	AET	that	focuses	on	specifically	job-related	skills,	which	individuals	 undergo	 for	 job-related	 reasons,	 may	 have	 a	 more	 positive	 impact	 on	employment	outcomes	compared	with	other	types	of	AET.	Also,	 formal	education	may	better	 prepare	 individuals	 for	 the	 labour	 market	 than	 non-formal	 education,	 if	 the	former	 provides	more	 structured	 and	 rigorous	 training	 than	 the	 latter.	 On	 the	 other	hand,	non-formal	education	may	be	more	practically	oriented	and	thus	generate	skills	that	are	more	relevant	on	the	labour	market.	To	explore	such	potential	heterogeneity,	it	is	 important	 to	 analyse	 the	 effects	 of	 different	 types	 of	 AET.	 More	 research	 is	 also	necessary	 at	 a	 more	 general	 level,	 since	 most	 existing	 studies	 are	 quite	 old,	 which	means	that	they	are	unlikely	to	reflect	the	effects	of	AET	on	today’s	labour	markets,	and	often	use	regression	methods	that	ignore	potential	selection	bias.	
5.3. Data		To	study	the	impact	of	AET	on	employment	outcomes	in	Sweden,	we	exploit	micro-level	data	from	PIAAC.	PIAAC	surveys	the	adult	population’s	literacy,	numeracy,	and	problem	solving	 in	 technology-rich	 environments.	 It	 also	 collects	 rich	 information	 on	respondents’	backgrounds	and	how	they	utilise	their	skills.	In	the	first	round,	which	was	carried	out	in	2012,	there	were	166,000	participants	aged	16–65	from	24	countries.	In	
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the	 2016	 round,	 14	 additional	 countries	 participated.2	Table	 5.A.1	 outlines	 the	descriptive	statistics	of	the	data	analysed.						The	Swedish	sample	in	PIAAC	2012	was	composed	of	10,000	individuals,	who	were	randomly	drawn	 from	 the	adult	population	aged	16–65.	Data	were	 collected	between	August	2011	and	May	2012.	The	non-response	rate	was	55	per	cent,	which	means	that	the	 sample	 in	 the	 end	was	 composed	 of	 4,468	 individuals.3	Using	 the	 sample	weights	provided,	it	is	nevertheless	possible	to	ensure	that	this	sample	is	representative	of	the	targeted	 population.	 Indeed,	 despite	 the	 non-response	 rate,	 the	 OECD	 (2013b)	 found	the	Swedish	 results	 to	be	 reliable.	However,	we	exclude	all	 students	aged	16–24	who	are	 in	 their	 first	 formal	 cycle	 of	 studies,	 since	 they	 do	 not	 form	 part	 of	 the	 AET	population.	This	decreases	the	available	sample	to	3,888	individuals.4		
5.3.1. Adult	education	and	training		To	analyse	the	effects	of	lifelong	learning,	we	exploit	a	variable	in	the	PIAAC	database,	which	indicates	whether	respondents	participated	in	some	form	of	adult	education	and	training	 in	 the	12	months	before	 the	 survey	was	 carried	out.	This	 variable	 is	 derived	from	questions	enquiring	whether	respondents	studied	for	(1)	any	formal	qualification	at	 primary,	 secondary,	 university,	 or	 post-secondary	 level,	 and	 (2)	 whether	 they	participated	 in	 non-formal	 education	 through	 ‘Courses	 conducted	 through	 open	 or	distance	 education,	 ‘Organised	 sessions	 for	 on-the-job	 training	 or	 training	 by	supervisors	or	co-workers’,	‘Seminars	and	workshops’,	and/or	‘Other	courses	or	private	lessons’.	Individuals	who	did	participate	in	any	form	of	AET	are	given	a	value	of	1,	while	those	 who	 did	 not	 are	 given	 a	 value	 of	 0.	 This	 variable	 does	 not	 include	 education	undergone	by	students	aged	16–24	who	are	in	their	first	formal	cycle	of	studies,	which	means	that	it	only	picks	up	different	types	of	AET.	This	is	useful	since	the	average	effect	of	different	types	of	AET	has	not	previously	been	evaluated	in	Sweden.						Yet	it	is	also	important	to	investigate	heterogeneous	effects	depending	on	the	type	of	AET	 pursued.	 For	 example,	 it	 is	 plausible	 that	 job-related	 AET	 affects	 employment																																																									2	In	contrast	to	many	international	assessments	at	the	school	level,	PIAAC	is	not	carried	out	continuously	in	the	same	countries.	To	date,	each	country	has	only	participated	once,	with	the	exception	of	the	United	States	(which	participated	in	both	the	2012	and	2016	rounds).	3	Technically,	 the	final	sample	was	composed	of	4,469	respondents,	but	due	to	one	observation	with	no	values	in	the	database,	the	number	available	for	analysis	is	4,468.	4	However,	 our	 preferred	 inverse-probability	 weighted	 regression-adjustment	 estimator,	 discussed	 in	Section	 5.4,	 automatically	 excludes	 a	 few	 individuals	 who	 have/have	 not	 undergone	 AET,	 but	 whose	values	on	the	covariates	do	not	overlap	with	any	of	the	individuals	who	have	not/have	undergone	AET.	
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outcomes	differently	compared	with	non	job-related	AET.	In	PIAAC,	respondents	were	asked	whether	the	AET	in	which	they	participated	was	‘job	related’,	which	is	defined	as	AET	 that	 individuals	 report	 having	 undergone	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 improving	 their	employment	chances	in	general.	The	OECD	has	constructed	two	separate	indicators	for	job-related	 and	 non	 job-related	 AET	 respectively,	 which	 we	 utilise	 in	 our	 analysis.5	Similarly,	the	effects	of	AET	may	depend	on	whether	it	is	delivered	through	the	formal	education	 system	 or	 provided	 informally	 outside	 that	 system.	We	 thus	 separate	 job-related	 and	 non	 job-related	AET	 into	 their	 formal	 and	 non-formal	 components,	 again	based	on	the	above	statements,	creating	four	different	AET	categories	in	total.6	We	also	separate	 each	 non-formal	 AET	 category	 that	 is	 related	 to	 employment	 into	 its	 four	components.7	Finally,	 to	study	whether	any	detected	effects	vary	by	training	 intensity,	we	 create	 a	 variable	 indicating	 the	 number	 of	 AET	 activities	 in	 which	 individuals	participated,	for	each	AET	type	that	we	find	to	be	related	to	employment.		
5.3.2. Employment	outcomes		The	 respondents	were	asked	whether	 they	did	any	paid	work	 in	 the	week	before	 the	survey	was	carried	out.	Those	who	reported	doing	any	paid	work	 for	at	 least	an	hour	are	given	the	value	of	1,	while	those	who	did	not	are	given	a	value	of	0.		We	utilise	this	indicator	as	our	main	dependent	variable.	However,	in	one	robustness	test,	we	also	use	an	indicator	for	whether	respondents	worked	full	time	at	the	time	of	the	survey.	Those	who	report	that	they	are	full-time	workers	are	given	a	value	of	1	and	those	who	do	not	–	including	 part-time	 workers	 –	 are	 given	 a	 value	 of	 0.	 This	 allows	 us	 to	 investigate																																																									5	It	is	not	possible	for	individuals	to	simultaneously	report	that	they	underwent	both	job-related	and	non	job-related,	formal	AET,	or	job-related	and	non	job-related,	non-formal	AET,	but	it	is	possible	for	them	to	report	 that	 they	 underwent	 different	 combinations	 of	 formal	 and	 non-formal	 AET.	 The	 OECD’s	assignment	of	individuals	to	the	job-related	and	non	job-related	categories	is	based	on,	firstly,	the	type	of	formal	 AET	 they	 underwent,	 and,	 secondly,	 the	 type	 of	 non-formal	 AET	 they	 underwent.	 For	 example,	individuals	 who	 underwent	 non-job	 related,	 formal	 AET	 as	 well	 as	 job-related,	 non-formal	 AET	 are	assigned	 to	 the	 non-job	 related	 AET	 category.	 In	 an	 unreported	 robustness	 test,	 we	 instead	 created	 a	separate	indicator	for	individuals	who	underwent	both	job-related,	formal	AET	and	non	job-related,	non-formal	 AET,	 or	 non	 job-related,	 formal	 AET	 and	 job-related,	 non-formal	 AET	 (about	 2	 per	 cent	 of	 the	sample),	but	found	little	support	for	interaction	effects	in	this	respect.	6	We	follow	the	OECD’s	method	of	assigning	individuals	to	the	different	categories	by,	firstly,	the	type	of	formal	AET	they	underwent,	and,	secondly,	the	type	of	non-formal	AET	they	underwent	(see	the	previous	footnote).	 In	 an	 unreported	 robustness	 test,	 we	 created	 a	 separate	 indicator	 for	 respondents	 who	underwent	both	formal	and	non-formal	AET	(about	9	per	cent	of	the	sample),	but	found	little	support	for	interaction	effects	in	this	respect.	7	In	this	analysis,	to	be	able	to	distinguish	differential	effects,	we	exclude	individuals	who	participated	in	more	 than	 one	 non-formal	 AET	 component.	 In	 an	 unreported	 robustness	 test,	 we	 further	 excluded	individuals	who	also	underwent	some	form	of	formal	AET,	but	the	results	were	essentially	identical.	
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whether	the	effects	of	AET	on	the	probability	of	working	full-time	differ	from	the	effects	on	the	probability	of	doing	any	work	at	all.		
5.3.3. Covariates		In	the	analysis,	we	adjust	for	a	number	of	relevant	covariates.	These	include	indicators	for	the	respondents’	background:	age,	gender,	first-	and	second-generation	immigration	status,	whether	Swedish	is	their	native	language,	years	spent	in	Sweden,	the	number	of	books	at	home	(6	intervals),	maternal	educational	level	(3	levels),	paternal	educational	level	(3	levels),	and	the	number	of	people	in	the	household	(capped	at	6	people).	Also,	we	control	for	the	participants’	formal	educational	level	(in	years	of	schooling)	and	their	literacy	 and	 numeracy	 scores	 in	 PIAAC.	 This	 is	 important	 since	 Swedes	 with	 higher	levels	of	education	and	cognitive	skills	tend	to	be	more	likely	to	pursue	AET	than	people	with	lower	levels	of	education	and	cognitive	skills	(see	Bussi	and	Pareliussen	2015).						Furthermore,	 in	 the	 preferred	 model,	 we	 include	 an	 indicator	 for	 whether	 or	 not	respondents	carried	out	paid	work	in	the	12-month	period	prior	to	the	survey.	Since	all	respondents	 who	worked	 in	 the	 week	 before	 the	 survey	 by	 definition	 also	 did	 so	 at	some	 point	 in	 the	 year	 preceding	 it,	 our	 comparison	 effectively	 takes	 into	 account	whether	or	not	currently	non-working	respondents	did	paid	work	at	some	point	in	the	previous	year.	We	also	include	an	indicator	for	whether	or	not	respondents	have	done	any	 paid	 work	 in	 their	 lives	 at	 all.	 In	 robustness	 tests,	 we	 further	 include	 industry	dummies	as	well	as	indicators	for	the	geographical	region	in	which	respondents	live.8						Given	 that	we	 are	 able	 to	 adjust	 for	unusually	 rich	data,	we	believe	we	are	 able	 to	control	 for	 most	 factors	 that	 explain	 both	 AET	 and	 employment.	 Still,	 the	 functional	form	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 covariates	 and	 employment	 is	 far	 from	 clear,	making	 it	 important	 to	 create	 treatment	 and	 control	 groups	 that	 have	 comparable	values	on	the	observable	characteristics	that	we	seek	to	hold	constant.	The	next	section	discusses	the	method	we	utilise	to	be	able	to	do	so.	
5.4. Method		For	 the	 purposes	 of	 studying	 the	 total	 impact	 of	 all	 types	 of	 AET	 on	 employment	outcomes,	consider	the	following	OLS	model:																																																									8	Following	previous	research,	we	replace	missing	values	 for	 the	covariates	with	the	sample	means	and	include	separate	indicators	for	missing	values	in	the	regressions	(see	Hanushek	and	Woessmann	2011).	
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𝑒# = 𝛼 + 𝛽)𝑎𝑒𝑡# + 𝛽+𝑥# + 𝜀# 				 	 	 												(1)		where	𝑒#	is	the	indicator	for	paid	work	in	the	week	before	the	survey;	𝑎𝑒𝑡# 	denotes	the	AET	 dummy;	𝑥# 	is	 a	 vector	 of	 observable	 covariates;	 and	𝜀# 	is	 the	 error	 term.	 The	model’s	 assumption	 is	 that	𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑎𝑒𝑡#, 𝜀# 𝑥# = 0	so	 that	 the	 average	 treatment	 effect	 is	given	 as	𝐸 𝑒# 𝑥#, 𝑎𝑒𝑡# = 1 − 𝐸 𝑒# 𝑥#, 𝑎𝑒𝑡# = 0 = 𝐸 𝑒)# − 𝑒@# 𝑥# .	However,	 if	𝑥# 	does	 not	include	 all	 variables	 that	 impact	 both	𝑒#	and	𝑎𝑒𝑡# 	or	 if	𝑒#	affects	𝑎𝑒𝑡# 	directly,	 it	 would	mean	 that	𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑎𝑒𝑡#, 𝜀# 𝑥# ≠ 0	and	 the	 results	 will	 suffer	 from	 endogeneity	 bias	(Angrist	 and	 Pischke	 2009).	 That	 is,	 AET	 may	 be	 affected	 by	 paid	 work,	 generating	reverse	 causality,	 and/or	 omitted	 variables	 may	 affect	 both	 the	 probability	 to	participate	in	AET	as	well	as	the	likelihood	of	working.						In	order	to	estimate	causal	effects,	it	is	necessary	to	either	obtain	quasi-experimental	variation	in	the	take-up	of	AET	or	have	access	to	enough	observable	characteristics	to	make	the	conditional	independence	assumption	plausible.	In	our	data,	it	does	not	seem	feasible	to	obtain	quasi-experimental	variation,	especially	since	we	seek	to	 investigate	potential	heterogeneous	effects	across	different	 types	of	AET.	However,	we	do	believe	that	 our	 dataset	 is	 rich	 enough	 to	 make	 the	 conditional	 independence	 assumption	plausible.	Still,	research	indicates	that	parametric	models	with	rich	controls	may	in	fact	increase	 bias,	 if	 the	 functional	 form	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 controls	 and	 the	outcome	 is	 not	 adequately	 captured.	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 when	 the	 mean	 and	variances	in	the	controls	differ	significantly	between	the	treatment	and	control	groups	(see	Heckman	et	al.	1998;	Rubin	2001,	2008;	Rubin	and	Thomas	2000).	In	other	words,	it	is	likely	important	to	balance	the	distribution	of	the	control	variables	included	in	the	model	across	 the	 treatment	and	control	groups,	so	as	not	 to	make	assumptions	of	 the	functional	form	of	the	relationship	between	the	controls	and	the	outcome.						We	 propose	 to	 do	 so	 using	 an	 inverse-probability	weighted	 regression-adjustment	estimator,	or	IPWRA	(see	Wooldridge	2010).	This	estimator	has	recently	been	exploited	for	 similar	 purposes,	 such	 as	 in	 analyses	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 vocational	 education	 and	personality	traits	on	labour-market	outcomes	(see	Brunello	and	Rocco	2017;	Mendolia	and	Walker	2015).9	The	fundamental	problem	in	all	econometric	evaluations	is	that	one	cannot	observe	any	given	individual	both	treated	and	not	treated	at	 the	same	time.	 In	our	 case,	 since	we	 in	 some	models	 seek	 to	 analyse	 different	 types	 of	 AET	 separately,																																																									9	Our	outline	of	the	estimator	draws	on	Brunello	and	Rocco’s	(2017,	pp.	338–342)	discussion.	
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there	are	several	different	potential	employment	outcomes	for	each	individual,	yet	we	only	 know	 the	 outcome	 that	 followed	 the	 type	 of	 AET,	 if	 any,	 the	 individual	 actually	pursued.	The	 inverse-probability	weighted	 regression-adjustment	 estimator	 allows	us	to	 solve	 this	 problem	 by	 predicting	 for	 each	 individual	 all	 potential	 outcomes,	 using	information	 from	 individuals	 with	 similar	 observable	 characteristics	 who	 did	 not	undergo	any	AET	(or	an	alternative	 type	of	AET	than	the	 individual	 in	question).	This	means	 that	 we	 can	 study	 all	 average	 treatment	 effects	 of	 the	 different	 forms	 of	 AET	separately	in	the	same	model.						In	other	words,	the	conditional	independence	assumption	for	all	possible	AET	types	𝑎	gives	 us	 𝐸 𝑒#(𝑎) 𝑥 = 𝐸 𝑒#(𝑎) 𝑎# 𝑎 = 1, 𝑥 ,	 where	 𝑎# 𝑎 = 1 	denotes	 individuals	undergoing	 AET	 type	𝑎.	 Once	 we	 adjust	 for	𝑥,	 the	 average	 treatment	 effect	 of	𝑎	compared	 with	 the	 benchmark	𝑎′	–	 which	 denotes	 either	 individuals	 who	 have	 not	undergone	 any	 AET	 or	 those	 who	 have	 undergone	 other	 types	 of	 AET	 than	𝑎	–	 is	obtained	by	effectively	comparing	the	conditional	employment	rate	among	individuals	who	 underwent	𝑎	with	 the	 conditional	 employment	 rate	 among	 individuals	 with	benchmark	𝑎′:	𝐸 𝑒# 𝑎 𝑎# 𝑎 = 1, 𝑥 − 𝐸 𝑒# 𝑎k 𝑎# 𝑎k = 1, 𝑥 = 𝐸 𝑒# 𝑎 − 𝑒# 𝑎k 𝑥 													(2)							The	inverse-probability	weighted	regression-adjustment	estimator	is	thus	composed	of	 two	 steps.	 The	 first	 step	 estimates	 the	 probability	 of	 undergoing	 AET	𝑎	from	observable	characteristics,	using	a	logit	model	or,	when	analysing	the	effect	of	different	types	of	AET,	 a	multinomial	 logit	model.	 The	 second	 step	 then	 estimates	 the	 effect	 of	AET	𝑎	on	the	employment	outcomes	using	a	linear	model,	with	the	inverse	probability	of	 undergoing	 AET	𝑎	as	 weight,	 while	 also	 including	 all	 covariates.10	In	 practice,	 the	estimator	 thus	 compares	 individuals’	 actual	 employment	 outcomes	 after	 undergoing	AET	𝑎	with	 the	 counterfactual	 outcomes	 the	 same	 individuals	 should	 have	 obtained	under	benchmark	𝑎k.11	To	ensure	that	the	weighting	procedure	balances	the	covariates	across	 the	main	 treatment	 and	 control	 groups,	 which	 is	 important	 for	 drawing	 valid																																																									10	Since	the	model	is	dependent	on	respondents	having	similar	values	on	the	covariates,	it	is	only	possible	to	study	AET	effects	among	people	in	the	treatment	and	control	groups	for	which	the	covariates	overlap.	That	is,	the	cell	where	𝑥 = 𝑋,	for	all	possible	𝑋,	must	include	respondents	undergoing	both	𝑎	and	𝑎k.	11	While	 the	 assumptions	 are	 essentially	 the	 same	 as	 in	 propensity	 score	matching,	 the	 latter	 does	 not	allow	analyses	of	multiple	treatments	simultaneously.	In	non-reported	robustness	tests,	we	instead	used	regular	 nearest	 matching	 to	 study	 the	 average	 effect	 of	 AET.	 The	 results	 were	 essentially	 identical	 to	those	reported	in	Column	6	in	Table	5.1.	
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inferences	(see	Rubin	2008),	we	use	Imai	and	Ratkovic’s	(2014)	over-identification	test	for	 covariate	 balance	 and	 also	 present	 the	 raw	 and	 weighted	 differences	 as	 well	 as	variance	ratios	for	the	two	groups.12						Unlike	 simple	 regression-adjustment	 estimators,	 which	 only	 model	 the	 outcome	directly	based	on	covariates,	and	inverse-probability	weighting	estimators,	which	only	model	 the	 treatment	 based	 on	 these	 covariates,	 the	 inverse-probability	 weighting	regression-adjustment	 estimator	 involves	 both	 steps.	 Thus,	 it	 has	 the	 ‘double-robust’	property:	the	estimates	will	still	be	consistent	if	one	of	the	equations	is	–	but	not	if	both	equations	are	–	 incorrectly	specified	(Wooldridge	2010).	To	ensure	that	our	estimates	are	relevant	for	the	population	from	which	the	sample	is	drawn,	we	include	the	sample	weights	provided	in	the	PIAAC	database	in	the	first	step	of	the	model.13						Using	 the	 methodology	 outlined	 above,	 our	 identification	 assumption	 is	 thus	 that	assignment	to	different	types	of	AET	is	as	good	as	random	conditional	on	the	covariates	outlined	 in	 Section	 5.3.3,	 including	 individuals’	 work	 history.	 While	 we	 cannot	conclusively	 rule	 out	 the	 possibility	 of	 selection	 bias	 due	 to	 unobservable	characteristics,	 we	 test	 whether	 our	 assumption	 is	 likely	 to	 hold	 by	 carrying	 out	 a	number	 of	 robustness	 tests.	 These	 include	 adding	 indicators	 for	 industry	 and	geographical	region	to	the	equation,	and	excluding	all	covariates	apart	from	age,	gender,	and	the	dummy	indicating	whether	or	not	respondents	carried	out	any	paid	work	in	the	previous	 year.	 If	 the	 results	 are	 very	 similar	 despite	 adding	 potentially	 important	predictors	of	employment	outcomes,	and	when	excluding	predictors	that	are	normally	crucial	for	such	outcomes	–	including	socio-economic	background,	cognitive	skills,	and	years	 of	 schooling	 –	 we	 believe	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 conditional	independence	assumption	holds.	We	also	analyse	whether	 the	effects	of	any	AET	type	that	 we	 find	 to	 be	 related	 to	 employment	 outcomes	 vary	 depending	 on	 training	intensity.	If	the	relationship	is	 ‘dose	dependent’,	 it	indicates	that	general	selection	into																																																									12	The	over-identification	test	can	only	be	carried	out	in	analyses	with	one	treatment	group,	and	we	thus	only	present	these	statistics	for	the	main	model	analysing	the	average	effect	of	all	types	of	AET,	as	well	as	for	models	separately	analysing	the	types	of	training	that	have	effects	on	employment	outcomes.	13	While	 literacy	 and	numeracy	 scores	 in	PIAAC	are	 estimated	 from	 ten	 ‘plausible	 values’	 derived	 from	multiple	imputations,	and	replicate	weights	are	used	to	adjust	for	sampling	error	(see	OECD	2013b),	we	use	the	average	of	all	plausible	values	for	each	subject	in	our	models	and	regular	robust	standard	errors.	This	 is	 in	order	 to	estimate	both	the	 inverse-probability	weighted	regression-adjustment	estimator	and	the	covariate	balance	test	correctly.	However,	the	OLS	results	are	identical	if	we	estimate	the	regressions	for	 each	 plausible	 value	 separately	 and	use	 replicate	weights	 to	 adjust	 the	 standard	 errors,	 suggesting	these	adjustments	matters	little	–	which	is	further	supported	by	prior	research	analysing	similar	survey	structures	(see	Jerrim	et	al.	2017).	
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the	AET	type	in	question	is	unlikely	to	bias	estimates.	Still,	some	caution	regarding	the	results	is	naturally	warranted	and	future	research	should	further	investigate	the	effects	of	 AET	 using	 quasi-experimental	 variation	 to	 address	 potential	 selection	 on	unobservable	characteristics.	
5.5. Results		As	a	starting	point,	Columns	1–3	in	Table	5.1	show	the	results	from	a	regular	OLS	model	when	including	different	combinations	of	control	variables.	The	estimates	indicate	that	AET	is	positively	associated	with	paid	work,	regardless	of	which	controls	we	include.	In	the	 full	 model	 in	 Column	 3,	 undergoing	 some	 form	 of	 AET	 is	 associated	 with	 a	 5	percentage	 point	 increased	 likelihood	 of	 doing	 paid	 work.	 Thus,	 our	 initial	 results	indicate	 that	 there	 is	 a	 positive	 correlation	 between	AET,	 as	measured	 in	 PIAAC,	 and	employment	outcomes	in	Sweden.	
Table	5.1:	AET	and	the	probability	of	doing	paid	work			 OLS	 OLS	 OLS	 IPWRA	 IPWRA	 IPWRA			 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	AET	 0.18***	 0.14***	 0.05***	 0.17***	 0.13***	 0.04***		 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.01)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.01)	Background	variables	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	Education	and	PIAAC	scores	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 Yes	Paid	work	in	the	previous	year		 No	 No	 Yes	 No	 No	 Yes	Never	done	paid	work	 No	 No	 Yes	 No	 No	 Yes	R2	 0.08	 0.12	 0.48	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	
n	 3,884	Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	We	always	restrict	the	sample	to	observations	that	do	not	violate	the	overlap	assumption	in	Column	6.							Turning	 to	 the	 estimates	 from	 the	 inverse-probability	 weighted	 regression	adjustment	 model	 in	 Columns	 4–6,	 we	 note	 that	 the	 results	 are	 in	 fact	 very	 similar	compared	 to	 the	OLS	 results:	 in	 the	 full	model	 in	 Column	6,	we	 find	 that	 undergoing	some	form	of	AET	increases	the	probability	of	doing	paid	work	by	4	percentage	points.	Since	this	model	is	most	likely	to	pick	up	the	causal	impact	of	AET,	we	take	this	to	be	our	main	estimate.	Nevertheless,	the	headline	finding	is	in	fact	similar	regardless	of	whether	we	assume	that	the	relationships	between	the	covariates	and	the	probability	to	do	paid	work	are	linear,	using	the	OLS	model,	or	do	not	make	any	assumptions	of	the	functional	form	of	these	relationships,	using	the	IPWRA	model.						However,	 as	noted	 in	 Section	5.4,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 analyse	whether	 the	weighting	estimator	 balances	 the	 covariates	 across	 the	 treatment	 and	 control	 groups.	 Table	 5.2	
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presents	results	from	the	balance	tests	following	the	full	model	in	Column	6	in	Table	5.1.	There	 is	no	doubt	 that	 the	raw	differences	between	treatment	and	control	groups	are	significant	 in	many	 cases,	 highlighting	 the	 importance	 of	 ensuring	 that	 our	weighting	procedure	 balances	 the	 groups	 appropriately.	 Indeed,	 the	 estimates	 indicate	 that	 our	method	worked	as	intended:	the	weighted	differences	in	means	and	variances	are	small,	and	the	over-identification	test	for	covariate	balance	displays	a	value	of	0.94,	suggesting	we	 comfortably	 fail	 to	 reject	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 of	 balanced	 covariates.	 Overall,	 the	results	thus	support	our	drawing	causal	inferences	from	our	preferred	specification.	
Table	5.2:	Balance	tests	on	covariates	 	 	 	 			 Standardised	differences	 Variance	ratio		 Raw	 Weighted	 Raw	 Weighted	PIAAC	numeracy	score	 0.50	 -0.02	 0.74	 1.03	PIAAC	literacy	score	 0.58	 -0.02	 0.75	 1.04	First-generation	immigrant	 -0.13	 -0.02	 0.79	 0.96	Missing	dummy	for	immigrant	background	 0.05	 -0.01	 1.18	 0.98	Second-generation	immigrant	 -0.02	 0.02	 0.90	 1.13	Years	in	Sweden	 -0.22	 0.03	 0.77	 1.02	Mother's	education	 0.38	 -0.04	 1.34	 0.99	Missing	dummy	for	mother's	education	 -0.10	 0.00	 0.52	 1.01	Father's	education	 0.34	 -0.01	 1.34	 1.04	Missing	dummy	for	father's	education	 -0.16	 -0.01	 0.48	 0.95	Books	at	home	 0.46	 -0.02	 0.90	 0.91	Missing	dummy	for	books	at	home	 -0.10	 0.00	 0.17	 0.94	Years	of	schooling	 0.59	 -0.01	 0.93	 1.16	Age	 -0.44	 0.03	 0.92	 0.99	Gender	 0.09	 -0.03	 1.01	 1.00	Paid	work	in	the	previous	year	 0.49	 0.01	 0.35	 0.97	No	paid	work	ever	 -0.07	 -0.01	 0.62	 0.92	Number	of	people	in	household	 0.11	 -0.02	 0.96	 0.96	Native	language	is	Swedish	 0.11	 0.03	 0.83	 0.96	Test	for	covariate	balance	(p-value)	 0.94	Note:	 the	 table	 displays	 standardised	 differences	 between	 the	 treatment	 and	 control	 group	 and	 the	variance	 ratios	 for	 these	 groups	 based	 on	 the	 model	 in	 Column	 6	 in	 Table	 5.1.	 The	 raw	 (weighted)	number	of	observations	in	the	treatment/control	group	is	2,659/1,225	(1,994.7/1,889.3).		
5.5.1. Does	the	impact	differ	depending	on	AET	type?			Do	 the	 effects	 of	 AET	 depend	 on	 whether	 it	 is	 job-related	 or	 non	 job-related	 and	whether	 it	 is	 formal	 or	 non-formal?	 Table	 5.3	 shows	 results	 from	 the	 inverse-probability	 weighted	 regression-adjusted	model	 corresponding	 to	 Column	 6	 in	 Table	5.1.	The	first	panel	presents	results	from	models	analysing	the	effects	of	job-related	and	non	 job-related	AET	 separately,	while	 the	 second	panel	 presents	 results	 from	models	further	separating	 the	effects	of	 job-related	and	non	 job-related	AET	 into	 their	 formal	and	non-formal	components.	
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					The	results	 in	the	first	panel	show	that	the	effect	of	AET	on	employment	 is	entirely	driven	 by	 job-related	 AET,	 which	 raises	 the	 probability	 of	 doing	 paid	 work	 by	 6	percentage	 points.	 The	 coefficient	 for	 non	 job-related	 AET	 is	 small	 and	 statistically	insignificant.	 Interestingly,	when	we	 separate	 these	 effects	 along	 the	 formal	 and	non-formal	 dimension,	 we	 find	 that	 job-related,	 non-formal	 AET	 raises	 the	 probability	 of	employment	 by	 8	 percentage	 points,	 while	 the	 other	 types	 have	 no	 impact:	 the	coefficients	 for	 the	 two	 types	 of	 formal	 AET	 are	 negative,	 but	 not	 by	 a	 statistically	significant	margin.	Overall,	our	findings	thus	suggest	that	 job-related,	non-formal	AET,	such	 as	 on-the-job	 training,	 dominates	 other	 types	 in	 terms	 of	 helping	 individuals	improve	their	work	prospects.	
Table	5.3:	Effects	of	different	types	of	AET	on	the	probability	of	doing	paid	work	Panel	1	 (1)		Job-related	AET	 0.06***		 (0.01)	Non	job-related	AET	 0.01		 (0.02)	n	 3,872	Panel	2	 (2)	Job-related,	formal	AET	 -0.01		 (0.03)	Non	job-related,	formal	AET	 -0.09		 (0.07)	Job-related,	non-formal	AET	 0.08***		 (0.01)	Non	job-related,	non-formal	AET	 0.02		 (0.02)	n	 3,858	Panel	3	 (3)	Job-related,	formal	AET	 -0.01		 (0.03)	Non	job-related,	formal	AET	 -0.11		 (0.08)	Non	job-related,	non-formal	AET	 0.03		 (0.02)	On-the-job	training	(job-related,	non-formal	AET)	 0.06***		 (0.02)	Seminars	and	workshops	(job-related,	non-formal	AET)	 0.08***		 (0.02)	Courses	through	open	or	distance	education	(job-related,	non-formal	AET)		 0.09***		 (0.03)	Other	courses	or	private	lessons	(job-related,	non-formal	AET)	 0.06**		 (0.03)	n	 2,770	Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	The	models	include	the	same	covariates	as	the	one	presented	in	Column	6	in	Table	5.1.		
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					But	 are	 all	 forms	 of	 job-related,	 non-formal	 AET	 equal?	 To	 investigate	 this,	 we	separate	 the	 impact	of	 job-related,	non-formal	AET	 into	 its	 four	separate	components,	as	outlined	in	Section	5.3.1.	The	results	are	presented	in	the	third	panel	in	Table	5.3.	We	find	that	the	effect	of	job-related,	non-formal	AET	is	similar	across	the	four	components,	suggesting	that	the	impact	is	not	driven	by	any	particular	component	of	such	training.	The	point	estimate	is	the	largest	for	open	or	distance	education	and	the	smallest	for	on-the-job	 training	 and	 other	 courses	 or	 private	 lessons,	 but	 these	 differences	 are	 not	statistically	 significant.14	The	 homogeneous	 findings	 in	 this	 respect	 also	 suggest	 that	possible	sources	of	omitted-variable	bias	that	are	specific	to	certain	types	of	job-related,	non-formal	AET	are	unlikely	to	drive	the	results.15		
5.5.2. Robustness	tests		To	test	the	robustness	of	our	findings,	we	(1)	present	results	from	models	analysing	the	effects	of	the	different	types	of	AET	on	the	probability	to	do	full-time	work,	(2)	restrict	the	 sample	 to	 individuals	 aged	 35	 and	 over,	 (3)	 include	 industry	 and	 geographical	dummies	as	covariates,	and	(4)	exclude	all	 covariates	apart	 from	age,	gender,	and	 the	dummy	 indicating	whether	 or	 not	 respondents	 carried	 out	 any	 paid	work	 in	 the	 12-month	period	prior	to	the	survey.	Finally,	since	we	find	that	job-related,	non-formal	AET	drives	 the	overall	 positive	 impact	 on	 the	probability	 to	do	paid	work,	we	 (5)	 exclude	respondents	who	have	undergone	other	types	of	AET,	as	this	allows	us	to	carry	out	the	over-identification	 test	 for	 covariate	 balance	 for	 this	 particular	 type	 of	 training.	 The	results	are	reported	in	Table	5.4.						Regardless	of	model,	we	obtain	results	that	are	consistent	with	our	main	estimates.	Interestingly,	 the	effects	of	AET	on	 the	probability	of	working	 full	 time	 in	 fact	 appear	larger	than	on	the	probability	of	doing	any	paid	work	at	all.	It	is	especially	noteworthy	that	 the	 model	 that	 excludes	 all	 controls	 apart	 from	 age,	 gender,	 and	 the	 dummy																																																									14	This	also	holds	true	when	excluding	individuals	who	did	not	participate	in	any	form	of	job-related,	non-formal	AET	and	using	“On-the-job	training”	as	benchmark	category.	15	For	example,	the	findings	largely	rule	out	one	potential	source	of	bias:	individuals	undergoing	on-the-job	training	as	preparation	for	a	new	position	for	which	they	have	already	been	selected.	Such	individuals	undergo	AET	as	a	result	of	getting	the	new	position	rather	than	vice	versa.	While	we	believe	adjusting	for	paid	work	 in	 the	previous	 year	 is	 sufficient	 to	deal	with	 this	potential	 issue,	 the	 fact	 that	we	 find	very	similar	 effects	 across	 all	 types	 of	 job-related,	 non-formal	 AET	 further	 indicates	 it	 is	 not	 an	 important	problem.	 This	 conclusion	 is	 also	 supported	 by	 unreported	 analyses	 in	 which	 we	 found	 essentially	identical	effects	of	job-related,	non-formal	AET	when	excluding	all	individuals	who	underwent	such	AET	mainly	(1)	because	they	were	obliged	to	do	so	or	(2)	to	do	their	jobs	better	and/or	improve	their	career	prospects,	either	of	which	would	presumably	apply	 if	AET	was	undertaken	as	a	 result	of	getting	a	new	position.	
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indicating	whether	or	not	 respondents	 carried	out	 any	paid	work	 in	 the	previous	12-month	 period	 displays	 almost	 identical	 results	 as	 the	 main	 estimates,	 suggesting	 it	effectively	 irons	 out	 differences	 in	 other	 covariates	 –	 including	 social	 background,	cognitive	 skills,	 and	 formal	 educational	 levels	 –	 that	 generally	 are	 assumed	 to	 affect	both	 the	probability	of	engaging	 in	AET	and	of	doing	paid	work.	This	strengthens	our	assumption	 that	 the	 conditional	 independence	 assumption	 is	 likely	 to	 hold	 in	 our	analysis.	The	impact	of	job-related,	non-formal	AET	is	also	essentially	identical	when	we	exclude	 respondents	who	 have	 undergone	 other	 types	 of	 AET.	 The	 test	 for	 covariate	balance	shows	a	p-value	of	0.96,	suggesting	that	the	weighting	procedure	also	works	as	intended	for	the	type	of	training	that	drives	our	main	findings.	Overall,	the	findings	thus	further	 strengthen	 the	 idea	 that	 specifically	 job-related,	 non-formal	 AET	 raises	 the	probability	 of	 doing	 paid	 work,	 while	 other	 types	 have	 no	 consistent	 effects	 in	 this	respect.	
Table	5.4:	Robustness	tests	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	 Full-time	work	 People	aged	35+	 Add	industry	and	region	 Only	age,	gender,	and	paid	work	in	previous	year	as	covariates	Panel	1	 	 	 	 	AET	 0.07***	 0.06***	 0.04***	 0.05***		 (0.02)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	
n	 	3,883	 2,820	 	3,883	 	3,890	Panel	2	 	 	 	 	Job-related	AET	 0.10***	 0.07***	 0.05***	 0.06***		 (0.02)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	Non	job-related	AET	 -0.03	 0.03	 0.00	 0.01	
	 (0.03)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	
n	 	3,871	 2,809	 	3,847	 	3,878	Panel	3	 	 	 	 	Job-related,	formal	AET	 -0.05		 0.04	 	-0.05	 0.02		 (0.04)	 (0.03)	 (0.03)	 (0.05)	Non	job-related,	formal	AET	 -0.03	 0.01	 -0.07	 -0.03		 (0.09)	 (0.11)	 (0.04)	 (0.05)	Job-related,	non-formal	AET	 0.12***	 0.07***	 0.07***	 0.08***		 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.01)	 (0.01)	Non	job-related,	non-formal	AET	 0.01	 0.03	 0.02	 0.03		 (0.03)	 (0.03)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	n	 	3,857	 2,749		 	3,722	 	3,878		 (5)	Panel	4	 Only	job-related,	non-formal	AET	compared	with	no	AET	Job-related,	non-formal	AET	 0.08***		 (0.01)	Test	for	covariate	balance	(p-value)	 0.96	
n	 2,962	Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		
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5.5.3. Does	the	impact	vary	depending	on	training	intensity?		One	may	expect	the	effect	of	job-related,	non-formal	AET	to	vary	depending	on	training	intensity;	participating	in	more	AET	activities	may	theoretically	yield	larger	benefits	on	the	 labour	 market.	 To	 explore	 whether	 this	 is	 the	 case,	 we	 analyse	 the	 impact	 of	participating	 in	one	 job-related,	non-formal	AET	activity,	 two	such	activities,	 three-to-five	 such	 activities,	 and	more	 than	 five	 such	 activities	 separately.16	Table	 5.A.2	 shows	the	 results.17	They	 indicate	 that	 there	 is	 a	 ‘dose-dependent’	 relationship	 between	 the	number	of	job-related,	non-formal	AET	activities	in	which	individuals	have	participated	and	 the	 probability	 that	 they	 do	 paid	 work:	 the	 coefficient	 increases	 with	 each	 step	change	 on	 the	 variable.	 For	 example,	while	 participating	 in	 one	 activity	 increases	 the	probability	of	doing	paid	work	by	6.5	percentage	points,	participating	 in	 five	or	more	activities	 increases	 the	 probability	 of	 doing	 paid	 work	 by	 11.1	 percentage	 points,	 a	difference	 that	 is	 statistically	 significant.	 The	 results	 thus	 support	 the	 idea	 that	 the	effects	of	job-related,	non-formal	AET	depend	on	training	intensity.	Moreover,	since	we	in	this	analysis	focus	our	comparison	on	individuals	who	have	all	participated	in	at	least	one	job-related,	non-formal	AET	activity,	they	further	suggest	that	general	selection	into	this	type	of	AET	is	unlikely	to	bias	the	estimates	in	Tables	5.3	and	5.4.18	
5.6. Conclusion		As	 rapid	 technological	 development	 increases	 knowledge	 requirements	 on	 developed	countries’	 labour	 markets,	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 become	 more	 important	 for	 people	 to	continuously	maintain	and	update	 their	skills	 to	ensure	high	employment	rates	 in	 the	future.	There	are	thus	reasons	to	believe	that	adult	education	and	training	could	play	a	key	role	in	ensuring	well-functioning	labour	markets	in	the	future.						In	 this	paper,	we	have	analysed	how	AET	affects	employment	outcomes	 in	Sweden,	exploiting	 data	 from	 the	 international	 survey	 PIAAC,	 which	 allows	 us	 to	 obtain	 rich	information	on	individuals’	observable	characteristics,	including	cognitive	skills,	formal																																																									16	These	categories	roughly	correspond	to	observations	in	the	25th	percentile	and	below,	between	the	25th	and	 the	50th	 percentile,	 between	 the	50th	 and	 the	75th	 percentile,	 and	 in	 the	75th	 percentile	 and	above,	among	people	who	participated	in	at	least	one	job-related,	non-formal	activity.	17	In	 order	 to	 accurately	 display	 the	 ‘dose-dependent’	 relationship,	 we	 report	 coefficients	 with	 three	decimal	places,	instead	of	two,	in	Table	5.A.2	specifically.	18	In	unreported	analyses,	we	also	studied	the	impact	of	participating	in	several	types	of	job-related,	non-formal	 AET,	 among	 individuals	who	 participated	 in	 at	 least	 one	 such	AET	 type,	 and	 found	 evidence	 of	positive	effects	of	participating	in	three	or	all	four	types	(about	7	per	cent	of	the	sample),	and	a	smaller	and	 statistically	 insignificant	 impact	 of	 participating	 in	 two	 types	 (about	 14	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 sample),	compared	with	the	baseline	category	of	participating	in	one	type	only	(about	22	per	cent	of	the	sample).	
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education	 levels,	 and	 work	 history.	 In	 combination	 with	 our	 exploiting	 an	 inverse-probability	 weighted	 regression-adjustment	 estimator,	 this	 increases	 the	 probability	that	the	estimates	reflect	causal	effects.						We	found	that	individuals	who	participated	in	AET	in	the	year	prior	to	the	survey	are	about	4	percentage	points	more	 likely	 to	do	paid	work	 in	 the	week	before	 the	survey	than	 comparable	 individuals	 who	 did	 not	 undergo	 AET.	 Intriguingly,	 the	 effect	 is	entirely	 driven	 by	 job-related	 AET,	 which	 raises	 the	 probability	 of	 working	 by	 6	percentage	points	–	and	this	impact	is	in	turn	entirely	driven	by	non-formal,	job-related	AET,	which	raises	the	probability	of	working	by	about	8	percentage	points.	We	further	found	that	the	positive	impact	is	very	similar	across	different	types	of	non-formal,	job-related	 AET.	 If	 anything,	 this	 positive	 impact	 is	 even	 larger	 when	 analysing	 the	probability	of	working	full	time	instead	of	the	probability	of	doing	any	paid	work	at	all.	Interestingly,	the	effect	of	non-formal,	job-related	AET	appears	to	be	‘dose	dependent’,	as	 the	 impact	 increases	with	 the	 number	 of	 such	 AET	 activities	 in	 which	 individuals	have	participated.	Yet	non-formal,	non	 job-related	AET	and	 formal	AET	of	 either	 type	are	 not	 related	 to	 the	 employment	 outcomes	 under	 investigation.	 While	 we	 cannot	conclusively	rule	out	that	omitted-variable	bias	affects	the	results,	our	analysis	does	not	suggest	it	is	a	crucial	problem	for	our	conclusions.						Certainly,	it	is	important	to	note	the	context	of	our	findings:	we	analyse	data	collected	in	Sweden	during	 the	country’s	economic	recovery	 following	 the	2008	 financial	crisis.	Since	 the	 effects	 of	 AET	 on	 employment	 outcomes	may	 well	 be	 country	 specific	 and	interact	with	the	business	cycle,	future	research	should	investigate	the	generalisability	of	the	results	in	these	respects.	Nevertheless,	the	positive	impact	found	on	employment	outcomes	 in	a	developed	country	 in	 the	aftermath	of	a	serious	economic	downturn	at	least	 suggests	 that	 adult	 education	 and	 training	 could	 play	 a	 role	 in	 ameliorating	negative	employment	effects	in	similar	settings.						Overall,	our	findings	thus	support	policies	seeking	to	increase	take-up	of	non-formal,	job-related	AET	as	a	way	to	secure	high	employment,	at	 least	 in	similar	countries	and	economic	 contexts.	 While	 reforms	 to	 increase	 access	 to	 lifelong	 learning	 should	 be	considered,	more	research	into	what	works	in	this	respect	is	necessary	before	deciding	on	 such	 reforms	on	a	 large	 scale.	 Finding	out	what	works	 to	 efficiently	 raise	 relevant	AET	take-up	is	thus	likely	to	be	a	fruitful	venue	of	future	research.		
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Appendix		
Table	5.A.1:	Descriptive	statistics	 	 	 	 	Variable	 Mean		 SD	 Min	 Max	Participated	in	AET	 0.65	 0.48	 0	 1	Participated	in	AET	(paid	work	in	the	previous	year)	 0.70	 0.46	 0	 1	Participated	in	AET	(no	paid	work	in	the	previous	year)	 0.37	 0.48	 0	 1	Participated	in	job-related	AET	 0.52	 0.50	 0	 1	Participated	in	non	job-related	AET	 0.13	 0.34	 0	 1	Participated	in	formal	AET	 0.14	 0.35	 0	 1	Participated	in	formal,	job-related	AET	 0.10	 0.30	 0	 1	Participated	in	formal,	non	job-related	AET	 0.04	 0.20	 0	 1	Participated	in	non-formal	AET	 0.60	 0.49	 0	 1	Participated	in	non-formal,	job-related	AET	 0.49	 0.50	 0	 1	Participated	in	non-formal,	non	job-related	AET	 0.11	 0.31	 0	 1	On-the-job	training	(job	related)	 0.29	 0.45	 0	 1	Seminars	and	workshops	(job	related)	 0.28	 0.45	 0	 1	Courses	through	open	or	distance	education	(job	related)	 0.12	 0.32	 0	 1	Other	courses	or	private	lessons	(job	related)	 0.15	 0.36	 0	 1	Number	of	job-related,	non-formal	AET	activities	 2.45	 5.31	 0	 83	1	job-related,	non-formal	AET	activity	 0.13	 0.33	 0	 1	2	job-related,	non-formal	AET	activities	 0.09	 0.28	 0	 1	3–5	job-related,	non-formal	AET	activities	 0.15	 0.36	 0	 1	>5	job-related,	non-formal	AET	activities	 0.13	 0.33	 0	 1	Paid	work	 0.73	 0.44	 0	 1	Full-time	work	 0.61	 0.49	 0	 1	Paid	work	in	the	previous	year	 0.85	 0.35	 0	 1	No	paid	work	ever	 0.02	 0.14	 0	 1	Age	 43.53	 13.01	 16	 65	Woman	 0.49	 0.50	 0	 1	Number	of	people	in	household	 2.70	 1.32	 1	 6	First-generation	immigrant	 0.19	 0.39	 0	 1	Second-generation	immigrant	 0.03	 0.17	 0	 1	Native	language	is	Swedish	 0.89	 0.38	 0	 1	Years	in	Sweden	 39.31	 16.36	 0	 65	Number	of	books	at	home	 3.79	 1.40	 1	 6	Mother’s	educational	level	 1.66	 0.82	 1	 3	Father’s	educational	level	 1.69	 0.83	 1	 3	Years	of	schooling	 12.21	 2.55	 6	 20	PIAAC	literacy	score	 278.09	 49.04	 23.57	 415.64	PIAAC	numeracy	score	 278.54	 53.35	 52.18	 444.13	Note:	 all	 data	 are	weighted	 by	 respondents’	 sampling	 probability	 in	 PIAAC.	 Only	 observations	without	imputed	 values	 are	 used	 to	 calculate	 the	 descriptive	 statistics.	 The	 21	 industry	 and	 8	 geographical	dummies,	as	well	as	dummies	indicating	missing	values	for	covariates,	are	suppressed.											
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Table	5.A.2:	Effects	of	job-related,	non-formal	AET	depending	on	training	intensity		 (1)	 (2)	1	job-related,	non-formal	AET	activity	 0.065***	 Benchmark		 (0.018)	2	job-related,	non-formal	AET	activities	 0.070***	 0.005	
	 (0.018)	 (0.024)	3–5	job-related,	non-formal	AET	activities	 0.074***	 0.020		 (0.018)	 (0.021)	>5	job-related,	non-formal	AET	activities	 0.111***	 0.045**		 (0.015)	 (0.021)	n	 3,799	 2,023	Note:	Significance	levels:	*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	The	models	include	 the	 same	 covariates	 as	 the	 one	 presented	 in	 Column	 6	 in	 Table	 5.1.	 The	 first	 model	 includes	individuals	who	did	not	 participate	 in	 any	 job-related,	 non-formal	AET	 activities	 and	 are	 therefore	 the	baseline	category.	However,	in	the	second	model,	such	individuals	are	excluded	and	the	baseline	category	is	instead	composed	of	individuals	who	participated	in	one	job-related,	non-formal	AET	activity.		
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6. Conclusion		Drawing	 causal	 inferences	 from	 empirical	 research	 is	 vital	 for	 allowing	 politicians	 to	create	and	 implement	social	policies	 that	effectively	and	efficiently	deal	with	 the	 issues	they	 are	 designed	 to	 address.	 Yet	 this	 is	 rarely	 reflected	 in	 the	 policy	 process,	 partly	because	much	social-policy	research	historically	has	not	employed	methods	with	which	it	is	possible	to	separate	causation	from	correlation,	and	partly	because	policymakers	often	ignore	 the	 quality	 of	 research	 for	 political	 reasons.	 Rather	 than	 shaping	 policy	 after	robust	evidence,	there	has	been	a	tendency	to	lean	on	research	that	supports	policy	and	ideology.						A	key	aspect	of	methodologically	sound	quantitative	research	is	that	it,	in	one	way	or	the	other,	 retrieves	variation	 in	 the	variable	 that	 is	not	 itself	affected	by	 the	dependent	variable	and	is	not	related	to	other	factors	–	observable	or	unobservable	–	that	affect	the	dependent	 variable.	 Historically,	 such	 variation	 has	 often	 been	 obtained	 by	 running	randomised	 trials,	 earning	 them	 a	 reputation	 for	 being	 the	 ‘gold	 standard’	 of	 policy-relevant	 research.	 Yet	 also	 randomised	 trials	 have	weaknesses,	 such	 as	 the	 difficulties	involved	 in	 obtaining	 sufficiently	 large	 and	 diverse	 samples	 to	 obtain	 high	 external	validity	in	the	findings,	which	in	turn	often	decrease	their	usefulness	for	policy	purposes.	Also,	 they	 can	 be	 expensive	 and	 are	 sometimes	 too	 sensitive	 to	 be	 politically	 viable,	especially	 when	 analysing	 the	 effects	 of	 large-scale	 interventions.	 For	 this	 reason,	randomised	trials	are	neither	always	possible	nor	desirable	for	the	purposes	of	obtaining	exogenous	variation	in	the	policy	of	interest	for	research	purposes	–	which	in	turn	makes	it	important	to	exploit	econometric	methods	with	which	one	can	draw	causal	inferences	also	from	observational	data.						This	 thesis	has	presented	 four	papers	employing	such	methods	 to	answer	 important	research	 questions	 in	 three	 different	 areas	 of	 social	 policy:	 education,	 health,	 and	immigration.	 To	 conclude	 the	 thesis,	 this	 chapter	 summarises	 the	main	 findings	 of	 the	papers,	discusses	 the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	 the	methods	utilised	and	the	papers	more	generally,	provides	directions	for	future	research,	and	outlines	policy	implications.		
6.1. Retirement	and	mental	health		The	second	chapter	of	the	thesis	analysed	the	short-	and	long-run	impact	of	retirement	on	mental	 health	 in	 Europe,	 exploiting	 several	 waves	 of	 data	 from	 the	 Survey	 of	 Health,	
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Ageing,	and	Retirement	in	Europe.	Since	the	1990s,	several	governments	have	reformed	their	state-pension	systems	to	incentivise	higher	labour-force	participation	rates	among	the	elderly,	including	by	increasing	the	official	state-pension	age.	Postponing	retirement	may	 theoretically	 carry	 both	 mental-health	 benefits	 and	 costs,	 which	 have	 important	implications	for	the	viability	of	the	reforms	that	are	currently	underway.	The	paper	used	an	individual-fixed	effects	instrumental-variable	design	with	state-pension	thresholds	as	instruments	to	obtain	causal	estimates	of	the	impact	of	the	retirement	decision	in	both	a	short-	 and	 longer-run	 perspective,	 being	 the	 first	 study	 to	 separate	 the	 short-	 from	longer-term	effects	in	such	a	set-up.	While	the	paper	found	no	impact	in	the	short	run,	it	did	find	a	large	longer-term,	lagged	negative	impact	of	retirement	on	mental	health,	which	does	 not	 differ	 between	 men	 and	 women	 or	 people	 with	 different	 educational	 and	occupational	backgrounds.					An	 important	 strength	 of	 the	 study’s	 methodology	 is	 its	 reliance	 on	 institutional	differences	 in	 retirement	 incentives	 that	 are	 dependent	 on	 age	 thresholds.	 These	thresholds	are	highly	 likely	 to	be	exogenous	to	mental	health	and	therefore	allow	us	to	draw	 causal	 inferences	 from	 the	 results.	 The	 findings’	 credibility	 hinges	 on	 the	assumption	that	merely	crossing	the	state-pension	age	thresholds	serving	as	instruments	does	 not	 impact	 individuals’	 mental	 health	 around	 the	 thresholds,	 apart	 from	 via	retirement,	 once	 adjusting	 flexibly	 for	 the	 impact	 of	 age.	 The	 study	 provided	 several	robustness	and	sensitive	tests	to	show	that	this	assumption	is	likely	to	hold.	In	addition,	the	 variation	 exploited	 is	 highly	 relevant	 for	 public	 policy,	 as	 the	 estimates	 concern	individuals	whose	retirement	are	determined	by	the	state-pension	age	thresholds	–	which	in	turn	are	those	most	likely	to	be	affected	by	changes	to	those	thresholds.	In	other	words,	the	method	employed	is	credible	both	from	a	research	and	policy	perspective.						At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 method’s	 strength	 in	 this	 respect	 is	 to	 some	 extent	 also	 a	weakness:	 the	 study’s	 findings	 cannot	necessarily	be	extrapolated	 to	people	who	retire	for	other	reasons	than	because	they	reach	the	regular	state-pension	age,	including	those	who	 retire	 early	or	because	of	 ill	 health.	 In	other	words,	while	 the	 study’s	 findings	are	highly	 relevant	 for	 understanding	 the	 mental-health	 effects	 of	 retirement	 due	 to	 one	important	policy-relevant	parameter	–	the	incentives	created	by	the	regular	state-pension	age	 –	 it	 is	 not	 necessarily	 relevant	 for	 understanding	 the	 effects	 of	 retiring	 for	 other	policy-relevant	 reasons.	 Analysing	 the	 short-	 and	 longer-term	 mental-health	 effects	 of	retirement	using	other	sources	of	exogenous	variation	would	therefore	be	a	fruitful	venue	
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for	future	research.	In	addition,	the	study	is	silent	on	the	mechanisms	through	which	the	negative	longer-term	effect	of	retirement	at	the	regular	state-pension	threshold	operates.	As	policymakers	would	benefit	from	understanding	such	mechanisms,	for	example	when	seeking	 to	 address	 the	 negative	 impact	 found	 in	 the	 paper,	 it	 is	 important	 for	 future	research	to	identify	mechanisms	linking	retirement	to	declining	mental	health.	Also,	while	the	 study	 analyses	 the	 effects	 of	 retirement	 in	 the	 longer-term	 perspective,	 this	perspective	 is	 defined	 as	 about	 4–6	 years	 following	 the	 retirement	 decision;	 future	research	 should	determine	whether	 these	 effects	persist	 further.	 Finally,	 the	paper	has	identified	an	average	effect	of	retirement	across	ten	European	countries;	it	has	not	sought	to	investigate	possible	heterogeneity	across	the	countries	and	it	is	not	clear	whether	the	findings	can	be	extrapolated	to	countries	not	included	in	the	study.						Still,	 overall,	 the	 paper	 has	 important	 policy	 implications.	 Its	 findings	 suggest	 that	European	 policymakers	 do	 not	 face	 a	 trade-off	 between	 increasing	 the	 regular	 state-pension	age	and	improving	mental	health	among	the	elderly,	at	least	in	a	slightly	longer-term	 perspective.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 results	 indicate	 that	 politicians	 who	 raise	 the	regular	state-pension	age	could	produce	a	virtuous	circle	in	which	pension	systems	are	made	 sustainable,	 health	 expenditures	decreased,	 and,	with	 some	 time,	mental	 health	among	the	elderly	improved.		
6.2. School	competition	and	the	wellbeing-efficiency	trade-off	in	education		The	third	chapter,	in	turn,	investigated	whether	independent-school	competition	involves	a	trade-off	between	pupil	wellbeing	and	academic	performance.	While	much	educational	theory	 assumes	 that	 wellbeing	 and	 achievement	 go	 hand	 in	 hand,	 existing	 evidence	indicates	 that	 interventions	 that	have	a	positive	 impact	on	achievement	often	decrease	pupil	wellbeing.	Yet	this	is	the	first	study	to	investigate	whether	the	trade-off	applies	to	independent-school	competition	specifically,	the	general	effects	of	which	have	become	a	fiercely	debated	topic	worldwide.	Using	international	pupil-level	data,	covering	hundreds	of	thousands	of	pupils	in	34	OECD	countries,	the	paper	exploited	an	instrument	based	on	early	 Catholic	 resistance	 to	 state	 schooling	 to	 obtain	 exogenous	 variation	 in	 current	enrolment	 shares	 in	 independently-operated	 schools.	 It	 found	 that	 independent-school	competition	 decreases	 pupil	 wellbeing	 but	 raises	 achievement	 and	 lowers	 educational	costs.	 It	 also	 found	 mechanisms	 explaining	 the	 trade-off,	 including	 more	 traditional	teaching	and	stronger	parental	achievement	pressure.	
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					A	key	strength	of	the	third	chapter’s	methodology	is	its	ability	to	estimate	the	system-level	 effects	 of	 independent-school	 competition	 on	 pupil	 wellbeing,	 achievement,	 and	costs	 in	 the	 very	 long-term	perspective.	 Studies	 analysing	 the	 effects	 of	within-country	reforms	that	increase	independent-school	competition	often	suffer	from	limited	variation	over	time,	making	it	difficult	to	draw	conclusions	about	the	general-equilibrium	effects	in	the	long	run.	In	addition,	within-country	studies	are	more	likely	than	cross-national	ones	to	suffer	from	spill-over	effects	across	the	regional	levels	used	to	estimate	the	impact	of	competition.	 Exploiting	 cross-country	 data	 on	 pupil	 wellbeing,	 drawn	 from	 nationally	representative	 samples	 of	 pupils,	 also	 enables	 the	 study	 to	 obtain	 estimates	 that	 are	relevant	 for	 external-validity	 purposes	 in	 this	 respect,	 which	 otherwise	 is	 difficult	because	of	 the	 lack	of	pupil-wellbeing	surveys	that	are	representative	at	regional	 levels	within	countries.	Another	strength	of	 the	study	more	generally,	which	contrasts	 it	with	the	 other	 chapters	 in	 the	 thesis,	 is	 that	 it	 is	 able	 to	 explore	 and	 identify	 several	mechanisms	linking	independent-school	competition	to	lower	pupil	wellbeing	and	higher	academic	performance,	which	is	somewhat	rare	in	the	empirical	literature.						However,	as	in	the	second	chapter,	some	of	the	strengths	of	the	method	employed	may	also	imply	possible	weaknesses	in	other	respects.	For	example,	exploiting	cross-national	variation	 in	 independent-school	 competition	 means	 that	 the	 study	 must	 deal	 with	unobserved	heterogeneity	at	the	country	level.	The	study	went	at	length	to	show	that	the	methodology	 addresses	 this	 issue	 satisfactorily;	 if	 anything,	 it	 suggested	 that	 such	heterogeneity	may	bias	 the	 results	 against	 the	paper’s	 conclusions.	 In	other	words,	 the	effects	of	independent-school	competition	on	pupil	wellbeing	and	academic	performance	may	in	fact	be	larger	than	what	the	study	finds.	Yet	another	potential	weakness	is	that	the	findings	cannot	necessarily	be	extrapolated	to	independent-school	competition	that	is	not	linked	to	Catholic	resistance	to	state	schooling	in	the	late	19th	and	early	20th	centuries.	For	example,	competition	that	arose	because	of	voucher	reforms	in	which	for-profit	operators	have	 been	 allowed	 to	 participate,	 as	 in	 Chile	 and	 Sweden,	 or	 because	 of	 reforms	 that	enabled	mass	 conversions	of	 state	 schools	 to	 independently-operated	status	essentially	overnight,	 as	 in	 England,	 is	 unlikely	 to	 have	 much	 to	 do	 with	 the	 variation	 exploited.	Future	 research	 should	 therefore	 employ	 alternative	 strategies	 and	 analyse	 different	settings	 to	 analyse	 how	 other	 forms	 of	 independent-school	 competition	 affect	 pupil	wellbeing	and	academic	performance.	
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					Nevertheless,	overall,	the	third	chapter	carries	important	policy	lessons.	In	contrast	to	the	 second	 chapter,	 it	 suggests	 that	policymakers	do	 face	 a	 trade-off	 between	different	goals	 –	 academic	 performance	 and	 children’s	 subjective	 wellbeing	 at	 school	 –	 when	considering	 reforms	 designed	 to	 increase	 independent-school	 competition.	 A	 tentative	back-of-the-envelope	calculation	 indicated	 that	 the	economic	benefits	of	 independent-school	competition	via	its	positive	impact	on	achievement	are	likely	to	outweigh	its	cost	via	 lower	 pupil	 wellbeing,	 but	 also	 that	 the	 costs	 of	 competition	 may	 outweigh	 its	benefits	when	using	adult	 life	satisfaction	as	the	unit	of	measurement.	The	paper	thus	suggests	 the	 potential	 for	 a	 more	 general	 trade-off	 between	 the	 traditional	 goals	 of	education	policy	and	the	wellbeing	agenda,	to	which	policymakers	should	pay	attention.		
6.3. Refugee	immigration	and	voter	turnout		Meanwhile,	the	fourth	chapter	analysed	the	effects	of	refugee	inflows	on	voter	turnout	in	Sweden	 in	 a	 period	 when	 shifting	 immigration	 patterns	 made	 the	 previously	homogeneous	country	increasingly	heterogeneous.	An	important	possible	consequence	of	immigration	 could	be	altered	political	 engagement	 among	natives,	 but	 it	 is	not	 clear	 in	which	direction	 engagement	 should	 theoretically	 be	 affected	–	 and	disentangling	 cause	from	effect	is	very	difficult.	Analysing	individual-level	panel	data	and	exploiting	a	national	placement	programme	–	which	assigned	refugees	to	the	municipalities	via	contracts	–	to	obtain	plausibly	exogenous	variation	in	immigration,	the	paper	found	that	refugee	inflows	significantly	 raise	 the	probability	 of	 voter	 turnout.	 Balancing	 tests	 on	 initial	 turnout	 as	well	as	placebo	tests	regressing	changes	in	turnout	on	future	refugee	inflows	support	the	causal	interpretation	of	the	findings.	The	results	are	consistent	with	group-threat	theory,	which	predicts	that	increased	out-group	presence	spurs	political	mobilisation	among	in-group	members.						An	 important	 strength	 of	 the	 fourth	 chapter’s	 methodology	 is	 that	 it	 addresses	 the	difficult	 endogeneity	 issues	 involved	 in	 studying	 the	 effects	 of	 immigration	 on	 political	outcomes,	 thus	 suggesting	 high	 internal	 validity	 of	 the	 estimates.	 The	 identification	depends	on	the	assumption	that	the	influx	of	refugees	into	the	municipalities	arising	due	to	 the	 placement-programme	 contracts	 is	 exogenous	 to	 changes	 in	 individual-level	turnout,	when	conditioning	on	variables	of	relevance	for	understanding	the	programme’s	dynamic.	 The	 study	 provided	 a	 battery	 of	 balancing,	 placebo,	 and	 robustness	 tests	 to	show	that	 this	assumption	 is	 likely	 to	hold.	Overall,	 the	methodology	employed	makes	
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the	 study	 a	 significant	 contribution	 to	 a	 literature	 that	 thus	 far	mostly	 has	 provided	associational	evidence	and/or	analysed	aggregate	outcomes.	Additionally,	the	variation	used	to	obtain	exogenous	variation	in	refugee	inflows	is	policy	relevant,	since	it	springs	from	a	government	programme.	Similarly	to	the	method	employed	in	the	second	chapter,	the	variation	exploited	in	the	fourth	chapter	 is	thus	pertinent	both	from	a	research	and	policy	perspective.						Certainly,	 the	methodology	 also	 has	 limitations,	 perhaps	 the	most	 important	 one	 of	which	 is	 the	 potential	 lack	 of	 external	 validity.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 data	 analysed	were	designed	to	be	representative	at	the	national	rather	than	municipal	level,	meaning	that	it	is	 not	 necessarily	 possible	 to	 extrapolate	 the	 findings	 beyond	 the	 sampled	 population.	Also,	 the	 findings	 are	 obtained	 in	 a	 situation	when	 a	 previously	 homogeneous	 country	rapidly	 became	 more	 heterogeneous	 because	 of	 refugee	 immigration;	 whether	 other	types	of	immigration,	or	similar	types	of	immigration	in	other	contexts,	would	have	the	same	 effects	 is	 unclear.	 Similarly,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 whether	 an	 increased	 probability	 in	individual-level	turnout	translates	into	higher	aggregate	turnout	at	the	municipal	level,	since	 this	 partly	 depends	 on	 how	 immigration	 affects	 overall	 demographic	 changes	across	communities.	The	extent	to	which	these	issues	affect	the	study’s	conclusions	is	an	important	venue	for	future	research.	Finally,	although	the	study	highlights	a	prominent	theoretical	mechanism	 linking	refugee	 immigration	to	 turnout,	 it	does	not	analyse	 the	precise	 reasons	 explaining	 this	 mechanism,	 such	 as	 attitudinal	 changes	 towards	immigrants.	 Exploring	 such	 reasons	 empirically	 is	 thus	 another	 important	 topic	 for	future	research.						In	 similarity	with	 the	 third	 chapter,	 the	 fourth	 chapter’s	 policy	 implications	 are	 not	clear-cut.	On	the	one	hand,	the	study	suggests	that	refugee	immigration	is	likely	to	boost	the	probability	of	voter	turnout,	which	is	an	important	goal	for	policymakers	worldwide.	On	the	other	hand,	 this	boost	 is	 likely	to	be	the	result	of	 ‘group	threat’,	which	has	been	theorised	to	stimulate	political	mobilisation	among	natives.	While	perceptions	of	threat	may	 potentially	 be	 addressed	 through	 increased	 contact	 between	 natives	 and	immigrants,	which	has	been	 found	 to	 improve	 inter-group	relations	 in	some	contexts,	such	 contact	 tends	 to	 be	 endogenous	 to	 inter-group	 attitudes	 –	 and	 real-world	demographic	changes	do	not	necessarily	generate	more	voluntary	contact	between	in-	and	out-group	members.	Thus,	while	it	is	possible	to	view	the	impact	of	refugee	inflows	on	 voter	 turnout	 in	 a	 positive	 light,	 a	 more	 pertinent	 lesson	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 the	
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importance	 of	 devising	 strategies	 to	 decrease	 natives’	 sense	 of	 threat	 in	 situations	 of	high	 refugee	 immigration,	 perhaps	 through	 various	 forms	 of	 nudging	 to	 increase	 the	probability	 of	 positive	 contact	 with	 refugees.	 Yet	 further	 empirical	 research	 to	investigate	what	works	in	this	respect	is	necessary.		
6.4. Adult	education	and	employment	outcomes			Finally,	 the	 fifth	 chapter	 analysed	 the	 impact	 of	 adult	 education	 and	 training	 (AET)	 on	employment	 outcomes	 in	 Sweden.	 It	 is	 plausible	 that	 AET	 could	 help	 promote	 the	knowledge	and	skills	necessary	 for	ensuring	high	employment	and	productivity	 levels	in	 the	 future.	 Exploiting	unusually	 rich	data	 from	 the	Programme	 for	 the	 International	Assessment	of	Adult	Competencies	and	using	an	inverse-probability	weighted	regression-adjustment	(IPWRA)	estimator	to	deal	with	selection	bias,	the	study	found	that	AET	raises	the	 probability	 of	 doing	 paid	 work	 by	 4	 percentage	 points	 on	 average.	 This	 impact	 is	entirely	 driven	 by	 non-formal,	 job-related	 AET,	 such	 as	 workshops	 and	 on-the-job	training.	The	study	also	found	that	the	effect	–	which	increases	with	training	intensity	–	is	very	similar	across	different	types	of	non-formal,	job-related	AET.						Unlike	 the	 other	 studies	 in	 the	 thesis,	 the	 fifth	 chapter	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 quasi-experimental	variation	to	obtain	causal	estimates.	Instead,	it	assumes	that	assignment	to	the	different	forms	of	non-formal,	job-related	AET	is	as	good	as	random	conditional	on	the	 rich	 covariates	 included,	 including	 individuals’	 work	 history,	 but	 does	 not	 make	assumptions	about	the	functional	form	of	the	relationship	between	those	covariates	and	the	 outcome	 analysed.	 The	 specification	 and	 robustness	 tests	 do	 suggest	 that	 the	conditional	independence	assumption	holds	–	which	is	further	supported	by	the	fact	that	the	 impact	 is	 very	 similar	 across	 different	 forms	 of	 non-formal,	 job-related	 AET	 and	increases	 with	 training	 intensity	 –	 and	 if	 it	 does,	 the	 IPWRA	 model	 comes	 with	 the	benefit	of	high	external	 validity,	 since	 it	 estimates	 the	average	 treatment	effect	 in	 the	population	 of	 interest.	 In	 contrast,	 as	 highlighted	 above,	 models	 relying	 on	 quasi-experimental	 variation	 estimate	 the	 local	 average	 treatment	 effect	 among	 individuals	who	 respond	 to	 the	 specific	 variation	 that	 is	 exploited.	 This	 difference	 is	 especially	important	for	this	study	since	it	concurrently	analysed	several	forms	of	AET,	for	which	it	is	difficult	to	find	and	simultaneously	exploit	separate	sources	of	quasi-experimental	variation.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 IPWRA	 model	 also	 holds	 an	 advantage	 over	 matching	models,	which	do	not	allow	analyses	of	multiple	treatments	at	the	same	time.	
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					Yet	the	method	also	has	weaknesses	that,	as	in	previous	chapters,	to	some	extent	are	related	 to	 the	 sources	 of	 its	 strengths.	 For	 example,	 despite	 the	 specification	 and	robustness	 tests,	 the	 study	 cannot	 entirely	 rule	 out	 that	 unobservable	 heterogeneity	biases	 the	estimates.	 Some	caution	 regarding	 the	 results	 is	 thus	warranted	and	 future	research	 should	 attempt	 to	 investigate	 the	 effects	 of	 separate	 forms	 of	 AET	 using	different	 types	 of	 quasi-experimental	 variation	 to	 address	 potential	 selection	 on	unobservable	 characteristics.	 At	 a	 more	 general	 level,	 the	 study’s	 findings	 cannot	necessarily	be	extrapolated	beyond	Sweden,	a	country	with	one	of	the	most	knowledge-intensive	 labour	 markets	 in	 the	 world,	 and	 the	 context	 of	 the	 country’s	 economic	recovery	following	the	2008	financial	crisis.	In	addition,	the	paper	is	silent	on	potential	mechanisms	 linking	 AET	 to	 better	 work	 prospects.	 An	 important	 venue	 for	 future	research	would	thus	be	to	analyse	the	impact	of	multiple	types	of	AET	in	other	contexts	as	well	as	explore	mechanisms	that	could	help	explain	any	detected	effects.						Still,	 the	 fifth	 chapter	 also	 has	 important	 policy	 implications.	 Specifically,	 its	 results	indicate	 that	 policies	 stimulating	 take-up	 of	 relevant	 job-related,	 non-formal	 AET	 have	promise	 as	 a	way	 to	 secure	 higher	 employment	 rates	 in	 the	 future,	 at	 least	 on	 labour	markets	 as	 knowledge	 intensive	 as	 the	 one	 in	 Sweden.	 Reforms	 to	 increase	 access	 to	relevant	lifelong	learning	and	training	should	thus	be	considered	and	trialled.		
6.5. Concluding	thoughts		Overall,	the	papers	presented	in	the	thesis	have	together	highlighted	important	trade-offs	between	different	 identification	strategies	 frequently	employed	in	observational	studies	designed	to	obtain	causal	estimates,	as	they	rely	on	different	assumptions	and	are	able	to	answer	different	questions	about	the	effects	of	the	factors	analysed.	They	have	distinctive	strengths	and	weaknesses,	which	must	be	 carefully	 considered	when	drawing	research	and/or	policy	conclusions.	In	this	sense,	apart	from	making	a	significant	contribution	to	the	literature	in	each	of	the	separate	areas	under	investigation,	the	thesis	has	provided	important	case	studies	of	how	different	econometric	techniques,	given	varying	contexts	and	data	availability,	can	be	utilised	to	answer	different	questions	of	relevance	to	social	policy	specifically	–	as	well	as	displayed	how	important	it	is	that	politicians	draw	on	this	type	 of	 research	 more	 often	 than	 is	 currently	 the	 case.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 has	 sought	 to	contribute	to	the	development	of	more	evidence-based	social	policy	worldwide.	
